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SUMMARY 
This study explores the mechanisms of domestication and neutralization of social 
and labor protests in Russia. While economic difficulties and governmental 
policies regularly provoke grassroots discontent and spark conflicts, these do not 
present any political challenge to the regime. Some of the numerous protests 
formally succeed as the authorities satisfy the demands from below. At the same 
time, the success remains localized. Local victories contribute to the sustainability 
of the existing regime and do not enhance the capacity for protest mobilization. 
This dissertation uses the concept of transformism proposed by Antonio Gramsci 
and developed, in a poststructuralist setting, by Ernesto Laclau. Transformism 
refers to processes accommodating protesters’ demands from below within the 
current political and social order. This concept comes along with the distinction 
between democratic and popular politics. Democratic politics unfolds within the 
confines of the existing system of rule, while popular politics is antagonistic 
toward the present order. When trapped in the transformist paradigm, grassroots 
protests generate democratic politics, but avoid confronting the regime and thus 
do not engage in popular politics. This study demonstrates how transformism 
works by studying Russian trade unions. It analyzes the structure of the unions, 
their discourses, and then focuses on concrete cases of unions’ activities in three 
North-Western regions of Russia, as well as the 2018 nation-wide campaign 
against the pension reform. Trade unions are regularly involved in social and labor 
conflicts by spearheading local protests, which often succeed in getting conces-
sions from the employers and the authorities. In the process, however, social and 
labor conflicts are channeled into local agreements between the authorities and 
the workers. Thus, transformism neutralizes protest movements and contributes 
to the survival of the authoritarian regime.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Since 2011, the Russian regime has experienced several crises. In the winter 
2011–2012, massive protests erupted after the fraudulent elections. In 2014, Russia 
faced international sanctions after the annexation of Crimea and intervention in 
Eastern Ukraine. In December 2014, the depreciation of the Russian ruble indicated 
the beginning of a new economic crisis and subsequent stagnation. Although social 
and labor conflicts occur regularly, none of them present a challenge to the overall 
political stability. 
The Russian regime cannot be considered democratic. It has made a long 
journey of authoritarian consolidation (Gel’man 2015). After 2011, Russian 
authoritarianism has become stricter and harsher. Censorship of mass media and 
repressions against opposition have intensified. Nonetheless, there is plenty of 
grassroots activism in Russia. Social movements, civic initiatives, and trade 
unions exist and often succeed. They pose various demands which are sometimes 
satisfied by the authorities. 
The usual juxtaposition of the state and civil society does not explain relations 
between the Russian regime and grassroots movements. These relations are far 
from a unidimensional picture of repressions from above and resistance from 
below. In today’s authoritarian Russia the regime can use remnants of the 
independent civil society to reinforce internal political stability. As highlighted 
by contemporary scholars, the state and civil society are not necessarily hostile 
to each other and can be understood as two parts of an integrated whole (cf. Riley 
and Fernandez 2014). The multitude of approaches to relations between the state 
and civil society helps to avoid an oversimplification of these relations.  
Social and labor protests occur in Russia regularly, but they neither contribute 
to democratization of the country, nor challenge the regime. Although protest 
movements are usually considered as drivers of social and political change (cf. 
Sztompka 1993; Tilly 2004), the case of today’s Russia demonstrates that there 
is a huge gap between grassroots protests and political change. My research 
explores this gap.  
The problem of the protest failure is relevant across the globe. During the past 
few years, the world has seen various protest waves, whose political and social 
impact has been ambivalent at best, and often in contradiction to their declared 
goals. It is not clear how new social movements are related to the so called ‘rise 
of populism’ or how, and whether, they contribute to the sustainability of liberal 
democracies. This demonstrates that relations between protest movements and 
politics should be carefully scrutinized. 
Russia does not exist in isolation from global trends. Despite the pressure from 
the authoritarian state, Russian social movements and trade unions are active and 
relatively independent. Even as they engage in protests, these are not necessarily 
suppressed, but their political impact remains marginal at best. This research 
addresses relations between grassroots activities and the authorities in Russia. 
These relations are multifaceted and are not limited to coercion. The authorities 
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often tolerate protests but use non-coercive means to prevent the emergence of 
political challenges to the regime. In this thesis I focus both on such non-coercive 
methods used by the authorities to hinder political development of protests and 
on the practices of grassroots movements that contribute to this outcome. 
Hence, the research question is what prevents the social and labor protests 
from developing politically and transforms them from a potential challenge to the 
authoritarian regime to a factor of its survival? 
Answers should be sought not only in repressions, propaganda, and economic 
conditions. I argue that there are allied and constructive relations between the 
regime and subaltern classes, which manifest themselves through labor and social 
protests. I focus on subaltern classes because politics and, more broadly, history 
cannot be made without the engagement of popular masses. Even the hypothetical 
situation of a ‘palace coup’, which is sometimes anticipated as a possible scenario 
of regime change in Russia, cannot be envisaged without taking into account 
people’s activities and sentiments. It is even more evident when it comes to the 
relations between the authorities and grassroots initiatives. Importantly, attention 
should be paid to both sides of this alliance, because the regime would not have 
built constructive relations with the subaltern classes if the subaltern classes 
against their will.  
In this thesis, I propose a political perspective on grassroots movements. My 
aim is to avoid sociologism, which deduces politics from social conflicts and 
concentrates on interactions among individuals involved in protest activities. 
When protest goes beyond separate neighborhoods and workplaces, it enters the 
realm of politics, and this is where sociological theories reveal their limitations 
trying to explain political processes through social phenomena. However, my 
approach still prioritizes popular activities as the driving force of politics, while 
the behavior of the elites and state institutions is treated as reactive.  
This research is based on theories advanced by Antonio Gramsci. The central 
concept of the dissertation is transformism. Gramsci employed this term to 
describe relations between subaltern classes and the system of rule. He analyzes 
the history of Italy in the second half of the nineteenth century, when several 
independent states were united into one centralized kingdom. As is well known, 
this process is usually called Risorgimento (the Resurgence). Gramsci noted that 
the unification and economic development of Italy was not accompanied by signi-
ficant social changes. It means that, although the country was united due to massive 
popular movements, the majority of Italian population remained poor and 
suffered from social inequality. The country was unable to overcome the economic 
cleavage between the North and the South. Thus, Gramsci believed that even as 
the popular movements contributed to the unification of Italy, they did not result 
in an improvement of the social and economic conditions of subaltern classes. 
Besides, the kingdom was politically dominated by the upper classes of bour-
geoisie and landowners. Representatives of grassroots movements did not obtain 
political influence. Gramsci used the term trasformismo to define the situation 
when popular movements did not come to power and did not significantly improve 
living standards of subaltern classes but some demands of these movements were 
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partially satisfied by the elites, which secured their dominance in this way. In the 
nineteenth century Italy, the demands for the unification and modernization, which 
were posed by popular movements, were satisfied by the existing elites. At the 
same time, these elites secured their political and economic dominance. Gramsci 
emphasized that capitalist development of Italy did not cause the overthrowing 
of the old elites. He contrasted this to France where revolutions and popular 
uprisings dethroned rulers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
The Gramscian concept of transformism can be used as a tool to improve our 
understanding of the survival of Russian authoritarianism and of the relations 
between the regime and grassroots movements.  
Scholars identify a period of a decline of protest activity in the early 2000s, 
when regional elites lost independence, the ‘systemic’ opposition weakened, the 
space for independent activities shrank, and economic situation stabilized 
(Robertson 2011). Yet this decline was not absolute and eventually gave way to a 
new wave of protest activities. In fact, there have always been successive cycles 
of protest in Russia. 
The mid-2000s was the time of the emergence of new labor unions and social 
movements. The recovery of industries meant there was more demand for workers’ 
representation. In 2005, the government attempted a ‘monetization’ by replacing 
many social benefits with direct payments. This measure was extremely unpopular 
and brought thousands to the streets across the country. Protesters held massive 
rallies and even blocked roads in some cities. These actions were partially suc-
cessful and the ‘monetization’ reform was revised and adjusted. The 2005 protests 
are considered by some scholars as a turning point which indicated the revival of 
Russian social movements (cf. Clement, Demidov and Miriasova 2010). Later, 
numerous other governmental policies faced opposition from below. Grassroots 
initiatives tried to work together and established various coordinating organiza-
tions. It would not be an exaggeration to say that social movements, trade unions, 
and civic initiatives experienced a certain renaissance between 2005 and 2011. 
The 2011–2012 protests were a turning point in many ways. They did not 
fulfill the expectations of those who were waiting for a democratization from 
below. However, it would be a mistake to argue that it was a drastic tightening of 
authoritarian policies which stifled these movements. The regime increased its 
harshness gradually, while adapting to possible challenges from below. The 
gradual evolution of the regime after the failure of the 2011–2012 protests was 
accompanied by a relative stagnation in the development of social movements 
and trade unions. Tomila Lankina (2014) believes that post-protest repressions 
forced citizens to alter their protest strategies. However, Graeme Robertson (2013) 
notes that the repertoire of actions had formed in the second half of the 2000s and 
did not change in the aftermath of the 2011–2012 protests. He distinguishes 
between ‘symbolic actions’ displaying dissent to ‘influence broader publics and 
political decision makers’ and ‘direct actions’ ‘inflicting direct economic harm to 
press employers and/or the state’. Robertson argues that symbolic actions prevail 
over direct actions in the Russian protest since the late 2000s, while in the 1990s 
and the beginning of the 2000s the situation was the opposite. Thus, social and 
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labor movements have not changed their strategies and methods after 2011. The 
2011–2012 protests, however, demonstrated that the regime was more resilient 
than one might have expected.  
 After 2014, economic difficulties led to a growth in the number of labor and 
social protests (Crowley and Olimpieva 2016). Mikhail Dmitriev suggests that 
‘economic discontent can also support other types of protest demands… This, in 
turn, could facilitate the linking up of economic protesters in the provinces with 
urban political protesters in the capital into a more concerted political movement’ 
(Dmitriev 2015: 240). Although economic and social discontent still fuels numer-
ous protests, ‘a more concerted political movement’ has not emerged to this day.  
In accordance with the Gramscian notion of transformism, this research argues 
that protest activities may contribute to the survival of the regime. Protest groups 
succeed in solving local problems but avoid aggravating the confrontation with the 
authorities. Social and labor conflicts result in mutual concessions between the 
regime and protest groups. These concessions imply deliberation: protest groups 
channel mass discontent into discussions with the authorities. Deliberation is 
instrumental in solving local problems, it deescalates conflicts and facilitates 
cooperation between the regime and protest groups. The responsiveness of the 
authorities allows social movements and trade unions to achieve particular goals 
but prevents potential political development, which presupposes an escalation of 
the conflict. Protest groups limit their demands to parochial issues and trade more 
radical agenda for the solutions to local problems. Thus, while some isolated 
demands are satisfied by the regime, political challenges are also prevented. 
Accumulation of local and isolated victories does not lead to any development of 
protest movements.  
Mass discontent can be channeled into deliberation by various means. I focus 
on Russian trade unions. They bring together millions of employees and exercise 
various functions. Trade unions often act as social movements and address a wide 
range of issues besides industrial relations. As the government raised the age of 
retirement in 2018, trade unions led protests against the pension reform. However, 
they usually cooperate with the authorities and serve as an example of protest 
groups which channel mass discontent into deliberation. Of course, trade unions 
are not supposed to be a ‘revolutionary force’ threatening the regime. Exposing 
and escalating social contradictions by any means is not their primary task. At the 
same time, it is hard to imagine a scenario of a politically successful mass 
movement for democracy that would not rely on workers’ support. Besides, other 
movements, including the so-called ‘non-systemic’ political opposition, which do 
aim at regime change, also fail to challenge the existing order. These failures are 
to a large extent due to the transformistic processes which mollify multiple 
conflicts and protests. Trade unions and their activities are not the only display of 
transformistic mechanisms in Russia, but the most visible one.  
Relations between trade unions and the state can be ambiguous. Analyzing 
labor movements in Latin America, Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier note 
that, in general, the state tries to control labor movements while simultaneously 
seeking their support, while trade unions hesitate between cooperation with the 
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state and resisting this cooperation (Collier and Collier 2002: 48). In Russian 
history, trade unions have played a political role several times. In the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, miners’ strikes contributed to the collapse of the USSR. In the 
second half of the 1990s, numerous labor protests influenced the overall political 
situation in Russia. Today, trade unions are involved in regular social and labor 
conflicts. Since politics can emerge anywhere, local conflicts and processes 
preventing their escalation deserve a detailed examination. Recent protests in 
Belarus implicitly confirmed the significance of labor movements in post-Soviet 
countries. The protesters there counted on potential strikes, which could cause 
additional difficulties for the existing regime. However, the absence of large-scale 
strikes is among the reasons why the regime so far has survived (Kuznetsov 2020; 
Otkrytoie Obrashcheniie 2020).  
I apply the Gramscian concept of transformism in a broader theoretical frame-
work, which mostly builds on the work of Ernesto Laclau. In this research, 
Gramsci’s and Laclau’s theories are combined with approaches of other authors, 
mostly Alain Badiou and Sylvain Lazarus. The main advantage of these theories 
is their focus on popular activities. It was expressed in Lazarus’s formula ‘people 
think’ (Lazarus 2015), which means that while dealing with politics, one needs to 
focus on people over state policies and individual interactions. ‘People’ here is 
used in the generic sense, as referring to common humanity. This appeal to people 
as such indicates that politics is open for everyone and not only for elites. More-
over, people’s politics is understood as an independent sphere of activities, which 
is irreducible to economic or social issues. Badiou, who has been influenced by 
Lazarus, also elaborates an approach presupposing the autonomy of politics from 
the social and focusing on problems of political subjectivity. 
Thus, the dissertation explores processes preventing political development of 
social and labor protests and contributing to the survival of the regime. The 
theoretical framework of this research can provide a fresh perspective on the 
political implications of protests in Russia.  
 
The dissertation is organized as follows.  
The first chapter provides an overview of conventional approaches used to 
describe relations between grassroots movements and ruling regimes. It demon-
strates the shortcomings of generally accepted theories. The literature on grass-
roots protests is divided in two parts. The first part comes from the field of political 
science. The second part belongs to the sociology of social movements. I argue 
that while the former pays more attention to the elites and considers the subaltern 
classes as passive, the latter cannot estimate how social conflicts affect politics.  
The second chapter explains the main terms of the dissertation, its theoretical 
background, and methodology. This part of the dissertation is based mostly on 
Ernesto Laclau’s works, which are critically revisited from the viewpoint of Alain 
Badiou’s and Sylvain Lazarus’s ideas. I argue that a combination and critical 
examination of their theories provide a new tool for the analysis of the political 
implications of social and labor protests.  
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The third chapter addresses Russian discourses on subaltern classes, trade 
unions, and grassroots activities. I analyze the official discourse and discourses of 
the largest pro-governmental mass media. This analysis demonstrates that subaltern 
classes are portrayed as the regime’s supporters. Grassroots activities are allowed 
within certain limitations and trade unions are considered as legitimate represent-
atives of subaltern classes.  
The fourth chapter covers the system of Russian trade unions, their organiza-
tions, and discourses. As previously mentioned, trade unions often channel mass 
discontent into deliberations and cooperation with the authorities and, hence, 
enable transformism. This chapter analyzes protest activities and discourses of 
main Russian labor unions.  
The fifth and sixth chapters include case studies which describes examples of 
transformism. There, I analyze protest activities of trade unions in three Russian 
regions and the 2018 campaign against the pension reform.   
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CHAPTER 1.  
Conventional approaches to relations between 
subaltern classes and the regime in Russia 
This chapter reviews theoretical approaches to the study of grassroots activities 
and the states’ response to such activities. Scholars often try to assess political 
consequences of protest movements. In the case of Russia, despite the increasing 
frequency of social and labor conflicts, their political effect seems insignificant. 
Scholars propose various ways to theorize relations between grassroots move-
ments and the regime. The argument of this chapter is that conventional approaches 
have several shortcomings.  
The first section of this chapter covers theories addressing mainly the regime’s 
policies. The focus on the regime’s policies presupposes that elites are understood 
as an active part in the relations between the regime and grassroots movements. 
According to these theories, the regime uses propaganda and effectively manages 
people’s activities through intimidation, repressions, and pay-offs. Independent 
grassroots movements are almost impossible within this framework of analysis. 
On the other hand, approaches embraced by the sociology of social move-
ments admit that people can influence politics and be active. However, I argue 
that the sociology of social movements inaccurately assesses political effects of 
grassroots activities. Within this framework, protest movements are successful if 
they contribute to the development of deliberative procedures. In the case of 
Russia, successes of organized and independent protest initiatives and the improve-
ment of deliberative procedures have the effect of blocking potential political 
development. These phenomena are not properly addressed within the sociology 
of social movements.  
This chapter shows that the understanding of the relations between the regime 
and grassroots movements, and of the political consequences of these movements 
requires a critique of conventional approaches.  
 
 
Propaganda, patronalism, and clientelism 
The sustainability of Russian authoritarianism, its support from below, and the 
absence of significant protest movements have been extensively described in the 
scholarly literature, especially in the works on regime transitions. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the inconsistent attempts at democratization, 
Russia found itself under a new authoritarian regime, which still seems resilient 
today. The development of Russian authoritarianism and the perturbations of 
institutions are in the focus of approaches overviewed in this section. Since my 
research revolves around the relations between the regime and subaltern classes, 
I focus on those scholars who describe these relations and explain why protests 
from below do not challenge Russian authoritarianism. 
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As Adam Przeworski noted, ‘[a]uthoritarian equilibrium rests mainly on lies, 
fear, or economic prosperity’ (Przeworski 1991: 58). This famous quotation has 
been cited and applied to the Russian situation numerous times. In other words, 
according to Przeworski, an authoritarian regime has three pillars: coercion, 
economic growth, and manipulation of information. Under the present conditions 
in Russia the economic pillar seems to be unreliable. Although the repressiveness 
of the regime has increased since 2011, massive repressions are generally absent 
as well (Gel’man 2015). Therefore, ‘lies’ or ‘manipulation of information’ remains 
one of the main pillars of the regime. However, what does ‘manipulation of infor-
mation’ mean? Guriev and Treisman (2015) reduce this to propaganda, censor-
ship, and the bribing of journalists. They connect efficiency of such practices with 
economic performance: ‘[I]ncompetent leaders can survive by manipulating the 
information so long as economic shocks are not too large’ (Guriev and Treisman 
2015). The popular metaphor describing Russian political processes as a battle 
between ‘the TV set (the propaganda) and ‘the refrigerator’ (the deteriorating 
economic conditions). This metaphor presupposes that an economic crisis will 
undermine political stability, which rests on the propaganda. Yet economic dif-
ficulties seem to be less consequential for authoritarian regimes than for democratic 
ones. For instance, Grigorii Golosov (2016) proves that poor economic per-
formance does not affect voter volatility in authoritarian regimes. Analyzing the 
role of the Russian television, Marlen Laruelle notes that state owned TV chan-
nels participate in maintaining national identity within the traditional framework 
and contribute to the preemption of a possible mobilization against the regime 
(Laruelle 2014). Sarah Oates shifts the focus from television to the Internet and 
demonstrates how Russian propaganda can also cope with challenges from the 
new media (Oates 2016). 
Nonetheless, it would be an oversimplification to reduce the sustainability of 
the Russian regime to sophisticated propaganda: none of the previously cited 
scholars argue that only propaganda matters. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way 
(2010) note that United Russia became the dominant party without any cohesive 
ideology typically needed as a base for propaganda. Hence, it is important to 
understand what embodies values proliferated by the propaganda and what is an 
organizational base for the activities desired by the regime. In other words, 
persuasion is not enough. There is a difference, for example, between support for 
the regime and the actual participation in voting for the incumbent. This is 
because under authoritarian regimes, which normally do not presuppose high 
level of grassroots political engagement, participation requires organizations.  
Since propaganda alone does not make people act in a certain way, scholars 
pay attention to organizational issues and focus on political machines, clientelism, 
and patronalism. Political machines as such are a well-studied phenomenon 
which is rooted in the history of different (not necessarily authoritarian) regimes. 
Clientelism refers to ‘asymmetric but mutually beneficial relationships of power 
and exchange… It entails votes and support given in exchange for jobs and other 
benefits’ (Roniger 2004: 353–354). As Susan Stokes (2005) argues, clientelism 
and political machines, which are defined as clientelistic parties, flourish in 
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numerous countries and under varying conditions. Well known examples are the 
Tweed machine in New York in the nineteenth century and the Dowson machine 
in Chicago in the twentieth century, as well as similar phenomena in Mexico, in 
Argentina under Peron, and in Italy after the Second World War, when Christian 
Democratic Party operated as a clientelistic party in the South.  
Along with clientelism comes patronalism, defined as ‘a social equilibrium in 
which individuals organize their political and economic pursuits primarily around 
the personalized exchange of concrete rewards and punishments’ (Hale 2015: 20). 
Both terms refer to interrelated phenomena and describe the hierarchical infra-
structure of mutually beneficial exchange among elite groups and between elites 
and subaltern classes. The focus on the role of elites in this process suggests that 
subaltern classes do not play any independent role and it is only elites which of 
interest to scholars. Analyzing the case of Russia, Henry Hale notes that the 
stability of the Russian regime relies on an effective patronal network which was 
developed in the 2000s and subsumed previously independent competing net-
works. This network prevents the emergence of independent political actors. 
Governors and regional legislatures lost the autonomy they enjoyed in the 1990s. 
The opposition can no longer find independent sponsors (Hale 2015). Therefore, 
Hale analyzes mainly strategies and activities of presidents and top-ranking 
officials. He mentions the necessity of public support and the means used by the 
regime to obtain this support. The popular backing of the regime, however, is 
considered to be dependent on the elites’ policies.  
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, in their research on nondemocratic regimes, also 
focused on methods used by elites to mobilize subaltern classes. Although some 
nondemocratic regimes exist without ‘extensive and intensive mobilizations’, 
they mobilize subaltern classes occasionally and use ‘coercive or clientelistic 
methods’ (Linz and Stepan 1996: 44–45). Thus, authoritarian regimes use 
intimidation, repressions, and payoffs toward subaltern classes while the latter 
remain passive. 
Clientelism, patronalism, and the functioning of political machines are studied 
on the Russian ground as well. These studies and the research on propaganda 
supplement each other and claim to provide a holistic picture of the relations 
between the Russian regime and the people.  
Thus, Vladimir Gel’man describes what brought victory to United Russia in 
the 2011 parliamentary elections: ‘unhesitating use of the state apparatus to 
maximize the “United Russia” vote by all available means (ranging from work-
place mobilization to shameless fraud); genuine support of the status quo regime 
on the part of peripheral voters; the apathy and nonparticipation of “advanced” 
voters…’ (Gel’man 2015: 117). Here, two aspects are important: workplace 
mobilization and the genuine support of peripheral voters. They reflect the 
clientelistic relations and effects of propaganda respectively. Gel’man describes 
subaltern classes as supportive of the regime. According to him, they are either 
passively subjected to mobilization at workplaces, or exposed to propaganda. In 
both cases subaltern classes are considered to be passive. This approach follows 
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Seymour Lipset’s assumption on lower classes’ commitments to authoritarianism 
(Lipset 1960).  
Grigorii Golosov describes the main social groups which are usually included 
in the clientelistic system: ‘First of all, this concerns the pensioners… The 
principal brokers in the clientelistic exchange are the state organs, mostly the 
local departments of social protection’ (Golosov 2013: 476). Public sector 
employees including doctors and teachers can also be easily influenced by 
political machines because some of them ‘have extremely low pay and are heavily 
dependent on the directors of the schools and clinics where they work’ (Golosov 
2013: 477). Here, Golosov focuses on the material conditions and organizations 
and puts propaganda aside. He supposes that pensioners may genuinely support 
the regime but the activities of state organs which facilitate voting for incumbents 
are more important.  
Another social group which is often mobilized to vote are workers of state 
owned enterprises: ‘Firms that are vulnerable to state pressure, such as those with 
immobile assets and those that are owned by or sell their output to the state, are 
more likely to mobilize votes for the regime because autocrats find it easy to 
induce the leadership of these firms to mobilize their workers’ (Frye, Reuter, and 
Szakonyi 2014: 223). The leading role of the state in the Russian economy 
enables a large-scale and usually successful workplace mobilization of voters.  
In this framework of analysis, scholars may be suspicious of grassroots activities, 
if they even emerge, because protests can be inspired and instrumentalized by 
elites to have leverage over intra-elite bargaining. For example, during the 1990s, 
governors provoked labor strikes to press the Kremlin for additional funding 
(Robertson 2007). Graeme Robertson and Ora John Reuter note that the regime 
takes protests under control by means of personal cooptation of protest leaders in 
regional legislatures and makes protests elite-led (Reuter and Robertson 2015). 
Thus, even when subaltern classes protest, these protests are organized or led by 
the elites. In this approach, only elites have any active role. This idea was bluntly 
expressed in a collective monograph Making and Breaking Democratic Transitions: 
The Comparative Politics of Russia’s Regions (Gel’man et al. 2003). The authors 
argue that in Russia ‘agents of mass politics, such as popular movements, labor 
unions, or political parties, with rare exceptions, either could not become actors … 
or became instruments in the struggle for political dominance among elite actors’ 
(Gel’man et al. 2003: 14). This assumption confirms the theoretical framework 
in which ‘only elite agents are regarded as actors, while the masses are considered 
to be a resourse’ (Gel’man et al. 2003: 15). 
Samuel Greene and Graeme Robertson (2019) admit that the Russian regime 
does not rely only on coercion but also enjoys popular support. Although they 
address people’s sentiments in their book Putin v. the People, Greene and 
Robertson focus mainly on the regime’s policies. According to this book, the so 
called ‘simple people’ consider the current rule as inevitable and do not see any 
alternative. This is the starting point of Greene’s and Robertson’s analysis. How-
ever, they quickly shift to the regime’s actions, including propaganda, mobili-
zation of supporters, repressions, and the intervention in Ukraine. The people, 
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which were mentioned in the book title, are treated as an object of the elites’ 
policies. Although the authors mention the non-systemic opposition and its 
protest actions, ‘simple people’ are not deeply involved in these actions.  
The studies, addressed here, shed light on an important part of the relations 
between the regime and subaltern classes. Various social groups support the present 
regime either because they are paid or coopted or because they are afraid of being 
punished for any potential disobedience or the lack of loyalty. However, this 
approach has at least two disadvantages. First of all, it addresses and explains 
only a limited set of phenomena such as voters’ mobilization and participation in 
pro-Kremlin events. These practices are examples of coercive or nearly coercive 
methods. While the regime uses its centralized state apparatus and administrative 
capacities to influence public sector employees, these frequent practices of pro-
regime mobilization do not reflect the full spectrum of the relationship between 
subaltern classes and the regime. What scholars usually miss are the mechanisms 
which do not belong directly to the state apparatus but involve day-to-day 
management of protest activities. This management does not require payments, 
manipulations or threats.  
Secondly, political scholars pay attention mainly to the functioning of the elites 
and the state apparatus while ignoring grassroots activities. Studies of political 
participation may constitute an exception as they address not only state policies 
but also citizens’ activities. Political participation is defined as ‘legal activities by 
private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of 
governmental personnel and/or the actions they take (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978: 
46). At the same time, students of political participation focus on activities ‘within 
the system’ and ‘regular and legal ways of influencing politics’ (Verba, Nie and 
Kim 1978: 48). Also, within this approach, political participation is grounded in 
culture. In other words, politics is not considered as an autonomous realm. As 
previously mentioned, the autonomy of politics is of crucial importance for my 
theoretical approach. 
Analyzing political participation in Russia, Danielle Lussier explains patterns 
of Russian citizens’ activities by referring to the political closeness of the regime 
and the absence of ‘genuine’ liberalization (Lussier 2016: 275). Thus, discussions 
on citizens’ activities are still attached to state institutions, political culture, and 
regime policies, which provide a framework for grassroots activities.  
In the case of Russia, subaltern classes are inaccurately considered to be passive 
and supportive of the regime, which is not completely true. ‘Peripheral voters’ 
sometimes do not vote for incumbents. For example, compared to the Russian 
population as a whole, a smaller share of workers in the mining sector and 
metallurgy tend to vote for United Russia and Vladimir Putin (Miryasova 2014). 
Therefore, it would be a mistake to say that subaltern classes and especially 
employees of state owned or state dependent units are, by definition, supporters 
of the regime. Subaltern classes are not absolutely passive. Russian regions 
regularly experience independent social and labor protests that often are not sup-
pressed by the state. In short, the relations between the regime and the subaltern 
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classes are more complex than the one-sided picture that emerges when focusing 
on manipulation, intimidation, and payoffs.  
Even though grassroots activities are often missed in the framework of com-
parative politics, they are in focus of the sociology of social movements which I 
address in the next section. 
 
 
Social movements and the public sphere 
Relations between the state and grassroots activities, and the potential evolution 
of regimes under the pressure from below, are examined within the frameworks 
of two complementary fields: the sociology of social movements and studies of 
deliberative democracy. In this section I also discuss the philosophical ground 
associating these two very different fields of research. One main problem of the 
sociology of social movements and studies of deliberative democracy is the 
prioritization of public debates in politics. This prioritization is rooted in the 
philosophical grounding of the two subdisciplines and hinders a more accurate 
understanding of the potential for the political development of grassroots activities.  
It could be argued that the foundation of both frameworks is Kantian political 
philosophy, as it was retrospectively interpreted by Hannah Arendt (1992). The 
central position in this philosophy is occupied by the world-spectator. Spectators 
constitute the public and this makes them central to every event. In order for an 
event to become significant, spectators should perceive, contemplate, and reflect 
on it. Arendt noted: ‘The public realm is constituted by the critics and spectators, 
not by the actors or the makers… Or, to put it in another way, still in Kantian 
terms: the very originality of the artist … depends on his making himself under-
stood by those who are not artists (or actors)’ (Arendt 1992: 63). In the well-known 
example of Immanuel Kant’s attitude toward the French revolution, the spectators’ 
privileged position allowed them to judge what was right and what was wrong 
with this revolution: ‘[W]hat counted in the French revolution, what made it a 
world-historical event … were not the deeds and misdeeds of the actors but the 
opinions, the enthusiastic approbation, of spectators, of persons who themselves 
were not involved’ (Arendt 1992: 65). Arendt ultimately concluded that, in Kantian 
philosophy, ‘the spectator had precedence’ over the actor (Arendt 1992: 65). 
Arendt did not equate contemplation with action but insisted on the importance 
of public actions which make people free; contemplation, however, takes priority 
and enables debates because the possibility to contemplate and to be a spectator 
is a precondition for the existence of the public sphere and, hence, of debate. In 
Arendt’s philosophy, the latter becomes overwhelmingly significant because, as 
she argued, ‘debate constitutes the very essence of political life’ (Arendt 2006: 236). 
Then Arendt contrasts politics with truth, because, according to her, ‘truth 
strikes at the very roots of all politics’ (Arendt 2006: 228). Hence, politics relies 
on opinion, which is in opposition to truth. For Arendt, truth brings about a threat 
of uniformity that can eliminate plurality. Plurality, on the contrary, is necessary 
for political activities because Arendtian political actions require plural and 
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diverse spectators who can judge these actions (Arendt 1998, Passerin D’Entreves 
1989). Indeed, public debates need a plurality of opinions. This approach 
prioritizes specific types of activities, requiring deliberation and mechanisms for 
communication among different actors. 
Therefore, in this Kantian-Arendtian construction, debates are the foundation 
of politics. This construction does not disqualify actions as such, rather it puts all 
activities within specific frameworks presupposing that political development 
requires plurality of groups involved in debates. Then, it suggests that activities 
are analyzed and estimated in terms of the quality of discussions and public spheres. 
However, this approach ignores other types of political actions, which do not 
presuppose plurality and deliberation.  
Alongside Arendt, Jürgen Habermas builds his theory around the concept of 
the public sphere. In his Transformation of the Public Sphere, he studies the 
formation and function of the modern bourgeois society and the way in which 
private people came together to debate publicly (Habermas 1991: 27). These public 
debates of private people expressing their opinions on turn affect the political 
realm. Habermas upholds the significance of deliberation and individual judgment 
for politics. In this sense Habermas is even more radical than Arendt, as he does 
not distinguish debates from actions. This framework is limited in the way it 
requires mainly the development of deliberative mechanisms, which should 
involve as many participants as possible. 
Between theories of Arendt and Habermas and the sociology of social move-
ments still exists a missing link. Nancy Fraser bridges this gap between political 
philosophy and empirical research. She notes that Habermas’s concept of the 
public sphere contributes to theorizing social movements (Fraser 1990); Fraser 
tries to radicalize his theory by demonstrating how public spheres and hence, 
deliberative processes, can be expanded. While Habermas focused on the bour-
geois public spheres, she advanced the notion of ‘counterpublics’ (Fraser 1990). 
The bourgeois public sphere is exclusive, unequal, and largely inaccessible for 
numerous social groups, including subaltern classes. According to Fraser, this 
means that multiple publics and counterpublics should exist, ensuring the parti-
cipation of all groups. From a normative point of view, she sees the implementa-
tion of social justice as a ‘participatory parity’ relying on the ‘democratic pro-
cesses of public debate’ and repudiating ‘monological’ decisions (Fraser 2003: 
43). Therefore, social movements and theories of the public sphere are intercon-
nected. In the rest of this section, I focus on the way in which the sociology of 
social movements studies the relationship between grassroots activities and 
politics, and further discuss problems caused by the prioritization of deliberation. 
Social movements can be defined as ‘collective challenges, based on common 
purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, 
and authorities’ (Tarrow 2011: 9). Charles Tilly considers social movements as ‘a 
major vehicle for ordinary people’s participation in public politics’ (Tilly 2004: 
3). While social movements differ from political parties and groups of interests, 
they are related to labor unions and civic initiatives. Tilly (2004) reminds us that 
the history of social movements began in the nineteenth century Unided Kingdom 
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with the first workers’ organizations; the decline of the labor movement in the 
second half of the twentieth century, however, brought other movements to the 
forefront of academic interest. Mario Diani (1992) emphasizes that, by definition, 
social movements act ‘largely outside the institutional sphere and the routine 
procedures of social life’ (Diani 1992: 7). The fact that trade unions are more 
institutionalized and routinized in comparison to social movements does not 
mean that unions cannot act outside routine procedures. In some contexts, trade 
unions use ‘noninstitutional forms of protest, such as unsanctional strikes, rallies, 
and street actions’ and ‘resemble a social movement’ (Bizyukov and Olimpieva 
2014: 65). While trade unions are not necessarily part of social movements, they 
can circumstantially act as social movements and be considered through the 
prism of the literature on social movements. Besides, acting in a manner of social 
movements and addressing issues beyond industrial relations are among strategies 
used by trade unions to recover and secure their influence (Jansson and Uba 2019).  
According to Sydney Tarrow (2011), social movements generate so called 
‘contentious politics’ which is different from representative politics because 
contentious politics involve ‘ordinary people’ confronting elites and authorities. 
Tarrow argues that if contention ‘spreads across an entire society’ and is 
‘organized around opposed or multiple sovereignties, the outcome is a revolution’ 
(Tarrow 2011: 16). Elaborating on the term ‘contentious politics’, Graeme 
Robertson (2013) notes that this concept includes also social and labor protests, 
civil wars, rebellions, riots, and so on. Scholars see a continuum between local 
protests and revolutions. Thus, social movements have a political potential and 
can evolve into significant challenges to existing regimes. 
 ‘Contentious politics’ is considered as a continuum from moderate rallies to 
revolutions. Analyzing contentious politics, Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow 
argue that it ‘involves interactions in which actors make claims bearing on some-
one else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests, 
or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, 
or third parties’ (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 4). Here, governments are a necessary 
element of contentious politics. Defining political actors, Tilly and Tarrow also 
mention governments. Political actors are defined as ‘recognizable sets of people 
who carry on collective action in which governments are directly or indirectly 
involved, making and/or receiving contentious claims’ (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 
74). In other words, this approach attaches politics to governments, social conflicts, 
and social movements. This approach does not treat politics as an autonomous 
realm.  
Social movements promote social changes and can espouse democratization 
(Sztompka 1993, Tilly 2004). The specific perspectives of scholars analyzing 
social movements also influence their approach to politics, democracy, and demo-
cratization. In general, they emphasize the importance of citizens’ participation, 
deliberative mechanisms, and quality of the public sphere. According to Tilly, 
‘democratization means the formation of a regime featuring relatively broad, equal, 
categorical, binding consultation and protection’ (Tilly 2004: 128). Hence, the 
main contribution of social movements to the formation of democratic regimes is 
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consultation and deliberation, including the promotion of dialogue with the 
authorities.  
Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani (2006) note that successful social move-
ments change public policy by increasing citizens’ involvement in legislature 
procedures and other processes of decision making. One example of success are 
the social movements in Porto Alegre (Brazil), where activists achieved parti-
cipatory budgeting ensuring their participation in the adoption of the local budget 
and, hence, in the decision making. Nina Eliasoph emphasizes that civic practices 
create ‘contexts for political conversation in the potential public spheres’ (Eliasoph 
1996: 263), which is a precondition for democracy. Social movements are capable 
of creating a public sphere, whose function is ‘to make society hear their messages’ 
(Melucci 1985: 815). 
In short, social movements contribute to the improvement of the public sphere 
and, therefore, promote democratization which presupposes the development of 
deliberative procedures.  
Deliberation is important because, according to many authors, it is a precon-
dition and a significant part of democracy (cf. Mansbridge et al. 2012). Even 
though deliberative systems may, in principle, exist under non-democratic regimes, 
they typically serve as a tool or driver of potential democratization (Parkinson 
2012).  
Students of deliberative democracy mention the role of Habermas in ‘reviving 
the idea of deliberation in our time, and giving it a more thoroughly democratic 
foundation’ (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 9). The ‘marriage’ of democracy and 
deliberation, concluded in Habermasian thought, meant that democracy needs to 
include as many citizens as possible. Deliberation, according to some scholars, 
assists in avoiding extremism and enables citizen paricipation in decision-making 
regardless of the disctribution of political, social, and economic power (Rostboll 
2008; Shapiro 1999).  
At the same time, social movements might be presented as a threat to deliber-
ative processes. Some scholars argue that grassroots direct actions espouse con-
frontation rather than deliberation (Young 2001). However, confrontation also 
can result in peaceful debates and finally contribute to deliberative processes. 
Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright (2003) claim that grassroots movements 
involve citizens into decision-making procedures, balance other groups of influ-
ence, and, hence, deepen democracy. In other words, confrontation provoked by 
protesters adjusts and balances, rather than undermines, deliberative processes. 
Donatella della Porta, among others, notes that contemporary liberal demo-
cracies loose their legitimacy (Della Porta 2013; Della Porta 2019). Inequality, 
lack of trust in political parties and state institutions, and the erosion of nation 
states challenge democracy. These challenges are fuelled by right-wing populists. 
Della Porta argues that democracy can be saved by social movements promoting 
participatory and deliberative models of democracy. 
Della Porta also seeks to address concerns that social movements may poten-
tially threaten already established institutions and damage deliberative values. 
She notes that ‘what we need to restore democratic legitimacy and efficacy … is 
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more participation by the citizens. Not only is participation essential to restoring 
trust in institutions, it is also a way to develop good citizenship’ (Della Porta 2019: 
613). According to her, social movements bridge participatory and deliberative 
forms of democracy and contribute to peaceful solutions of conflicts through 
dialogue (Della Porta 2013). In fact, social movements stabilize existing regimes. 
Della Porta mostly focuses on democratic regimes, while also noting that social 
movements promote transition to democracy. In the current dissertation, however, 
I demonstrate that grassroots protests can play a stabilizing role not only in demo-
cratic, but in authoritarian regimes as well. 
At the same time, Della Porta mentions that the ‘institutionalization and 
moderation of social movements in the 1980s and 1990s and their integration into 
increasingly institutionalized forms of politics’ led to their isolation in ‘the insti-
tutional sphere of politics’ (Della Porta 2013: 165). Since non-institutionalized 
movements consequently obtain an image of violent protesters, they face harsh 
response on the part of the state. However, Della Porta does not explicitly criticize 
the institutionalization of movements and does not analyze what leads protesters 
to institutionalization. Christian Davenport (2015) summarizes factors which lead 
to a decline and demobilization of social movements. Besides external factors, 
which include resource deprivation, repressions, and propaganda, and internal 
factors, namely burnout, factionalization, loss of members, lost commitment, and 
rigidity, he points out so called ‘positive demobilization’. This term refers to a 
situation where a social movement has succeeded and no longer needs to engage 
in protest. A social movement organization might decide that its goals have been 
achieved and ‘the claims-making effort has been accommodated and/or incor-
porated into the existing political economy’ (Davenport 2015: 22). Thus, accom-
modation and incorporation are considered as a sign of success.  
One of the main problems faced by a deliberative democracy is the main-
tenance of participation. As previously mentioned, participation requires developed 
grassroots initiatives which enable the inclusion of various social groups. In this 
way, social movements and deliberative democracy are interconnected and justify 
each other. Social movements involve citizens in public politics and make 
deliberation possible and meaningful, while deliberative procedures provide tools 
enabling social movements to achieve specific goals. Building on these relations 
among grassroots movements, deliberation, and democracy, I will now address 
the application of the reviewed theoretical approaches to the Russian case.  
The development of social movements and trade unions and their contribution 
to politics in Russia were summarized in a detailed study by Karine Clement, 
Olga Miryasova, and Andrey Demidov, From Philistines to Activists. This book, 
published in 2010, predicted that ‘step by step, alongside the growth of civic 
initiatives horizontal ties among local and thematic movements are getting stronger’ 
(Clement, Demidov and Miryasova 2010: 647). Here, the strengthening of social 
movements meant enhanced cooperation of different protest groups.  
The authors thought that this development could have led to ‘deep social 
changes’ and to ‘undermining of the existing relations of domination and sub-
ordination’ (Clement, Demidov and Miryasova 2010: 658). This would have been 
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possible because the participants of social movements accumulated new 
experience and recognized their confrontation with the ‘power vertical’. The book 
argued that the recognition of this confrontation and the engagement with the 
problems of the society as a whole was equivalent to the ‘politicization’ of social 
movements. The authors believed that a gradual development of protest initiatives 
could ‘teach’ protesters how to create a political subject.  
The book represented a perspective on relations among social movements, 
trade unions, the state, and politics, in which Russian social movements and trade 
unions were expected to turn into a political challenge to the regime. This idea 
was reaffirmed in a later study Urban Movements in Russia in 2009–2012: On 
the Way to the Political (Clement et al. 2013), where the authors conclude that 
political movements are a logical continuation of social protests. 
Graeme Robertson expected that protests from below could ‘help break down 
elite consensus and monopolistic consensus’ and improve ‘the quality of political 
participation in the future’ (Robertson 2010: 212–213). He and Samuel Greene 
wrote about numerous labor protests and strikes provoked by the 2008–2009 
economic crisis: ‘Politically, too, the strike wave has potentially threatening 
implications for the current regime’ (Greene and Robertson 2010: 91). They 
assumed that examples of successful labor and social movements might inspire 
other people who were ‘dissatisfied with the narrow politics of Putin’s Russia’ 
(Greene and Robertson 2010: 91). Stephen Crowley and Irina Olimpieva (2018) 
mention that although labor and social protests do not threaten the regime at the 
moment, these protests can become politicized.  
However, these predictions did not materialize; no political project has 
emerged out of social movements or trade unions in Russia. I argue that this 
prognostic failure reflects certain key problems in the sociological approaches in 
general. They suppose that successful social movements are agents of ‘deep social 
changes’, whereas in fact their successes often strengthen authoritarian regimes. 
For example, Lorenzo Bosi claims that democratization is galvanized by the 
incorporation of social movements into the ‘formal political terrain’ and their 
institutionalization (Bosi 2016: 340). Hence, the main contribution of social 
movements to the formation of democratic regimes is consultation and delibera-
tion, including the enhancement of the dialogue with the authorities. In the 
existing literature, the absence of significant social change is often connected to 
a lack of the institutionalization of protest movements (for example: Klimov 2014).  
Samuel Greene, who highlights ‘the amorphous nature of the [Russian] state’, 
explains the difficulties of social movements by referring to the deinstitutional-
ization of the state, which atomizes ‘the experiences of the citizens’ (Greene 2014: 
2018). Robertson (2011) argues that the lack of independent organizations hinders 
the development of social and labor protests, while trade unions are integrated in 
the ‘power vertical’. The underdevelopment of the public sphere in Russia and 
the absence of a ‘common program’, which could unite various protests, are also 
mentioned among reasons preventing politicization of social movements (Clement 
et al. 2013).  
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Clement (2015) also argues that politicization of social movements is limited 
due to ‘the narrowness of a politics that boils down to either supporting or 
opposing Putin, leaving little room for a political understanding of the problems 
of daily life’. According to Clement, ’state populism’ is to blame for the lack of the 
political development of protests.  
From my perspective, the enhancement of dialogue between protest groups 
and the authorities often defuses the political potential of protests. This problem 
is rarely addressed in the literature on social movements and trade unions. 
Stephen Crowley and Irina Olimpieva (2017) point out that although labor and 
social protests do not threaten the regime at the moment they occur, these protests 
can become politicized. Karine Clement and Anna Zhelnina (2019) note that 
protesters often address political issues at the local level but abstain from so called 
‘high politics’ (Clement and Zhelnina 2019). Social movements studies, however, 
do not have tools to distinguish between different types of politics and cannot 
answer the question why protesters do not transit from ‘low politics’ to ‘high 
politics’. 
Within the sociology of social movements, politics is inextricably linked to 
participation in public debates. Then, it is not clear why even successful social 
movements, which address political issues and expand the public sphere, do not 
provoke any democratization in Russia. In other words, the sociology of social 
movements fails to address the limitation of the type of politicization that pre-
supposes the development of deliberative mechanisms. Moreover, although social 
movements can successfully solve particular problems, they are not able to signi-
ficantly improve people’s lives. In the long term it can be said that protest groups 
arrive at an accommodation with the regime, and some of their achievements can 
be gradually undermined.  
 There is no satisfactory analysis investigating relations between politics and 
grassroots movements. Some scholars argue that institutions of authoritarian 
regimes can mutate and contribute to democratization. For example, Xi Chen 
(2008) argues that some institutions which were supposed to serve authoritarianim 
can be used for ‘popular mobilization’. In the case of China protesters utilize 
‘collective petitioning’ to affect decision-making processes. Since the Chinese 
political system permits petitioning, some institutions of this system can facilitate 
collective actions, and ‘inside-out’ type of mobilization can be effective. This 
assumption is based on Guillermo O’Donnell’s and Philippe Scmitter’s note about 
the possible ‘conversion of older institutions, such as trade unions, professional 
associations, and universities, from agents of governmental control into instru-
ments for the expression of interests, ideals, and rage against the regime’ 
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 49). In the case of Russia, where collective 
petitioning is also a widespread means of protest actions, there is no evidence of 
the conversion of institutions. Petitioning channels popular discontent towards 
compromiseswith the regime rather than converting institutions. Danielle Lussier 
(2016) considers petitioning as an example of ‘contacting’ and ‘elite-enabling’ 
activities which support and ensure the existing regime. ‘Elite-enabling’ activities 
are contrasted by Lussier to so called ‘elite-constraining’ activities promoting 
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democratization. However, not only petitioning but even protests that are typi-
cally classified as ‘elite-constraining’, such as rallies and strikes, can in fact 
contribute to the sustainability of the present regime. In other words, protest can 
be ‘elite-enabling’ as well as ‘elite-constraining’. Existing literature does not 
properly address this phenomenon.  
I argue that conventional approaches to protest movements cannot accurately 
describe the relationship between protest movements and politics, as well as the 
capacities of these movements. In fact, there is a fragmented public space, where 
deliberative procedures are possible and protest movements can emerge and 
partially succeed. I propose a new perspective on the grassroots activities of 
subaltern classes and on the obstacles for the transition from social and labor 
protests to acquiring political subjectivity.   
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CHAPTER 2.  
Transformism, political subjectivity,  
and popular politics 
This chapter covers the theoretical framework of the dissertation and provides 
definitions of the main concepts used here.  
First of all, I define transformism and discuss how this term is utilized by 
different approaches. Then, I elaborate on the distinction between the types of 
politics. This distinction was introduced by Ernesto Laclau, who did not, however, 
go into much detail. This chapter shows how the development of Gramsci’s and 
Laclau’s concepts contributes to the understanding of grassroots movements and 
their political impact.  
The chapter also discusses the methods used in this dissertation and the case 
selection.  
 
 
The definition of transformism in Gramsci’s texts 
For the current dissertation, three of Grmasci’s terms are important, namely 
hegemony, transformism, and historical bloc. In Some Aspects of the Southern 
Question, Gramsci addresses ‘hegemony of the proletariat’, which is defined as 
the ‘social basis of the proletarian dictatorship and of the workers’ State’ (Gramsci 
1978: 443). He explains that ‘[t]he proletariat can become the leading and the 
dominant class to the extent that it succeeds in creating a system of class alliances 
which allows it to mobilize the majority of the working population against 
capitalism and the bourgeois State’ (Gramsci 1978: 443). According to Gramsci, 
hegemony means building alliances or blocs in which one of the members plays 
a leading role. 
Transformism is a notion connected to hegemony. According to Gramsci, 
transformism is defined as ‘gradual but continuous absorption… of the active 
elements produced by allied groups – and even of those which came from 
antagonistic groups and seemed irreconcilably hostile’ (Gramsci 1971: 215). This 
absorption is necessary for ‘the formation of an extensive ruling class’ (Gramsci 
1971: 214). Ruling classes absorb, adjust, and accommodate to their own 
advantage the aspirations and intentions of other social groups.  
Explaining this ‘absorption of the active elements produced by allied groups’, 
Gramsci introduces the notion of an ‘historical bloc’. He advances this notion to 
adjust the classical Marxist concepts of ‘structure’ and ‘superstructure’, i.e. the 
relations of production and the realm of ideologies. Gramsci explained the con-
cept of an historical bloc as follows: ‘Structure and superstructure form an 
historical bloc. That is to say the complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble 
of the superstructures is the reflection of the ensemble of the social relations of 
production’ (Gramsci 1971: 690).  
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It is widely recognized that the significance of the Gramscian thought consists, 
firstly, in considering the ‘superstructure’ as a realm which is partly independent 
from the ‘structure’ and, secondly, in problematizing the notion of class. In short, 
classes and their ideologies are not given from the very beginning. Classes are 
emergent phenomena which undergo transformations at both structure and super-
structure levels. They can be divided into numerous social groups which may 
adhere to different ideas. These social groups form alliances that are reflected in 
ideologies. An alliance of social groups under a certain political regime and with 
a certain ideology is basically an historical bloc (cf. Morton 2007: 96–97). The 
term ‘alliance’ presupposes that relations among social groups within an his-
torical bloc are cooperative. Although an historical bloc is organized hierarchi-
cally, stable relations within this hierarchical alliance require mutual concessions 
by different groups. 
Gramsci developed the concept of transformism in the context of his ref-
lections on passive revolution. Both of these phenomena explain the process of 
gradual capitalist reforms under the control of liberal or conservative bourgeoisie, 
without any revolutionary outbreaks. Gramsci compares the French revolution, 
which (from the Marxist viewpoint) destroyed the old regime and established a 
new capitalist order through the popular rebellion, and the Italian transition from 
the archaic feudal formation to capitalism, which left the old aristocracy in place 
and did not involve any popular uprisings. Gramsci argues that the transformist 
strategy of ‘absorption’ ‘was the brilliant solution of these problems which made 
the Risorgimento possible, in the form in which it was achieved (and with its 
limitations) – as “revolution” without a “revolution”, or as “passive revolution”’ 
(Gramsci 1971: 215). Therefore, while passive revolution means social and 
economic change in the absence of popular political subjectivity, transformism is 
the process which enables such changes by hindering political subjectivation. 
There are two main approaches to the study of transformism. The first one is 
developed in International Political Economy (IPE). The second one is based on 
poststructuralist theories and can be found in the texts of Ernesto Laclau. 
 
 
Transformism and international political economy 
Adam David Morton, one of the leading scholars who has developed the concept 
of transformism in the field of IPE, defines transformism as ‘attempts to remove 
substantive difference and establish a convergence between contending social 
class forces’ (Morton 2007: 98). Writing on passive revolution, he describes it as 
‘a condition in which capitalist development is either instituted and/or expanded, 
resulting in both “revolutionary” rupture and a “restoration” of social relations’ 
(Morton 2011: 4). It means that passive revolution combines capitalist economic 
development, and modernization, on the one hand, and preservation of the ruling 
elites, conservation of inequality, and suppression of popular activity, on the other 
hand. The social, political, and economic order forged under a passive revolution 
is conservative and reactionary but requires an alliance between dominant and 
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subaltern classes, even though this alliance is always unequal and hierarchical. 
Morton’s definitions elaborate the classical proposed by Gramsci. While Gramsci 
focused on political issues, Morton adds an economic dimension.  
Robert Cox, another important IPE scholar and neo-Gramscian theorist, adds 
that transformism is a ‘major feature of passive revolution’ and ‘can serve as a 
strategy of assimilating and domesticating potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting 
them to policies of the dominant coalition’ (Cox 1994: 55). As he also mentions, 
passive revolution is an ‘introduction of changes which did not involve any arousal 
of popular forces’ (Cox 1994: 54). Thus, transformism and passive revolution 
presuppose the evolution of the regime and moderate social and economic changes 
which do not lead to an elite change. Also, Cox mentions an important metaphor 
of ‘domestication’, which implies that a group challenging ruling elites gradually 
loses the independence and turns into a subordinated ally of these elites.  
Transformism and passive revolution require an expansion of the state 
apparatus. ‘The “passive revolution” … issues as a kind of “statisisation” of the 
transition which destroys the impact of every popular initiative’ (Buci-Glucks-
mann 2014: 219). Morton also emphasizes that the ‘modern state imposes itself 
on society and space through an attempt to homogenize relations of power’ 
(Morton 2010: 12). Cox notes that ‘one typical accompaniment of passive revo-
lution … is caesarism: a strong man intervenes to resolve the stalemate between 
equal and opposed social forces’ (Cox 1994: 54). 
The notions of transformism and passive revolution have been widely applied 
in the study of political, economic and social processes in Latin America. In 
‘Revolution and State in Modern Mexico’ Morton describes the economic and 
state development as ‘contested class practices’ and analyses the interrelation 
between revolutionary rupture and restoration. He shows how the popular uprising, 
which accompanied the 1910 revolution, was later assimilated by the state. The 
ultimate establishment of an authoritarian regime in Mexico precluded inde-
pendent political activity and modernized the country under the conditions of 
depoliticization. The regime incorporated the subaltern classes’ organizations, 
which had emerged during the revolution, into the new social and political order. 
In short, the Mexican regime managed to neutralize the popular uprising through 
various methods, from coercion and repression, to cooptation and the building of 
alliances. 
Morton supplements political economy with historical sociology. Though the 
state remains an important part of his approach, he criticizes state-oriented 
approaches: ‘A compelling case is therefore made for a decentered conception of 
politics by examining the interconnectedness and permeability of state and civil 
society in order to appreciate the multiple sites of resistance contesting state 
hegemonic processes’ (Morton 2011: 8–9).  
Thus, Morton demonstrates that modern capitalism and the modern state in 
Mexico were formed alongside the incorporation of peasants’ and workers’ 
organizations into the social and political order, a process that played a significant 
role during the revolution. Morton emphasizes ‘the development of property 
relations through state intervention – through the inclusion of new social groups 
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within conservative political order. There is no expansion of mass control over 
politics’ (Morton 2010: 18). 
Writing on the economic structure, Morton relies on the concept of uneven 
and combined development, which foregrounds regional heterogeneity and the 
influence of the global capitalist economy on the national economies (Morton 
2010). The focus on heterogeneity allows Morton to introduce spatial elements 
in his analysis. Uneven and combined development, a term originally advanced 
by Leon Trotsky, means that the development of the global economy affects the 
development of national economies, while developing countries combine in their 
economies social and political systems pre-modern elements inherited from their 
own past and modern elements borrowed from developed countries. Morton uses 
uneven and combined development in his own concept of ‘internalization of the 
international (geopolitical) factors’ (Morton 2011: 60). In other words, the 
analysis of economic and social development of any given country should take 
the international environment into account. Economically backward countries are 
influenced by more developed capitalist economies. Hence, their own moderniza-
tion is conducted not by popular progressive movements, which would overthrow 
reactionary regimes, but by conservative elites modernizing their country under 
the economic pressure from outside. In this case popular movements are usually 
suppressed (cf. Hesketh 2017). 
Neo-Gramscian IPE has been also applied to other countries of Latin America. 
For example, Jeffery Webber tries to explain agrarian reforms in Bolivia under 
Evo Morales through the lens of transformism. In his study of the reforms from 
2006 to 2016 he argues that during this period ‘relatively open contestation and 
contingency’ were ‘followed by the strong realignment of restoration through a 
novel agro-capital-state alliance’ (Webber 2016: 345). According to him, the 
window of possibilities was opened with the beginning of the agrarian reforms in 
2006 and was closed when agro-industrial capital forged a new alliance with the 
state and ‘agrarian oligarchs’ were ‘reinstalled in power’ (Webber 2016: 345). 
Webber demonstrates how, after the radical agrarian reforms introduced in the 
early years of Morales’s rule and the popular mobilization they precipitated, pre-
vious conditions partly reemerged, followed by a decline of peasants’ movements. 
Chris Hesketh and Adam Morton study another period of Bolivia’s history by 
looking at the 1952 revolution. They argue that ‘the Bolivian revolution was to 
significantly reorganize social property relations but in a manner that continued 
forms of class domination perpetuated through the expropriation and dispossession 
of peasants by large-scale capitalist enterprises’ (Hesketh and Morton 2014: 154). 
Even though the organized working class played a significant role in the revo-
lution, workers’ and peasants’ initiatives were eventually co-opted by the state 
which created pro-governmental unions. ‘[R]adical class demands were displaced 
or defeated by the specific road to capitalism, shaped through the slow transfor-
mation of large landholdings into capitalist enterprises’ (Hesketh and Morton 
2014: 155). 
As these examples show, neo-Gramscian IPE scholars have thoroughly revised 
the concept of transformism and demonstrated its applicability to a large variety 
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of cases. They analyze the economic, social, and historical conditions of trans-
formism and passive revolution. However, IPE scholars concentrate mainly on 
the economic structure and consider the political struggle as largely determined 
by the former. The specific moments of transformism when grassroots activities 
and regimes’ responses meet are usually eclipsed by over-detailed descriptions of 
the economic conditions and the international environment.  
In contrast to this approach, I focus not on economic policies and kaleido-
scopes of economic conditions, but rather on the people’s activities and the 
regime’s reactions. When Vladimir Lenin was defining the revolutionary situation, 
he mentioned two preconditions for such a situation: the lower classes do not 
want to live in the old way and the upper classes are unable to live in the old way 
(Lenin 1964: 213–214). This contradiction between willingness and capacities of 
the subaltern classes and the elites is essential for my analysis. Willingness and 
capacities emerge and change in specific and unique moments of time and do not 
necessarily depend on economic conditions. 
Concepts of transformism and passive revolution are regularly applied to the 
analysis of long-term developments. Morton, for example, described the epochs 
of Machiavelli, Risorgimento, and fascism. He studied the evolution of the 
Mexican regime from the 1930s to the present times. Gramscian theorists have 
attributed these concepts to Stalinism, Fordism, and social democratic policies 
after the Second World War (e.g. Buci-Glucksmann 2014). Kees van der Pijl, 
meanwhile, explains Russian history from 1861 to the collapse of the USSR (the 
October revolution was a short interruption) in terms of passive revolution (van 
der Pijl 1994). This macrohistorical approach, however, cannot address short 
moments of political events.  
To summarize, the approach of IPE explains macrohistorical evolution while 
neglecting mechanisms of transformism under particular conditions of relations 
between grassroots movements and regimes’ responses. Then, the concept of 
transformism is often used to analyze reforms which are not connected to grass-
roots activities (cf. Bruff 2010). Although transformism is possible during periods 
of ‘ordinary normal life’ without revolutions, the approach of IPE tells us nothing 
about the day-to-day management of grassroots activities. My approach is closer 
to Ernesto Laclau’s poststructuralist analysis in that it distinguishes popular 
politics associated with revolutionary upheaval from democratic politics in a 
nonrevolutionary context. 
 
 
Transformism, popular politics, and democratic politics 
Laclau reinterpreted Gramsci’s concepts within the framework of poststruc-
turalist discourse analysis. He distinguishes between two logics that define the 
interaction among discursive elements, i.e. articulatory logics. The first one is the 
logic of equivalence. This logic combines particular elements ‘by making them 
all bearers of a meaning which transcends their particularity’ and creates ‘equi-
valentantial chains’ (Laclau 2000a: 303). The second is the logic of difference, 
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which works in the opposite way by conserving the particularity of discursive 
elements. Laclau associates the logic of difference with transformistic strategy. 
On this basis Laclau differentiates between democratic and popular demands: 
‘The first can be accommodated within an expanding hegemonic formation; the 
second presents a challenge to the hegemonic formation as such’ (Laclau 2005a: 
82). Democratic demands are ‘the punctual demands which the system could 
absorb in a transformistic way’, while popular demands are ‘a large set of 
simultaneous demands presented as a unified whole’ (Laclau 2005a: 82). 
Here, Laclau relies on the notion of hegemonic formation. Laclau and Mouffe 
develop this notion on the basis of Gramsci’s concept of historical bloc, by adding 
Michel Foucault’s concept of discursive formation. The term ‘discursive 
formation’ addresses ‘a regularity’ ‘between objects, types of statement, concepts 
or thematic choices’ (Foucault 2002: 41). At the same time, Foucault emphasizes 
that discursive formation is ‘a system of dispersion’ (Foucault 2002: 41). In other 
words, discursive formation is not a ‘well-defined alphabet of notions’ or ‘per-
manence of a thematic’ but a series of gaps and transformations and ‘various 
strategic possibilities’ (Foucault 2002: 41). 
Laclau and Mouffe also stress the incoherence of elements within an historical 
bloc, understood as a hegemonic formation: ‘The type of link joining the different 
elements of the historical bloc — not unity in any form of historical a priori, but 
regularity in dispersion — coincides with our concept of discursive formation’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 136). Thus, a hegemonic formation consists of dif-
ferent spaces run by local but interconnected logics.  
Popular demands are antagonistic to the current rule. Meanwhile, democratic 
demands co-exist with any present order and enable transformism to preserve the 
already existing formation. Oliver Marchart, who emphasizes the importance of 
Laclau’s theory for the study of social movements differentiates ‘between forms 
of ‘‘democratic protest’’ and those of ‘‘popular protest’’, where the former exhibit 
a low degree of antagonization due to the defense of merely corporate or sectoral 
interests, while the latter aims at a much wider alliance of struggles’ (Marchart 
2012: 236). Populism drives the building of coalitions and consequent political 
subjectivation and requires ‘the generation of a political antagonism of such 
intensity that promotes the partition of society into two irreconcilable and rigid 
camps’ (Peruzzotti 2017: 51). 
is a demand addressing a local problem. This demand can be satisfied by the local 
authorities. Laclau writes: ‘If it is satisfied, that is the end of the matter’ (Laclau 
2005a: 73). However, an unsatisfied request can turn into a second type of 
demands which is a claim. The main difference between requests and claims is 
that requests passively accept the legitimacy of the existing institutions while 
claims presuppose a critique of the institutions (Laclau 2006: 656). Thus, claims 
can give birth to politics. However, the specific type of politics is not yet 
predetermined. If claims are limited and isolated, popular politics does not 
emerge. Popular politics requires claims introduced against the whole hegemonic 
In his analysis Laclau proposes an additional classification of demands and 
distinguishes between two types of demands. The first type is requests. A request 
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formation. Laclau provides an example of demands posed by the 1917 Russian 
revolution: ‘peace, bread, and land’. Initially these demands were addressed to 
the tsarist regime. Later, they turned into demands against the regime as such. 
‘Once we move beyond a certain point, what were requests within institutions 
became claims addressed to institutions, and at some stage they become claims 
against the institutional order’ (Laclau 2006: 655).  
In terms of social movements it means that a protest initiative starts with a 
request addressing a parochial problem. Then, this initiative can transit to a claim 
and criticize the local authorities. This claim becomes a democratic demand 
which enables democratic politics. However, democratic politics is inferior to 
popular politics, while transition from democratic politics to popular politics is 
never guaranteed.  
Laclau’s theoretical framework is anything but conventional. Students of 
social movements usually do not distinguish between popular politics and 
democratic politics. The development of democratic protests is equated with politi-
cization. Moreover, the understanding of ‘politicization’ also varies. Scholars 
such as Grigorii Golosov describe politicization as ‘the increase in the number of 
people who are interested in politics and ready to discuss and think about it’ 
(Golosov 2018). Even though democratic protests can solve particular problems 
and promote relative improvements in a separate sphere or region, these improve-
ments do not trigger significant political changes. At the same time, these relative 
improvements may be vulnerable to the countermeasures taken by the old elites.  
According to Laclau, antagonism and, hence, popular politics create a political 
subject. Laclau borrows the concept of antagonism from Carl Schmitt. In his well-
known work The Concept of the Political, Schmitt writes: ‘The specific political 
distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between 
friend and enemy’ (Schmitt 2007: 26). Thus, Schmitt defines politics through 
antagonism emerging from the distinction between friend and enemy. Laclau 
argues that one of Schmitt’s merits is his focus on hostility and antagonism which 
is ‘at the very center of political analysis’ (Laclau 2005b: 11). At the same time, 
various types of politics can treat antagonism differently, and democratic politics 
mitigates antagonism. Chantal Mouffe proposes to distinguish between antagonism 
and agonism: ‘Antagonism is struggle between enemies, while agonism is struggle 
between adversaries’ (Mouffe 2000: 102–103). The difference between enemy 
and adversary is that the enemy is to be destroyed, while an adversary is ‘some-
body whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put 
into question… An adversary is … a legitimate enemy, one with whom we have 
some common ground’ (Mouffe 2000: 102). It is noteworthy that Laclau does not 
use the term ‘agonism’. He emphasizes that the logic of equivalence, which 
underlies popular politics, ‘introduces negativity and social division’ and triggers 
antagonism which is always present in every society (Laclau 2000b: 7). 
Meanwhile, Mouffe considers the transformation of antagonism into agonism as 
a goal of politics. In her book For a Left Populism she argues that ‘left populism’ 
is supposed to establish a ‘new order’ within the liberal-democratic framework 
(Mouffe 2018). Laclau, on the contrary, does not restrict popular politics to 
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liberal-democratic frameworks. He rather criticizes the defenders of existing 
institutions and advocates ‘radical social changes’ linked to ‘a shift in the relation-
ship of forces’ between social groups (Laclau 2012). Thus, Laclau’s and Mouffe’s 
approaches do not necessarily coincide.  
However, politics is a generic term. Different approaches propose various 
definitions of politics and describe particular types of politics. Hereinafter, to 
avoid possible confusion, I will distinguish between ‘political subjectivation’ and 
‘politicization’: the former presupposes action, while the latter can be reduced to 
increased societal interest toward political issues. Then, popular politics corres-
ponds to political subjectivation and an antagonistic type of politics, while demo-
cratic politics corresponds to politicization and nonantagonistic type of politics.  
Populism requires the unification of separate demands and the creation of a 
new hegemonic formation which is antagonistic towards the existing one. The 
political subjectivation of a social or labor protest is a transfiguration of particu-
laristic democratic demands into popular demands. While populism presupposes 
that representatives of different groups overcome their particularities and compose 
a new subject, transformism does the opposite. In transformism, particularistic 
demands of protest groups are partly satisfied and transformed, leading to these 
groups being unable to broaden their protest activity. Since democratic politics 
involves punctual and sectoral demands and does not unify them in a whole, it 
facilitates transformistic processes.  
Here, it is obvious that Lalcau’s approach to populism is far from mainstream 
approaches which regularly define populism as an ideology contrasting ‘elites’ 
and ‘the people’ (cf. Enyedi 2015, Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). This term is 
usually used in a pejorative way. While critics of populism condemn this pheno-
menon as a threat to democratic institutions and an instrument of manipulation in 
the hands of irresponsible politicians, Laclau points out that institutionalism 
prevents popular mobilization and alienates people from politics (Laclau 2012).  
The mainstream understanding of populism seems vague because it lumps 
together disparate political forces. Since populism is a form of political struggle, 
it can be used by various actors. From this point of view, politicians such as 
Donald Trump, Viktor Orbán, or the Italian Five Stars Movement, who are usually 
blamed by mass media for being populists, may simply employ some populist 
strategies. As previously mentioned, Laclau argues that antagonism is a necessary 
dimension of politics, and that social divisions are irreconcilable. Hence, all 
political actors have to deal with antagonism and hostility in some way. Since 
mainstream approaches normalize liberal democracy, they presuppose that 
politicians should avoid antagonism and smoothen up social divisions. As clear 
from the above, Laclau does not prioritize societal consensus over political 
conflict – rather, he is in favor of the latter due to its importance for popular 
representation. 
In Laclau’s terms, populism has three preconditions: ‘the formation of an 
internal antagonistic frontier separating people from power’, ‘an equivalential 
articulation of demands making the emergence of the people possible’, and ‘the 
unification of these various demands into a stable system of signification’ (Laclau 
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2005a: 74). In other words, Laclau’s populism requires a popular political move-
ment. Thus, a simple appeal to people and critique of elites do not suffice as 
criteria of populism. Populism constructs a new people and a new hegemonic 
formation instead of modifying the existing one. As previously mentioned, the 
construction of a new formation means a shift in the relationship of forces between 
social groups (Laclau 2012). As every hegemonic formation is hierarchical, this 
shift also means the destruction of an old hierarchy and the creation of a new one.  
This in-depth, strict, and rigorous analysis of populism distinguishes it from 
transformism. The contrast between populism and transformism lies in the fact 
that populism entails antagonism, the unification of demands and, hence, politics, 
whereas transformism refers to an anti-political administration which neutralizes 
antagonism (Beasley-Murray 2010: 46). While populism constructs a new hege-
monic formation and a new people, transformism revises old ones.  
 
 
Administration and politics 
The distinction between politics and administration is important for the under-
standing of transformism. Laclau argues that the political moment is a moment 
of hostility, while ‘administration’ sets limits to hostility. Thus, the logic of equi-
valence, which drives political subjectivation, triggers social division by intro-
ducing negativity, while the logic of difference ‘organizes the positivity of the 
social’ (Laclau 2005b: 7). Laclau equates his distinction between logic of equi-
valence and logic of difference to the distinction between politics and administra-
tion. Besides, he refers to Jacques Rancière, who distinguishes between the police 
and politics in the same way. A brief analysis of Rancière’s thought clarifies the 
difference between politics and adminitstration.  
According to Rancière, the police is a ‘system of distribution and legitimiza-
tion… The police is essentially, the law, generally implicit, that defines a party’s 
share or lack of it…’ (Rancière 1999: 28–29). In other words, the police is the 
administration which structures the existing order. It defines and redefines the 
positions of different elements in this order. Politics is an ‘extremely determined 
activity antagonistic to policing: whatever breaks with the tangible configuration 
whereby parties and parts or lack of them are defined by a presupposition that, by 
definition, has no place in that configuration – that of the part of those who have 
no part’ (Rancière 1999: 29–30). 
Therefore, while the police is a conservative process which rules over the 
existing order and establishes a hierarchy and links among its elements, politics 
breaks the order. Rancière explains the contradiction between the police and 
politics by analyzing the trial of Auguste Blanqui, a French socialist, in 1832. 
When asked about his profession by a prosecutor, Blanqui replied that he was a 
‘proletarian’. Rancière notes: ‘For the prosecutor, embodying police logic, pro-
fession means job, trade... The proletarian class in which Blanqui professes to 
line himself up is in no way identifiable with a social group. The proletariat are 
neither manual workers nor the labor classes. They are the class of the uncounted…’ 
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(Rancière 1999: 37–38). According to Rancière’s idea, particular identities are 
maintained by the police or the administration. Due to the fact that Blanqui’s self-
identification surmounted separated workers’ identities imposed by adminis-
tration and attached to specific jobs or trades, his gesture was seen as significant 
and dangerous for the police order.  
Rancière introduces the metaphor of ‘counting’ to demonstrate the abstract 
mechanism of relations between the ‘police order’ and the subaltern classes. The 
latter are divided into particular professions that have much in common with other 
social groups such as entrepreneurs, for example. The subaltern classes are not 
counted in the ‘police order’ as the whole but they can be counted as workers of 
separate particular professions or jobs. 
Transformism and Rancière’s police address the same phenomena. Whereas 
the police represents only one side of transformism, the regime’s response to 
grassroots activities, transformism as a whole is a process in which not only the 
regime but also the subaltern classes are involved. In other words, transformism 
is possible when the police is successful and effective, and the subaltern classes 
do not move from democratic politics to popular politics. Thus, I will use the term 
‘the police’ to describe the regime’s responses to grassroots activities within 
transformistic processes.  
Rancière further demonstrates that the subaltern classes are divided into 
particular groups, which are only counted by the police. This significant division 
is one which I will analyze in my empirical sections. 
 
 
The problem of universality 
The dichotomy of particularity and universality is an important issue which directly 
concerns the concept of transformism. As the opposite of transformism, populism 
presupposes overcoming particular identities. Gramsci wrote: ‘The proletariat, in 
order to become capable as a class of governing, must strip itself of every residue 
of corporatism, every syndicalist prejudice and incrustation’ (Gramsci 1978: 448). 
Thus, Gramsci’s understanding of politics is connected to universalism. He 
elaborated here on Lenin’s approach toward the development of ‘class political 
consciousness’. Lenin argues that political consciousness does not derive from 
the experience of workers as a separate social group. In his important text What 
Is to Be Done?, Lenin writes: ‘To bring political knowledge to the workers the 
Social Democrats must go among all classes of the population’ (Lenin 1960: 422). 
Politics comes into existence if workers do not restrict themselves to their 
parochial problems and interests but engage in ‘the sphere of relationships of all 
classes and strata to the state and the government’ (Lenin 1960: 422), i.e. if they 
become a universal class. This idea derives from Karl Marx’s works. In his 
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx famously writes that proletariat is 
‘a class of civil society which is not a class of civil society, an estate which is the 
dissolution of all estates, a sphere which has a universal character by its universal 
suffering’ (Marx 1975: 186). However, the difference here is that for Lenin and 
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Gramsci proletariat is not given but needs to be constructed as workers have to 
overcome their particularism.  
In the same line, Alain Badiou calls differences and particular identities 
apolitical: ‘[W]hat we must recognize is that these differences hold no interest for 
thought, that they amount to nothing more than the infinite and self-evident 
multiplicity of humankind… Only a truth is, as such, indifferent to differences’ 
(Badiou 2001: 26–27). He leaves differences to ‘vulgar sociology’. For Badiou, 
universalism, the need to overcome particular identities, is a necessary pre-
condition of politics: ‘It is a question of knowing what identitarian and com-
munitarian categories have to do with truth procedures, with political procedures 
for example. We reply: these categories must be absented from the process’ 
(Badiou 2003: 11).  
Laclau, however, disagrees with Badiou on the issue of universality. Laclau 
argued that universality ‘is the result of displacement of the frontier between the 
countable and the uncountable – i.e. of the construction of an expansive hege-
mony; if articulation is given its proper central role, naming the void is con-
stitutively linked to the process of its filling, but this filling can only proceed 
through an uneasy balance between universality and particularity’ (Laclau 2004: 
127). For Laclau universality is inevitably contaminated by particularity because 
universality as such is a hegemonized particularity (Laclau 2000b: 51). Since 
hegemonic procedures still transfigure particularity, however, ‘no particularity 
can become political without becoming the locus of universalizing effects’ 
(Laclau 2000b: 56). Laclau does not specify how the hegemonized and uni-
versalized particularity changes through the universalizing and hegemonizing 
effect. Badiou’s critique of particularism shows that universalization and hege-
monization presuppose overcoming of sectorial identities and differences among 
them. In other words, the agent of hegemony cannot maintain its identity that exists 
before hegemonization.  
Although Laclau and Badiou assert different views on ontology, contradic-
tions between these two authors are not irreconcilable when it comes to uni-
versalism in politics. Laclau and Badiou, like Rancière, are antisociological 
thinkers. Their antisociologism does not neglect empirical studies but prevents 
deducing politics directly from the social. 
Laclau claimed that the social is a realm of objectivity, heterogeneity, and 
particularity (Laclau 2000b) and argued that ‘the sedimented forms of “ob-
jectivity” make up the field of what we will call the ‘social’’ (Laclau 1990: 35). 
On the contrary, the field of the political is constituted by ‘the moment of 
antagonism’ (Laclau 1990: 35). Politics does not derive directly from the social 
but rather is possible as a break within the social. This idea is shared by Rancière, 
who also posits that politics starts from a break with the police order and the 
emergence of a new subject, rather than from mere aspirations of any social group 
counted by the police. He illustrates this by turning to a moment in ancient Roman 
history when the plebs, who demanded equal rights with patricians, retreated to 
Aventine Hill and named itself the populus. Rancière notes that plebeians did not 
only leave the city. It was not a pure exodus, nor was their act limited to 
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declarations. Rancière notes: ‘[T]hey establish another order… [T]hey pronounce 
imprecations and apotheosis; they delegate one of their number to go and consult 
with their oracles; they give themselves representatives by rebaptizing them’ 
(Rancière 1999: 24). Thus, the Roman plebeians, who were an unpriviliged class, 
did not request privileges for themselves but broke with the whole order and 
established a new one because they were not the populus within the old order 
(Rancière 1999). Marchart (2007) observes the resemblance between Laclau and 
Rancière in the way Laclau’s populism is a construction of a new political subject 
or a new people and Rancière’s plebeians literally constructed a new people by 
creating an antagonistic frontier between them and the patricians: ‘To translate 
Rancière’s example into “Laclause”: what the plebeians do is to construct an 
antagonism vis-a-vis the patricians… For Laclau, the “people” of populism is a 
plebs who claims to be the only legitimate populus’ (Marchart 2007: 16–17). 
Although the political subject acts under given social conditions, politics does 
not merely represent social conflicts: it needs specific circumstances to exist. In 
his seminal book Anthropology of the Name Sylvain Lazarus emphasizes that 
‘politics is not a permanent instance of societies; it is rare and sequential’ (Lazarus 
2015: 72). He calls the type of politics which seeks its own foundations outside 
itself ‘politics in exteriority’. On the contrary, ‘politics in interiority’ has its 
foundations within itself. While interiority is ‘marked by the homogenous 
mulitiplicty of sites’, exteriority is ‘characterized by a heterogeneous multiplicity 
and presents itself as having a single locus – the State’ (Lazarus 2015: 73). Here, 
Lazarus follows the tradition which distinguishes politics from administration. 
Thus, the state is not political. It administrates spheres of law and economy. 
According to Lazarus, the state ‘stifles the prescription at work in political 
decisions’ (Lazarus 2015: 2). The prescription is a characteristic of the political 
subject. The political subject prescribes solutions and makes decisions that 
change social relations. Lazarus argues that the contemporary state imposes 
consensus which limits the field of political possibilities. The state is ‘identified 
by clear evidence of technicality and its related constraints (decisions are always 
presented as being good technically)… [T]he State is no longer in an antagonistic 
or programmatic context’ (Lazarus 2015: 76). Agents of politics in exteriority 
express their opinions on the functional aspect of the state and discuss mainly law 
and economy. Although the contemporary state imposes consensus on society, the 
state preserves heterogeneity within society. Consensus emerges among hetero-
geneous groups of society due to the functioning of the state. Agents of politics 
in exteriority, hence, operate under the conditions of heterogeneity and have to 
rely on the state, which administrate the relations among heterogeneous groups.  
Exteriority refers not only to heterogeneity, but also to the failure to think 
politics from within itself, while interiority points to the self-referential character 
of politics. Hence, ‘politics in exteriority’ is not politics as such. It does not 
overcome heterogeneity or break with the present order, and is subordinated to 
the state rather than independent of it.  
While Lazarus’s politics is always singular, there is a difference between his 
politics in interiority and politics in exteriority, on the one hand, and Laclau’s 
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popular politics and democratic politics, on the other hand. Because Lazarus 
understands politics as discrete sequences of unique events, while Laclau’s 
politics is rather a process, popular politics is what potentially leads to politics in 
interiority and democratic politics is what potentially leads to politics in 
exteriority. However, the most important aspect of this comparison of Lazarus 
and Laclau is that popular politics breaks with the state while democratic politics 
cooperates with the state. 
Lazarus’s concept of politics in exteriority highlights the connection between 
social movements and parliamentarianism. He draws on his criticism of move-
ments and parliamentarism in his analysis of the political history of France in the 
1960s–1980s. After the 1968 protests, leftist political parties experienced a 
gradual decay and were replaced by social movements, which were less radical 
and aimed at more local goals than traditional parties. Finally, these movements 
aligned themselves with the socialist presidency of François Mitterand and 
became part of the parliamentary consensus. Thus, Lazarus describes the transition 
of French politics through ‘the shift from the problematic of the Party to that of 
the movement to that of parliamentary consensus and the parliamentary State’ 
(Lazarus 2015: 21). Lazarus argues that politics of movements is a type of politics 
in exteriority, because they associate their activities with the state. They are 
heterogenous and require the state to be their ‘principle of transition to the whole’ 
(Lazarus 2015: 21). Hence, movements achieve their goals through the state. In 
Laclau’s terms, agents of democratic politics pose particular demands within the 
current hegemonic formation which makes these demands possible, meaningful, 
and worthwhile. Since democratic demands are isolated, they do not enable the 
creation of any new formation and have to coexist with the current one and, hence, 
cooperate with the state. According to Lazarus, parliamentary mode of politics in 
exteriority presupposes that politics becomes ‘an opinion on the government of 
the functional State’ (Lazarus 2015: 77).  
Lazarus’s thinking allows for a clarification of the conditions of possibility of 
popular politics and the relations between politics and the state. Since Laclau 
refers mostly to strategies, these strategies require a context and a discussion 
about the environment before one can estimate their efficiency and potential 
outcomes. Besides, Lazarus notes that politics in exteriority relies on the state. 
He also discusses the implications of the entanglement of politics in exteriority 
with the state. Agents of politics in exteriority deal with the functioning of the 
state. They strive to affect the way in which the state administrates relations 
among heterogeneous groups of society. In short, politics in exteriority improves 
state functions and contributes to the consensus imposed by the state on society. 
Although Laclau himself does not explicitly relate to these ideas, he is always 
critical toward institutions. He argues that ‘we start having the people of populism’ 
when grassroots demands become ‘claims against the institutional order’ (Lalcau 
2006: 655). While Laclau is critical towards existing liberal capitalist states, his 
critique sometimes remains uncertain. For example, he does not identify the 
relationship between different types of politics and parliamentarianism. Lazarus’s 
perspective adds details to the discussion on grassroots movements and the state. 
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Neither Lazarus nor Laclau advocate an anarchist understanding of politics and 
the state. However, they both prioritize popular activities over state institutions. 
Lazarus substantiates the preponderance of the people over the state.  
Thus, politics in exteriority is associated with the existing state, and democratic 
politics seeks a dialogue with the existing state, while politics in interiority breaks 
with the existing state and popular politics is antagonistic toward the existing state. 
Politics in interiority and politics in exteriority are better understood through 
Badiou’s concepts of the event and truth. Since Badiou accepts Lazarus’s influence 
in his own theories (Badiou 2006), the comparison of these two philosophers is 
justified. An event is a rupture within a situation, a real change which ‘compels 
us to decide a new way of being’ (Badou 2001: 41). Borrowing terms and logic 
from set theory, Badiou defines situation as a persistent multiplicity (Badiou 
2005). It means that there is no stable unity. Instead, different objects are grouped 
together and counted as one. Laclau interprets Badiou’s situation as ‘the field of 
objectivity’ (Laclau 2004: 121). Basically, a situation is the normal, objective, 
and conventional order of things. However, this order of things includes the void, 
or a term which the situation cannot count and recognize, something inconsistent 
in the conventional order. The most common example of the void is the proletariat 
in classical Marxism (Hallward 2004). Since the proletariat is deprived of social 
and political rights, it is the void of a situation and it is not counted by this 
situation. Hence, an event would be an uprising of the proletariat and obtaining 
of an independent political role.  
Then, an event reveals truth. Sam Gillespie notes that, according to Badiou, 
‘truth is a process by which an original situation becomes extended to encompass, 
or account for, elements that were not previously recognized’ (Gillespie 2008: 
78). Both the event and truth relate to the appearance of something new which 
was hidden before. The subject is defined through the fidelity to an event, which 
means that the subject acts in compliance with this new way opened by the event. 
Badiou calls this process of the fidelity ‘truth’ (Badiou 2001: 42). Therefore, 
Badiou’s event has consequences which shape further activities.  
It is important for Badiou that subjectivation is based on an event. Badiou 
writes that subject ‘needs something to have happened, something that cannot be 
reduced to its ordinary inscription in “what there is”’. (Badiou 2001: 41). In other 
words, the subject needs an event. After the event the subject invents ‘a new way 
of being and acting in the situation’ (Badiou 2001: 42).  
Hence, politics in interiority is evental politics or, one can say, true politics. 
From Badiou’s perspective, it is clear that politics in interiority is not associated 
with the state, which is inevitably conservative and preserves the existing social 
order. He points out that ‘the State is indifferent or hostile to the existence of a 
politics that touches truth’ (Badiou 2006: 100). Therefore, politics in interiority 
is anti-statist as such. It is noteworthy that the word ‘state’ is polysemic in 
Badiou’s texts. While situation counts elements of multiplicity, state recounts 
them and secures the persistence of multiplicity. In Being and Event, Badiou 
equates his philosophical ‘state’ to the state apparatus, in as much as one deals 
with a ‘historical-social situation’ (Badiou 2005: 104).  
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The break with the state means that popular politics requires a procedure to 
unify separate demands and create a new hegemonic formation which is 
antagonistic towards the current formation. Then, political subjectivation of a 
social or labor protest is a transfiguration of particularistic democratic demands 
into popular demands. This understanding of politics is based on Gramsci’s idea 
that ‘the proletariat, in order to become capable as a class of governing, must strip 
itself of every residue of corporatism, every syndicalist prejudice and incrustation’ 
(Gramsci 1978: 448). Politics presupposes that different groups overcome their 
particularities to compose a new subject. In transformism, on the contrary, 
particularistic demands of protest groups are partly satisfied and transformed so 
that these groups are unable to broaden the scope of their protest activities. From 
this point of view, social movements are not directly related to politics and 
possibility of their political subjectivation is not guaranteed, since the path from 
social conflicts to politics is not a direct or natural process. The same was meant 
by Lenin in What Is to Be Done when he insisted that the labor movement was 
not political from the very beginning and, if it became political, this type of 
politics was most likely a bourgeois politics or, in Laclau’s terms, democratic 
politics which co-exists with every present regime. In What Is to Be Done? Lenin 
distinguishes “trade-unionist politics” and “social-democratic politics”. The dif-
ference is that trade-unionist politics derives from economic struggle of workers 
at their workplaces while social-democratic politics emerges when the party goes 
‘among all classes of population’ (Lenin 1960: 422). Writing on two types of 
politics, Lenin differs “the trade-union secretary” and “the tribune of the people”. 
While the former restricts political activities to economic struggle of a separate 
social group, the latter addresses problems of the whole people. Lenin’s “social-
democratic politics” can be called popular politics or populism as he writes about 
problems and demands of all classes. Thus, the working class becomes the people 
by going beyond particular problems and demands of workers.  
Lenin notes that ‘to lend the workers’ economic struggle itself a political 
character’ is mainly the task of ‘the progressive representatives of bourgeois 
democracy’. Hence, ‘[t]rade-unionist politics of the working class is precisely 
bourgeois politics of the working class’ (Lenin 1960: 426). According to Lenin, 
trade-unionist politics also involves interactions with the government and struggle 
for economic reforms. However, these interactions and these reforms concern 
only one separate group but not the whole people. This politics remains bourgeois 
politics because, according to Lenin, struggle for economic reforms does not lead 
social-democrats to the seizure of power and overthrowing of capitalism. Besides, 
Lenin criticizes politicization of economic demands. He sees not a direct way 
from economic struggle to revolution but rather a break between trade-unionist 
politics and social-democratic politics. The term ‘contentious politics’ would for 
Lenin be inconsistent.  
In Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution Lenin (1962) 
anticipated Laclau’s distinction of democratic and popular politics. These two 
tactics were basically one of ‘a bargain with tsarism’ and one of popular uprising. 
Hence, social democrats could either join progressive bourgeoisie, who preferred 
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the way of mutual concessions with the autocratic regime, or deepen and 
radicalize popular movements. It is worth to note that Lenin considered both ways 
possible to promote democratization of Russia. He wrote: ‘The transformation 
the economic and political system in Russia along bourgeois-democratic lines is 
inevitable and inescapable’ (Lenin 1962: 55). However, the tactics of ‘a bargain 
with tsarism’ or, in Laclau’s terms, democratic politics would end in a ‘deal bet-
ween tsarism and the most “inconsistent” and most “self-seeking” representatives 
of bourgeoisie’ (Lenin 1962: 55). Consequently, this deal would result in ‘a 
docked constitution’ and the preservation of autocratic remnants and the domi-
nation of landlords. As is well known, the 1905 Russian revolution ended in the 
establishment of the Duma and the declaration of some civil liberties. Yet, the 
autocratic regime was preserved, the Duma was subordinated to the tsar and his 
government, and declared civil liberties were almost annulled. Genuine demo-
cratization of Russia was postponed as democratic politics prevailed.  
 
 
Opinion and politics 
Differences between popular politics and democratic politics also depend on their 
relations to public debates. As previously mentioned, social movements are 
associated with the development of deliberative procedures and deliberative demo-
cracy. Within the theoretical framework of the current dissertation, deliberation 
is considered as a sign of democratic politics. Adherence to deliberative pro-
cedures enables the coexistence of democratic politics and existing regimes. 
Besides, deliberation and public debates require the preservation of particularism.  
If popular politics emerges when particularism is replaced by universalism, 
the prioritization of deliberative processes should be recognized as a mistake 
made by the sociology of social movements. Badiou is among those who dis-
approve of this prioritization. He criticizes the Arendtian equation of politics and 
‘the public exercise of judgment’ (Badiou 2006: 13) and insists on differentiating 
between truth and opinions. The latter are ‘representations without truth’ (Badiou 
2001: 50). Although opinions are ‘the cement of sociality’ and ‘the primary 
material of communication’ (Badiou 2006: 50–51), they do not affect politics 
because they represent existing particular groups. As previously mentioned, 
politics for Badiou is a break within the social and overcoming of particularities. 
From this point of view, deliberation is based on expression and exchange of 
opinions and has no connection to politics as such. Rather it is a conservative 
procedure which reproduces existing social relations. Badiou argues that ‘the 
essence of politics is not the plurality of opinions. It is the prescription of a 
possibility in rupture with what exists’ (Badiou 2006: 24). Hence, since the state 
opposes popular politics, the state encourages the plurality of opinions and aims 
at ‘fashioning a consensus of opinions’ and ‘harmonizing the interplay of con-
flicting interests’ (Badiou 2006: 100).  
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Opinions and deliberation, Badiou continues, open the door to parlia-
mentarianism, which manifests pluralism and diversity. Lazarus classifies parlia-
mentarianism as a mode of politics in exteriority. Although the parliament collects 
heterogeneous and diverse opinions, it organizes them under domination of the 
state. Lazarus interprets the development of protest movements after the 1960s 
as a gradual shift to parliamentarianism. From this perspective, it becomes clear 
that social movements and trade unions, which do not overcome their particular 
identities, are able to be politicized and involved in democratic politics but this 
politicization leads to politics in exteriority. Successful social movements and 
trade unions that do not elevate to popular politics can become a kind of appendix 
to parliamentarianism. This statement is true even under authoritarianism, where 
parliamentarianism is debilitated. Deliberative mechanisms can exist even under 
authoritarianism. For example, although there are no fair elections in Russia and 
the parliamentarian system is underdeveloped, social movements and trade 
unions enjoy enough possibilities to exist, express their opinions, and deliberate 
problems with authorities even through local legislatures which formed via non-
competitive and fraudulent elections.  
In Laclau’s terms, deliberation is considered a part of transformism, because 
the exchange of opinions involves both elites and the subaltern classes and an 
antagonistic frontier between them becomes blurred in this way. Deliberation can 
mean communication between elites and subaltern classes. This communication 
in turn facilitates the incorporation of grassroots demands into the current 
political order. The multiplicity of heterogeneous opinions, which is necessary 
for deliberation, is a manifestation of the logic of difference. Laclau and Mouffe 
note that ‘the logic of equivalence is a logic of the simplification of political space, 
while the logic of difference is a logic of its expansion and increasing complexity’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 130). Thus, deliberation and the logic of difference 
both conserve high complexity of the social. Indeed, deliberation requires numer-
ous equal opinions and judgments. These opinions appear as ‘objective differences 
within the social’ and maintenance of them and their diversity stabilizes an 
existing order. Polarization and a consequent split of the discursive formation 
damage the plurality of opinions while giving rise to politics. Forces which may 
undermine the proper exchange of opinions are banished to the periphery of the 
hegemonic formation (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). A deliberative process involving 
both elites and subaltern classes can be seen as a part of anti-political administration 
due to the blurring of the antagonistic frontier between the regime and the masses.  
 
 
Capillary power 
Since the concept of hegemonic formation presupposes dispersion rather than 
stable unity, one should acknowledge that hegemonic formations and historical 
blocs are not homogenous but diverse. By developing this point, Laclau and 
Mouffe build on Michel Foucault’s ideas. Foucault, they write, ‘makes dispersion 
itself the principle of unity’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 106). Dispersion and 
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diversity leave space for relatively autonomous zones and local activities, which 
are absorbed into the hegemonic formation via transformistic processes. As trans-
formism is driven by the logic of difference, it enhances heterogeneity by 
reorganizing relations among discursive elements. 
The transition from medieval religious pastoral care for souls to the ‘political 
government of men’ in the seventeenth century influenced the evolution of ideas 
of autonomy and self-regulation (Foucault 1971). According to Foucault, the 
modern type of governing presupposes that society should be run by ‘natural 
processes’. ‘It means, of course, that not only will there be no justification, but 
also quite simply there will be no interest in trying to impose regulatory systems 
of injunctions, imperatives, and interdictions on these processes’ (Foucault 2007: 
451). Here ‘natural processes’ is a metaphor which means that all diverse zones 
obtain their local logics of regulation. Local autonomous logics are perceived as 
‘natural processes’, in contrast to direct interventions of the central apparatus.  
In the case of Russia, even the long history of various nondemocratic regimes 
has not eliminated civil society institutions. Employing Foucault’s theories, Oleg 
Kharkhordin demonstrates that civil society existed in the USSR and exists in 
today’s Russia (Kharkhordin 2002, Kharkhordin 2010). A variety of discourses 
and practices can be found in different periods and under different conditions. In 
fact, diversity is necessary for transformism and the logic of difference. Trans-
formistic processes include diverse discourses and practices into the hegemonic 
formation. The lack of diversity would lead to antagonism and hinder trans-
formism. Foucauldian studies of governmentality and dispersion of discourses 
shed light on the environment which makes transformism possible. Transformistic 
processes can be successful due to the internal diversity within discourses.  
The Foucauldian approach was preceded and indirectly influenced, via the 
structuralist philosophical tradition, by Gramsci’s critique of civil society. 
Gramsci did not contrast civil society and the oppressive state. Institutions of civil 
society do not oppose coercive state apparatus but supplement it (Fonseca 2016). 
Thus, it should be admitted that there is neither a clear division, nor a necessary 
confrontation between the state and civil society.  
Self-regulation and diversity of autonomous zones in which protests are 
possible are necessary for the sustainability and resilience of hegemonic forma-
tions. Hence, such autonomous zones and their self-regulation as well as mech-
anisms which bind these zones together should be scrutinized.  
If a hegemonic formation is not unity but dispersion, the factors that bind its 
elements together need further explanation. Gramsci’s term ‘capillary power’ 
which means diffuse indirect pressure is helpful in understanding these factors 
(Gramsci 1971: 295). 
The metaphor of ‘capillary power’ presupposes that state power is exercised 
not only through a centralized apparatus, but also through various decentralized 
elements which penetrate society as a whole. Even though mechanisms of 
capillary power are not necessarily run directly and rationally, they are still an 
integral part of the regime’s policy. While the police, the army, and the central 
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government belong to the centralized apparatus of the state, capillary power 
consists of organizations of civil society associated with the state indirectly.  
The notion of capillary power presupposes that the peripheral machinery 
depends more generally on the central apparatus but possesses relative autonomy. 
Transformism retains zones where protest is possible and governs these spheres 
on the basis of self-regulation and decentralization.  
The wide-spread opinion that Gramsci focused mostly on cultural and ideo-
logical issues is true to some extent. Indeed, he criticized economic determinism 
and worked on problems of anticipated the new proletarian culture; however, 
organizations and infrastructures are essential for Gramsci’s texts.  
Gramsci argues that institutions are connected to intellectuals who play a key 
role in the functioning of capillary power. In ‘Some Aspects of Southern Question’ 
he examines the organization of (‘capillary’) power and mass consent in Southern 
Italy and notes that ‘the Southern peasant is bound to the big landowner through 
the mediation of the intellectual’ (Gramsci 1978: 456). Gramsci defines intel-
lectuals more broadly as not only scholars or artists bur organizers of society in 
general (Gramsci 1971: 135). They not only produce ideology but also (and more 
importantly) disseminate it to enable and ensure social coherence at different 
levels. Representatives of a class who ‘have the capacity to be an organizer of 
society in general, including all its complex organism of services, right up to the 
state organism’ are defined as ‘organic intellectuals’ (Gramsci 1971: 135). ‘Organic 
intellectuals’ assimilate ‘traditional intellectuals’ who may be from the subaltern 
groups (from peasantry, for example, if we speak about ‘Gramscian’ Italy) and 
occupy subordinated positions as ‘executors’ of the ‘orders’ received from above.  
Intellectuals in the Gramscian thought are not far from bureaucrats (Gramsci 
1971: 413). Similar to intellectuals, bureaucrats structure and stabilize ‘relations 
between the leaders and the led’ (Migliaro and Misuraca 1982: 74). Both bureau-
crats and intellectuals organize society and supplement each other to such an 
extent that sometimes it is difficult to see a difference between them. Since 
discursive practices do not work in a manner of magic spell by mere articulation, 
ideology and discourse both rely on institutions. Gramsci’s intellectuals cannot 
be understood without a deeper analysis of organizations and infrastructures. 
Intellectuals are also involved in the state apparatus, which imposes the bureau-
cratic modus operandi. The interlacement of administration and traditional 
intellectuals at grassroots levels means that school and university teachers appear 
as bureaucrats, just as an example.  
Although intellectuals and bureaucrats are involved in the same process, they 
have different functions. While intellectuals elaborate and reproduce ideologies, 
bureaucrats maintain institutions. This is not a clear-cut division: intellectuals and 
bureaucrats exercise each others’ functions. Some institutions are used to dis-
seminate ideas and some intellectuals maintain institutions. 
As previously mentioned, capillary power is decentralized and relatively 
autonomous at the grassroots level. This happens also in authoritarian regimes 
and does not make them more democratic. The possibility of such a co-existence 
was noticed by Carl Schnmitt, who employed the concept of Verwaltungsstaat, 
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i.e. the state of administration or bureaucracy. Verwaltungsstaat involves a 
combination of authoritarian order and sovereign will at the highest level of the 
state apparatus and self-administration at grassroots levels (Schmitt 1968: 9). 
While Gramscian capillary power does not deny the existence of an overall center, 
it focuses more on the peripheral mechanisms, which possess relative autonomy 
and their own logic.  
Gramsci’s concept of diffuse indirect power was developed by Louis 
Althusser with his concept of ‘ideological state apparatuses’: ‘[T]he larger part 
of the Ideological State Apparatus is … part of the private domain. Churches, 
parties, trade unions, families, some schools, most newspapers, cultural ventures, 
etc., etc., are private’ (Althusser 2014: 243). Althusser draws attention to the 
necessity of institutions and organizations for the dissemination of ideas and 
stresses the connection between the state and the domain of civil society. This 
connection requires additional mechanisms besides the centralized coercive 
apparatus to govern civil society. Althusser’s concepts of ideological state 
apparatuses also influenced Foucault’s thinking on governmentality. Both of 
these concepts contribute to a broader understanding of capillary power which 
seems to be a more flexible phenomenon. Capillary power attracts attention to 
discrete actions and interactions of bureaucrats and intellectuals, while these 
actions and interactions are often deemphasized within structuralist theories.  
Capillary power manages grassroots activities on a daily basis with non-
coercive methods, constitutes the infrastructure of transformism, and enables the 
linkage of the police and potential challenges from below. Hence, transformism, 
capillary power, and the police determine the positions of lower classes within 
the hegemonic formation. Since subaltern classes are not passive, the next section 
will describe how subaltern positions are determined via transformistic processes. 
 
 
Subaltern classes within hegemonic formations 
Gramsci explained the positions of subaltern classes through their interrelations 
with the state and hegemony. Subaltern groups are subordinated to the state and 
the hegemonic formation established by dominant classes (Gramsci 1971: 202). 
The notion of subaltern classes was necessary to expand on the classical Marxist 
vision where oppressed classes were equated to industrial proletariat. In early 
twentieth century Italy, uneven and combined development produced a situation 
where the capitalist modernization faced the remnants of previous epochs. An 
analysis of this situation required consideration of not only workers from the 
developed Northern regions but also various factions of peasants and other groups 
divided by different dialects of Italian. ‘Subaltern groups’ was a term that referred 
to all these groups rather than just workers. Gyan Prakash notes that this 
Gramscian notion ‘refers to subordination in terms of class, caste, gender, race, 
language, and culture and was used to signify the centrality of dominant/ 
dominated relationships in history’ (Prakash 1994: 1477).  
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Describing positions of subaltern classes, scholars also focus on the short-
comings of representation and limited agency or lack of capacity for subaltern 
classes to act independently. This means that dominant groups speak about and 
for the subaltern groups. This approach is related to the works of Gayatri Chakra-
vorty Spivak (Spivak 1988) and the Subaltern Studies scholars. Viacheslav 
Morozov summarizes these definitions: ‘[T]he term “subaltern” refers to dis-
enfranchised individuals and groups, those whose agency is limited and who are 
deprived by the hegemonic social order of the possibility to make their voices 
heard’ (Morozov 2015, p. 1). 
Spivak also mentions that subalternity does not ‘permit the formation of a 
recognizable basis of action’ (Spivak 2005: 476). Marcus Green and Peter Ives 
add that ‘the political activity of subaltern groups rarely goes beyond certain limits’ 
(Green and Ives 2009: 9). The subordinated position of these groups prevents 
their mobilization. If they try to act independently, they face numerous problems. 
Even if they are able to protest, their activity often appears ineffective and is 
always influenced by the dominant classes (Liguori 2015; Gramsci 1971). 
While Gramscian theories concentrate on the non-coercive mechanisms of this 
domination and the relative consent of subaltern classes to be a part of the hege-
monic formation, it is not clear what enables this relative consent. Why do subaltern 
classes often share the hegemonic ideology and sometimes even its most conser-
vative variations? The answer can be found in the concept of common sense 
which derives from Antonio Gramsci’s works. He describes common sense as 
‘traditional popular conception of the world’ and associates it with ‘spontaneous 
feelings’ formed through everyday experience (Gramsci 1971: 433). The Gram-
scian tradition views ‘common sense [as] debilitating for subaltern social groups’ 
(Green and Ives 2009: 15). Andrew Robinson sees common sense as a source 
which is used by ruling elites to maintain status quo: ‘Political propaganda does 
not enter a void; it enters into a situation where conceptions of the world and 
cultural hierarchies already operate, and its role is rearticulation and dissection of 
existing ideas’ (Robinson 2005: 474). Although common sense is usually con-
servative and subjected to manipulations, it should not be considered in a one-
dimensional way. In addition, Gramsci introduces the notion of good sense which 
is ‘the healthy nucleus’ exiting in common sense (Gramsci 1971: 633). If the 
debilitating effects of common sense are overcome, it is due to good sense helping 
subaltern groups to protest.  
It would be a mistake to say that subaltern groups have essential and un-
changed ideological values. Green and Ives highlight ‘the dissonance between 
the imposed worldview and the conditions and understandings of those who are 
supposed to accept it’ (Green and Ives 2009: 15). In other words, this dissonance 
exists between conformist elements of common sense and good sense evolving 
from these ‘understandings’.  
To summarize, the positioning of subaltern classes within the hegemonic forma-
tion is problematic due to the fact that subaltern classes are not necessarily passive 
and supportive of the regime. The important question here is how subaltern classes 
adopt the hegemonic discourse and how this adoption influences protest activities. 
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Acceptance versus coercion:  
how subaltern classes accept the existing order 
Sustainable hegemonic formations presuppose that subaltern classes accept the 
existing order rather due to their adoption of the hegemonic discourse than due 
to repressions. Consent of subaltern classes is no less important than coercion. 
However, coercive measures attract more attentions of scholars than adoption of 
the hegemonic discourse by subaltern classes, especially when it comes to 
authoritarian regimes. At the same time, the exploration of coercion without 
analysis of consent can invite additional questions. Since coercion can be con-
sidered as an integral part of politics, it is always present in political life (Kapustin 
2003). Boris Kapustin (2003) notes that repressions from above may face a 
violent response from below. If repressions do not face a response from below, it 
can indicate the existence of consent.  
Drawing on the Gramscian theory, Ranajit Guha notes that hegemony suc-
ceeds if persuasion outweighs coercion within systems of dominance (Guha 1997: 
23). Guha describes the opposite situation in which the British colonial rule in 
India failed to obtain consent of the colonized and relied mainly on coercion. It 
means that the colonizers did not establish a hegemonic formation which would 
have included both the British authorities and the colonized. The sustainability of 
the hegemonic formation does not exclude coercion. Although repressions might 
be visible, no hegemonic formation can exist without consent of subaltern classes. 
Mechanisms enabling this consent are less evident and less explored than those 
of coercion. As an example, Michael Burawoy (1972) studied economic and 
managerial measures which secure workers’ consent at workplaces. At the same 
time, the emergence of political consent outside workplaces remains understudied.  
 This theoretical framework reconsiders the relationship between the regime 
and the state apparatus which can be considered in some approaches as objective 
bureaucracy (Weber 1978: 978–979). Authoritarian regimes do not exclude the 
existence of the neutral and apolitical apparatus which can be responsive towards 
demands from below and is not involved in coercion. However, this apparatus is 
responsible not only for administrative functions. The state apparatus in general 
and the local authorities in particular accommodate grassroots demands within 
the hegemonic formation. Thus, if the authoritarian regime relies on the sustain-
able hegemonic formation, consent can outweigh coercion and the state apparatus 
can respond to and satisfy grassroots demands. This does not make an authoritarian 
regime democratic. However, from this point of view, a sustainable democratic 
regime also has to secure the consent of subaltern classes, which presupposes the 
existence of a hegemonic formation. In other words, both authoritarian and demo-
cratic regimes allow subaltern classes to communicate their demands and influence 
the authorities. Such mechanisms include elections and various deliberative 
formats. They function differently depending on the regime type, but are indis-
pensable nearly everywhere for securing political legitimacy and contribute to the 
expansion of the hegemonic formation. 
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While elections, from a Gramscian perspective, could be considered part of 
the state apparatus, shifting the focus to other mechanisms highlights the role 
played by capillary power in bringing subaltern classes and dominant classes 
together. The Gramscian approach suggests that the imposition of the dominant 
worldview comes along with the assimilation of mass common sense, which 
represents entrenched feelings and views. Elaborating on Gramsci’s understanding 
of common sense, Ted Hopf notes that although every successful hegemonic 
project has to compromise with mass common sense, the latter can be in 
opposition to elites and their discourses (Hopf 2013). Thus, the hegemonic dis-
course and mass common sense do not coincide: there is an interplay and mutual 
influence between them.  
This responsiveness of the state apparatus presupposes the reservation of 
specific zones for legitimate expressions of discontent. Since subaltern classes 
are characterized by being underrepresented and unheard, it is to be expected that 
they seek to be properly represented and heard by the authorities. Thus, the 
expression of discontent may be a starting point of a protest which can become a 
part of democratic politics. Analyzing the 2011–2012 protests in Russia, Ilya 
Kalinin notes that protesters emphasized ‘stylistic creativity, which became not 
only a means of the articulation of political protests, but its very content’. He 
argues that ‘the problem of the expression of electoral will was conceived as the 
right to individual self-expression’ (Kalinin 2018: 51). It suggests that sometimes 
the pursuit of expression of discontent and self-expression may become an 
intrinsic value and an ultimate goal of protests as well as a part of protesters’ 
common sense. While Kalinin’s argument addresses mainly the 2011–2012 urban 
protests, the prevalence of symbolic actions over direct actions, which was high-
lighted by Robertson (2013) affects Russian labor and social protests in general. 
Therefore, the pursuit of self-expression and adherence to symbolic actions which 
aim to attract public attention are a part of protesters’ common sense.  
A sustainable hegemonic formation allows subaltern classes to express their 
demands. In other words, subaltern classes are not completely unrepresented and 
unheard. In some cases they have the possibility to express their demands through 
legitimate protests. Some of these protests may be successful, in the sense of the 
state apparatus agreeing to satisfy some demands from below. Hence, the hege-
monic discourse has to provide examples of legitimate protests which may be 
acceptable and successful. Protesters consequently adopt examples of acceptable 
and potentially successful activities. It means that the interplay between the 
hegemonic formation, which includes zones for expressions of discontent, and 
protesters, which ‘settle’ in these zones, constitutes a type of protesters’ common 
sense which define trajectories of grassroots activities. 
In sum, the existence of a hegemonic formation requires consent of subaltern 
classes. The sustainability of the formation presupposes that subaltern classes 
accept the hegemonic discourse as representing their interests, if not fully, then 
in most important respects. This acceptance relies on the responsiveness of the 
authorities, which accommodate demands from below, and on the workings of 
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capillary power, which propagates dominant views. As long as there is a func-
tioning hegemonic order, it retains some limited but prominent zones for the 
expression of demands, while protesters normally adjust their practices to stay 
within these zones. These adjusted practices also contribute to the proliferation 
of the hegemonic discourse and the expansion of the hegemonic formation.  
 
 
Operationalization  
The diverse relations between the Russian state and protest groups cannot be 
reduced to oppression and cynical manipulation. First of all, the hegemonic dis-
course is not absolutely hostile toward independent grassroots activities. Second, 
the hegemonic discourse sometimes overlaps with discourses of protest groups. 
It is necessary to analyze the hegemonic discourse and assess how it affects trade 
unions and social movements.  
Even though protest groups are not integrated in the hegemonic formation from 
the beginning, they are eventually included through processes of transformism. 
Social movements and labor unions usually address parochial problems which 
local authorities are responsible for. Constellations of trade unions, social move-
ments, employers, and local authorities form a part of the hegemonic formation, 
where protest groups occupy their own position. 
The inclusion of new and potentially challenging groups into the hegemonic 
formation leads to the expansion of this formation. This expansion is the essence 
of transformism. 
Expansion means that authorities and protest groups do not establish an 
antagonistic frontier but, on the contrary, intensify contacts. The intensification 
of contacts often appears through the development of deliberative processes. Some-
times protests result in public debates between protesting groups and local 
authorities. Deliberation enables the regime’s responsiveness and provides the 
opportunity to satisfy particular demands. As previously mentioned, this respons-
iveness and deliberative processes may prevent the political development of 
protest groups because this development requires antagonism. The disruption in 
the political development often preserves passivity and leaves problems unsolved. 
Minor successes and the intensification of public debates do not create any 
favorable environment for subsequent broader protests. In other words, the 
success of democratic politics may does not evolve into popular politics.  
The process of transformism can be identified using certain indicators. First, 
protesters’ demands are entirely or partially satisfied and the protest group which 
poses these demands arranges to meet and discuss local problems with authorities. 
Second, despite partial successes, the overall economic and social situation in the 
region remains poor, broader protests are unlikely or almost impossible, while 
protest groups do not want to risk their constructive relations with the authorities. 
Minor successes and gradual ‘learning’ of how to protest do not lead to political 
subjectification. In other words, minor successes combined with intensified 
deliberative processes and poor social and economic conditions serve as evidence 
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of transformism. Third, the failure of the political development of protests occurs 
when protesters do not try to find any new forms of activities even if the old forms 
seem to be ineffective.  
Since transformism relies on capillary power, another task of this research is 
exploring the latter phenomenon. The indicators of capillary power are wide, 
extensive, and diversified connections among authorities, employers, trade unions, 
and various protest groups and initiatives. Trade unions exercise functions of 
capillary power if they protest at the workplace and outside, addressing a wide 
range of social problems, and they cooperate with other social and civic move-
ments and connect them with the authorities. Hence, the focus here is on the 
mechanisms which enable contacts between protest groups and the authorities, 
and on the moment when a possible antagonistic frontier blurs. Thus, the question 
is how these contacts and mechanisms should be studied?  
As previously mentioned, hegemonic formations are principally diverse within 
themselves, and today’s Russia is no exception. This internal diversity manifests 
in two ways. Firstly, the diversity is discursive: the hegemonic discourse neither 
excludes the possibility of grassroots activities and protests nor marks them as 
inevitably dangerous and hostile. Secondly, the diversity occurs at the organiza-
tional level: trade unions, social movements, and civic initiatives are not sup-
pressed but treated as a reasonable part of public deliberation. 
Therefore, this research explores the hegemonic discourse and the develop-
ment of social and labor protests. The purpose of studying the hegemonic discourse 
is to show how social and labor protests and grassroots activities in general appear 
there and exemplify how they are related to other elements of the discourse. A 
positive attitude towards grassroots activities within the hegemonic discourse is 
an indicator of transformism. Another indicator is a possible proximity of the 
discourses of trade unions and social movements to the hegemonic discourse. 
Then, by exploring the development of social and labor protests the current study 
demonstrates how the state apparatus cooperates with trade unions and other 
protest groups within the field of public debates and deliberation, thus preventing 
democratic politics from evolving into popular politics. 
 
 
Methodology and case selection 
The Gramscian approach to the analysis of hegemonic formations presupposes 
an analysis of both ideologies and actual relations between protesters and the 
authorities. Hence, the methodology of my analysis is two-pronged. 
The first part is discourse analysis inspired by poststructuralist theories. The 
second part involves case studies of social and labor protests. The research starts 
with discourse analysis which provides an overall picture of the relations between 
the regime and grassroots activists. The second part includes case studies based 
on in-depth interviews and evidence from official web sites of trade unions.  
For postrstructuralist theories, the notion of nodal points is crucial and the task 
is to identify those within the discourse. This notion is elaborated by Laclau and 
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Mouffe, who associate nodal points with master signifiers and define them as 
privileged discursive elements which have a structuring function (Laclau and 
Mouffe 2001). Thus, discourses are organized around nodal points, while positions 
of other discursive elements can be comprehended through their relations to these 
nodal points.  
Marianne Jorgensen and Louise Phillips define a nodal point as ‘a privileged 
sign around which the other signs are ordered’ (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 26). 
In poststructuralist discourse analysis, ‘the other signs acquire their meaning from 
their relationship to the nodal point’ (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 26). Thus, the 
meaning of signs is defined by their relations with each other. Here, post-
structuralism is based on structuralist theories demonstrating that ‘signs derive 
their meanings not through their relations to reality but through internal relations 
within the network of signs’ (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 10). 
 Laclau and Mouffe argue that nodal points ‘fix meanings’ (Laclau and Mouffe 
2011: 113). In other words, signs can acquire different meanings depending on 
their position in the discursive formation vis-a-vis other discursive elements. 
Nodal points determine the precise meaning of other signs. Mouffe (2018) notes 
that by structuring the hegemonic formation, nodal points provide ‘the normative 
framework’ of a society. David Howarth adds that while the ‘aim of hegemonic 
projects is to construct and stabilize hegemonic formations’, these formations are 
organized around nodal points ‘that partially fix the identities of a particular set 
of signifiers’ (Howarth 2004: 259).  
Laclau and Mouffe postulate that relations among discursive elements are 
established through the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference. Chains 
of equivalence and, hence, hegemonic formations are incarnated in the empty 
signifier or ‘a signifier without a signified’ (Laclau 2007: 36). Since the empty 
signifier has no particular meaning, it both represents all elements of the equi-
valential chain and identifies the limits of this chain. Laclau argues that ‘the 
presence of empty signifiers is … the very condition of hegemony’ (Laclau 2007: 
43). The empty signifier symbolizes the unification of discursive elements. For 
example, a common goal, which all members of a group strive to achieve, or a 
common threat might be an empty signifier. This common goal or threat cannot 
be clearly defined and, hence, represent the subversion of signification.  
Changes in relations among elements are possible due to the openness of 
discursive elements to ‘different ascription of meaning’ (Jorgensen and Phillips 
2002: 28). Laclau and Mouffe call elements which cannot be attached to a per-
manent meaning floating signifiers. Floating signifiers acquire their meaning 
through the logic of equivalence which attaches them to a nodal point. Discursive 
practices compete over attaching of floating signifiers to nodal points.  
 Discourses of protest groups can be associated with hegemonic discourses 
through a set of interrelated nodal points. Elements of protesters’ discourses can 
be in a relationship of equivalence with elements of the hegemonic discourse and 
protesters’ discourses can be accommodated under in the hegemonic formation. 
Relations between discourses of trade unions and the hegemonic discourses 
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illustrate how the attachment of floating signifiers to specific nodal points re-
concile different discourses within the frameworks of the hegemonic formation.  
Therefore, my first task here is to analyze the hegemonic discourse in Russia, 
find its nodal points, and identify the positions articulated in the course of social 
and labor protests vis-a-vis these nodal points. The hegemonic discourse is 
analyzed through official statements and the largest pro-governmental media 
outlets. Then, I analyze discourses of social and labor protests and search for 
interconnections between them and the hegemonic discourse. Here, the next 
question is the selection of texts for analysis.  
Lene Hansen proposes four models for intertextual research. These models 
address official discourse, wider debate (parliamentary or media debates), cultural 
representations, and marginal discourses, respectively (Hansen 2006: 57). In my 
case I focus on the official discourse as it is represented in the public statements 
by President Putin and the pro-governmental media. Popular and high cultures 
reflect the sedimentation of the hegemonic discourse and are not appropriate for 
the analysis of techniques limited in time but may reconstruct a background. 
According to Hansen, marginal discourses include materials that are ‘concerned 
with policy’ but have ‘marginal status’ (Hansen 2006: 55). This involves, for 
example, texts of trade unions or social movements which are connected to the 
hegemonic discourse.  
Selected texts from the official discourse should meet the following criteria: 
‘they are characterized by the clear articulation of identities and policies; they are 
widely read and attended to; and they have the formal authority to define a political 
position’ (Hansen 2006: 76). 
To analyze official discourse I will use official texts such as the presidential 
addresses to the Federal Assembly, so called ‘Direct Lines’, and the annual press 
conferences where the president appeals to a broader audience. Another useful 
source for the analysis are articles published by the president to express his 
program before each presidential election.  
For a wider sample, I use the major pro-governmental media outlets, in which 
I analyse the materials covering events related to subaltern classes, their mobiliza-
tion in support of the regime, trade unions, and social and labor protests. These 
outlets include the two most important TV channels, Pervyi and Rossiia. Texts 
that were produced by these media have an advantage because they articulate the 
identity of subaltern classes and highlight specific policies.  
Then, I analyze specific cases of protests led by trade unions. I focus mainly 
on empirical examples of grassroots activities within the structure of the Federa-
tion of the Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR, Federatsiia Nezavisimykh 
Profsoiuzov Rossii), the largest federation of trade unions. I also analyze activities 
of the Confederation of the Labor of Russia (KTR, Konfederatsiia Truda Rossii), 
the second largest association of trade unions in Russia. It is not only trade unions 
which contribute to transformistic processes and mollify protests. However, trade 
unions and their activities provide a visible example of how social and labor 
conflicts are channeled to concessions between the authorities and protesters. 
Trade unions are not a part of the centralized apparatus, but cooperate with the 
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state at the same time, have sustainable organizations, and are permitted to organize 
protest actions. 
First of all, I demonstrate that discourses of trade unions have much in 
common with the hegemonic discourse. For this purpose I analyze program 
documents of trade unions and official statements on important all-Russian events 
such as elections or the pension reform. This analysis should prove that nodal 
points around which the discourse of trade unions is structured are the same as 
those in the hegemonic discourse. 
Then, I focus on several cases of unions’ activities in the North-Western part 
of Russia, where labor organizations are relatively energetic and influential. The 
selected regions include Leningrad Oblast, Pskov Oblast, and the Republic of 
Karelia. Trade unions of these regions are regularly involved in numerous protests, 
but at the same time thety collaborate with the authorities. Trade unions of the 
North-Western regions of Russia represent typical cases of unions’ activities. The 
selected regions do not differ significantly in terms of political situation and the 
position of trade unions. In all cases the local unions are quite active and relatively 
influential. According to several surveys (cf. Karta Trudovykh Protestov 2017, 
Reiting Protestnoi Aktivnisti 2019), the amount of protest actions in the three 
regions is moderate and close to the Russian average. Thus, these are three regions 
with the moderate amount of protest actions and active trade unions, which are 
involved in labor and social protests and cooperate with authorities.  
My main focus is on the social and labor protests where the FNPR was involved. 
Information about these practices is available on the official web site of the 
Federation and web pages of the regional organizations. However, web sites can 
provide only limited amount of information about protests and do not shed light 
on the communication between conflicting parties and, hence, on the workings of 
transformism. To better understand the functioning of trade unions, I took 11 in-
depth interviews, all of which were conducted in the period from 2017 to 2018. 
My informants were leaders and activists of the FNPR as well as trade union 
experts and consultants. They are all involved in certain protest activities, yet 
simultaneously cooperate with local authorities. The interviews focused on the 
following themes: how do trade unions participate in social and labor protests? 
what makes these protests possible and what hampers their development? how do 
trade unions interact and collaborate with the authorities? All informants have 
been involved in activities of trade unions in the aforementioned regions. I 
recruited leaders and top-ranking officials of local trade unions as well as trade 
union consultants who are able to provide a broader picture of labor and social 
protests in the regions. The interviews were anonymous and recorded.  
The interviews provide evidence of transformistic processes which neutralize 
and domesticate protests. I conclude that in all those cases protest was neutralized 
and domesticated, because, firstly, it succeeded on its own terms, which means 
that demands of the protest group were satisfied, but did not contribute to popular 
mobilization that could address the poor social and economic situation in the 
respective region. Secondly, interviewees acknowledge limitations of their forms 
of protest activities but do not try to find any new forms and prefer to deliberate 
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problems with the local authorities and intensify contacts with the regime. Thirdly, 
protests remain parochial and end with mutual concessions between the regime 
and protest groups. In general, this approach discloses that, although social and 
labor protests occur in Russia, they are included in the system of capillary power 
which prevents political challenges to the regime. 
In addition, I address the specific case of protests against the pension reform 
in 2018. This reform raised the age of retirement in Russia and provoked mass 
discontent. Trade unions were involved in the organization of a nation-wide 
protest campaign. The development of the 2018 protests was reconstructed on 
basis of evidence from official web sites of the FNPR and the KTR and the news-
paper Solidarnost’ published by the FNPR. The 2018 campaign was among the 
most significant social protests in Russia for the entire last decade. The number 
of protest actions in the third quarter of 2018 was 2.8 times higher than the 
number in the third quarter of 2017 (Rost Protestnoi Aktivnosti 2018). However, 
the campaign ultimately failed. Since trade unions played an important role in the 
2018 protests, it is important to explore which strategies of trade unions con-
tributed to this failure.  
Russian trade unions are rooted in the masses and handle protests on a regular 
basis. From this point of view, trade unions can potentially be more an important 
political actor than the non-systemic urban opposition. At the same time, the failure 
of the 2018 protests, which involved trade unions and the non-systemic opposition, 
demonstrates that neither the non-systemic opposition, nor trade unions were able 
to make the 2018 campaign effective. 
Analyzing the example of trade unions and the protests they organize, I 
demonstrate that while democratic politics can emerge and succeed within protest 
activities organized or supported by trade unions, popular politics is effectively 
prevented by transformistic processes, which the trade unions support. The 
examination of unions’ activities contributes to a practical understanding of trans-
formism and the relations between the Russian regime and the subaltern classes.  
 
 
The overall framework of analysis 
This section summarizes the theoretical framework utilized in this dissertation. 
In short, the theoretical approach relies on a poststructuralist interpretation of the 
Gramscian thought. 
Central notions of the dissertation are transformism and the hegemonic for-
mation. The hegemonic formation is a hierarchical bloc of various classes, groups, 
and their discourses. ‘Members’ of this bloc are not equal as there is a dominant 
force which organizes the formation under its own hegemony. Hegemony 
mobilizes elements of mass common sense and thus presupposes that subaltern 
classes partially accept the existing political order. 
 According to Laclau, popular politics can threaten the existing hegemonic 
formation. Popular politics constructs a new people and draws the antagonistic 
frontier between the people and the old order. The notion of transformism addresses 
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processes which prevent the emergence of antagonism and, thus, preserve the 
existing hegemonic formation. Transformistic processes involve accommodation 
of demands from below within the hegemonic formation. 
Since a sustainable hegemonic formation requires consent of the subaltern 
classes, elites have to respond to grassroots demands and partially satisfy them. 
Hegemony does not necessarily presuppose a suppression of protests expressing 
grassroots demands. Some protests can even go beyond local problems and give 
birth to democratic politics on a wider scale. The main difference between popular 
politics and democratic politics is that the latter coexists with the present formation 
and stops short of antagonism.  
Protest movements which adopt non-antagonistic approaches to grassroots 
activities channel discontent towards mutual concessions between protesters and 
the authorities. It must be highlighted that channeling here is understood as an 
outcome of grassroots activities, which is not common in the existing literature. 
Jennifer Earl (2003), for example, considers channeling as a repressive policy 
that restricts protesters and forces them to alter activities. By means of restrictions, 
the regime channels protests toward moderate activities. Protest movements which 
adopt non-antagonistic approaches to grassroots activities channel discontent 
towards mutual concessions between protesters and the authorities.  
To explore the workings of transformism in Russia, this dissertation examines 
the discourses and protest actions of Russian trade unions. Russian trade unions 
are in an ambiguous relationship with the state apparatus and the regime. On the 
one hand, trade unions organize and participate in numerous social and labor 
protests, some of which are successful. On the other hand, trade unions collaborate 
with the state; the discourses of the protesters intersect with the hegemonic dis-
course. This ambiguity allows trade unions to occupy zones within the hegemonic 
formation where the expression of grassroots demands is acceptable.  
Transformism is characterized by protesters’ adherence to deliberation and 
parliamentarianism. Therefore, the dissertation examines protest practices which 
consider public debates and parlamentarian procedures as an intrinsic value. The 
prioritization of parliamentarianism also indicates democratic politics. Activities 
of trade unions provide an example of this adherence to parliamentarianism and 
deliberative procedures. As previously mentioned, this argument does not pre-
suppose that trade unions are expected to overcome shortcomings of democratic 
politics and transit to popular politics. However, social conflicts and spontaneous 
protests, which occur in Russia, cause difficulties for the hegemonic formation. 
Trade unions defuse social tensions through deliberative procedures. The focus 
here is on processes which de-escalate social conflicts and channel mass dis-
content into discussions. Although other protest groups also channel grassroots 
discontent into deliberative procedures, trade unions are the most visible example 
of this channeling.  
The theoretical framework presupposes a focus on practices and discourses of 
trade unions. This focus gives precedence to agency of protesters over economic, 
cultural or social factors and governmental policies. At the same time, the empirical 
part also addresses the hegemonic formation and the hegemonic discourse, which 
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recognizes the legitimacy of some grassroots protests. The discussion on the 
hegemonic discourse and positions of subaltern classes within the hegemonic 
formation provides a context for the examination of Russian trade unions, which 
can be considered as representatives of subaltern classes. The analysis of trade 
union discourses demonstrates the intersection between protesters’ discourses and 
the hegemonic discourse. The exploration of protests which involve trade unions 
seeks to investigate how mass discontent is channeled to concessions between 
protesters and the authorities. In short, the analysis of discourses and practices of 
trade unions presents a broad sample that includes various forms of transformistic 
processes. 
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CHAPTER 3.  
The Russian hegemonic discourse and  
subaltern classes 
This chapter analyzes positions of subaltern classes and their activities within the 
Russian hegemonic discourse and how these positions affect transformism. 
Representation of subaltern classes and especially workers in the hegemonic 
discourse has significantly changed since the Soviet Union’s collapse and capitalist 
reforms of the 1990s. Some scholars note that in some liberal democracies and 
economies mass media often portrays subaltern classes in a pejorative way, as 
dangerous and inferior to middle classes (Jones 2012). However, it is not the case 
with the Russian official mass media. Subaltern classes are considered to be 
conservative and supportive of the regime. In this chapter, I demonstrate how the 
image of subaltern classes is constructed and how they are related to nodal points 
within the hegemonic discourse. 
I argue that the hegemonic discourse reflects the position of subaltern classes 
within the hegemonic formation. This position is controversial. On the one hand, 
the hegemonic discourse represents the subaltern classes as the regime’s genuine 
supporters which consequently means conservatism of subaltern classes. On the 
other hand, the hegemonic discourse does not preclude the possibility of labor 
and social protests, if these protests occur within certain limits. Therefore, local 
protests are both tolerated and prevented from transitioning to popular politics. 
In Laclau’s terms, democratic protests and democratic politics of subaltern 
classes are permitted, while popular politics is preempted. The transition from 
democratic politics to popular politics is prevented by the accommodation of 
demands within the hegemonic formation in the transformistic way. Antagonistic 
frontier does not emerge between the elites and the masses. The hegemonic dis-
course represents subaltern classes and their demands as isolated from each other. 
In other words, the hegemonic discourse counts different social groups separately 
and highlights diversified connections between the subaltern classes and the 
regime. As previously mentioned, the metaphor of counting was applied by 
Rancière to explain the functioning of the police which divides subaltern classes 
into particular professions and hinders the emergence of the people from 
particular social groups. The division of subaltern classes into separate groups is 
also in line with Laclau’s logic of difference which separates discursive elements. 
According to Rancière and Laclau, this separating count of subaltern classes and 
connections between them and the regime contribute to stability of the latter. 
Source selection is complicated when it comes to representation of subaltern 
classes in the hegemonic discourse. On the one hand, subaltern classes are on the 
margins of the hegemonic discourses. They are not in the spotlight of the main-
stream media. Unlike the Soviet ideology, the current official ideology does not 
prioritize the role of labor classes in history and politics. On the other hand, since 
subaltern classes are considered to be the regime’s supporters, they do attract 
some attention of mass media and officials. As previously mentioned, I analyze 
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official texts, namely presidential addresses, press conferences, and other state-
ments of the president and the prime minister. Additionally, I selected media 
messages of two largest TV channels (Pervyi and Rossiia) and the most circulated 
pro-governmental newspapers (Izvestiia, Komsomol’skaia Pravda, and Argumenty 
i Fakty). All of them have popular web sites as well.  
Official statements and pro-governmental media represent the hegemonic 
discourse. While official statements express policies toward subaltern classes and 
influence their identities, pro-governmental media outlets extend the discourse of 
official statements and appeal to broader audience than presidential addresses to 
the Federal Assembly.  
I focus on those official statements and media messages which deal with 
subaltern classes and their activities in relation to the regime. First, I discuss texts 
that portray subaltern classes in the context of major political events in Russia 
and abroad. These events include elections in Russia and other countries, protests, 
and various armed conflicts, such as in Syria and Ukraine. Second, I analyze texts 
that address relations between subaltern classes and governmental policies, such 
as mass media coverage of meetings between the officials and the representatives 
of subaltern classes or contribution of subaltern classes to Russia’s economic 
development. Third, I pay special attention to texts that address trade unions and 
their activities. These texts demonstrate that some labor protests are tolerated and 
that the regime and trade unions collaborate in some ways. Finally, I engage texts 
that describe subaltern classes as such and their values and virtues, from the point 
of view of pro-governmental media. These texts both reflect and construct the 
subaltern classes identity. I cover the period from the end of 2011 to the end of 
2018. 
The sample includes 393 statements and messages highlighting relations bet-
ween the regime and activities of subaltern classes. This sample mainly consists 
of messages from the TV channels Pervyi (198 units) and Rossiia (150 units). 
Statements from Russian officials, namely Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, 
number 24 units. Texts from other sources number 21 units.  
In terms of theory, this chapter illustrates the notion of dispersion elaborated 
by Foucault, Laclau, and Mouffe that I have discussed in the previous chapter of 
this dissertation. Since every discourse and every hegemonic formation is diverse 
and is a unity in dispersion, the Russian hegemonic discourse consists of different 
coexisting articulations that stand in various relations to each other. Antagonistic 
articulations constitute an exception because antagonism is a split of the hegemonic 
formation. For example, even if the Russian hegemonic discourse supports and 
promotes authoritarianism, it does not mean that this discourse cannot embrace 
other articulations which might be democratic ones and that it cannot promote 
grassroots activities.  
The first section addresses representation of Russian subaltern classes and 
discusses their relations to figures of stability and sovereignty. These figures are 
important because they are nodal points of the hegemonic discourse, as it will be 
demonstrated in the section.  
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The second section analyzes positions of subaltern classes of foreign countries 
within the Russian hegemonic discourse. Since pro-Kremlin media outlets pay 
special attention to international affairs, the examination of the image of foreign 
subaltern classes is also important for this research of the hegemonic discourse; 
it clarifies discursive positions of subaltern classes in general. 
The third section is a transition from discourses to organizations. Discourse 
analysis describes only one side of transformism. It is a preliminary phase of the 
research necessary for the analysis of organizational activities.  
 
 
Subaltern classes in Russia 
The inclusion of the subaltern classes in the hegemonic formation contributes to 
the sustainability of this formation. This inclusion is reflected and supported by 
the hegemonic discourse. I argue that the hegemonic discourse attaches subaltern 
classes to signifiers of stability and sovereignty which are nodal points of the 
discourse. This attachment assists to prevent potential antagonism between elites 
and masses. Moreover, this attachment allows to preempt transition from demo-
cratic protests to popular politics or, in other words, transition from local protests 
to political challenges. 
The main characteristics of the Russian hegemonic discourse are extensively 
described and analyzed by scholars within various theoretical frameworks. This 
section begins with a brief discussion of the literature addressing these charac-
teristics.  
The Russian hegemonic discourse prioritizes sovereignty and internal stability 
(Morozov 2008). Stability and national sovereignty are interrelated and inter-
dependent. In other words, internal stability is possible when the Russian state is 
sovereign and independent in its foreign and home affairs. At the same time, the 
state is sovereign and independent when it is stable from within. This discourse 
does not preclude diversity and allows the existence of different groups within 
the Russian nation. However, all these groups are supposed to cooperate with the 
state and contribute to the strengthening of sovereignty and stability.  
The discursive turn to stability was marked by Vladimir Putin’s texts, published 
in the end of 1999 before Boris Yeltsin’s resignation and the start of the 2000 
presidential campaign, and Putin’s two Addresses to the Federal Assembly in 
2000 and 2001. In the text entitled Rossiia na rubezhe tysiacheletii [Russia at the 
Turn of the Millennium], Putin, who at the time was the prime minister, wrote that 
Russia needed a strategy of the revival which was possible only under conditions 
of political stability. According to him, Russia had exhausted the limits of 
upheaval and radical transformations. In the 2000 address, Putin said that there 
would be neither revolutions nor counter-revolutions anymore. He specified: 
‘State stability built on a solid economic foundation is a blessing for Russia and 
for its people. It is high time to start living according to normal human logic’ 
(Putin 2000). The hegemonic discourse contrasts stability to the turmoil and 
disruption of the 1990s. Against the background of the collapse of the Soviet 
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Union and social and economic crises, Putinism is viewed as ‘a return to normality’ 
(Prozorov 2008: 219). Sergei Prozorov notes that the 2000s brought depoliti-
cization, the suspension of all political projects, and the decline of ideological 
parties (Prozorov 2008). Prozorov concludes Putinism was a pure maintenance 
of status quo. Stability and instability are empty signifiers for the hegemonic 
formation. They have no precise meaning and may relate, for example, to economic 
prosperity, independent foreign policy, absence of any acute political struggle, 
and so on. The impossibility of signification here makes stability and instability 
empty signifiers.  
After the 2011–2012 election protests and after the annexation of Crimea in 
2014, scholars question the fact that the Russian regime refrains from any 
political project and ideological mass mobilization (cf. Smyth, 2016). However, 
this maintenance of status quo, normalization, and stability remain important for 
the regime. In 2012–2014, the notions of stability and sovereignty were rearticu-
lated within the hegemonic discourse. It means that the protection of stability and 
sovereignty required certain political engagement of subaltern classes. Besides, 
as Prozorov argues, passivity should not be interpreted in terms of ‘pure inactivity’. 
Rather, passivity is a ‘ceaseless activity that is deprived of any telos, whereby all 
sorts of things happen for no reason whatsoever and can never be incorporated 
into a determinate Project’ (Prozorov 2008: 214). According to Prozorov, the 
absence of telos, however, does not mean pure aimlessness. Social and labor 
protests have aims but these aims are parochial, while, in this context, telos would 
be a universal aim of political subject. In other words, subaltern classes are not 
supposed to be passive all the time. They are allowed and sometimes even 
encouraged to be active if their activities do not result in political subjectivation.  
The hegemonic discourse is diverse, consists of various articulations, and 
includes also some democratic rhetoric. The Russian regime has never abandoned 
the democratic rhetoric completely and regularly appeals to the people as a bearer 
of ‘traditional values’ (Morozov and Pavlova 2018). The hegemonic discourse 
does not preclude the very possibility of grassroots activities and participation in 
decision-making. People are allowed to express their opinion within a specific set 
of limits. In fact, the hegemonic discourse has never abandoned democracy as a 
value. Rather, democracy has been subordinated to sovereignty and stability; it 
has been interpreted in technocratic and police terms. Russian leaders admit that 
democracy is necessary for economic development but warn that uncontrolled 
people’s activities can abuse civil rights and return Russia to turmoil of the 1990s 
(Morozov 2010).  
This democratic rhetoric within the hegemonic discourse presupposes that 
people may be active when it comes to protection of sovereignty and stability. In 
December 2011, the official mass media attempted to represent workers as sup-
porters of the present regime and as a counterweight to opposition rallies. During 
the annual Direct Line with Vladimir Putin on December 18, a manager from 
‘Uralvagonzavod’, a machine building plant in Nizhny Tagil, Igor Kholmanskikh, 
promised to go to Moscow together with the workers, forcibly disband rallies, 
and disband the opposition (Vladimir Putin Otvetil 2011). Thus, ‘Uralvagonzavod’ 
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became a symbol of the loyalty of subaltern classes and this Direct Line laid down 
the foundations of the subsequent discursive policy.  
In January and February of 2012, there were numerous rallies in support of 
the incumbent during the presidential run-up. The official trade unions partici-
pated in the organization of them.  
In 2012, Igor Kholmanskikh established a special social movement In Defense 
of the People of Labor. The declared goals of this movement were to maintain 
present political course and ‘stability’. ‘We have come to support our stability. 
We are for stability, for Russia… We do not want the 1990s, we should go forward’, 
said a worker at a rally in Yekaterinburg in February 2012 (Srazu Neskol’ko Partii 
I Obshchestvennykh Dvizhenii 2012). 
During the 2012 presidential campaign, workers and public employees partici-
pated in numerous events to support Putin. Official mass media stated that Vladimir 
Putin was a candidate of ‘ordinary people’ and the opposition represented ‘richer’ 
social groups (Kalinin 2018). In this regard, Komsomol’skaya Pravda quoted 
conservative pundit Sergei Markov: ‘While anti-Putin rallies in the capital were 
conducted by rich middle classes and “white collar” individuals, laboring people 
and workers who are in the “real sector” [i.e. industry] of economy advocate the 
prime minister [Putin]. It is evident that the latter are the majority in the country; 
they are Putin’s core electorate’ (Rukavitsy za Putina 2012). 
Laclau and Mouffe provide an example of the logic of difference by discussing 
policies of the nineteenth century British prime minister, Benjamin Disraeli. 
Disraeli observed a situation where European societies and the European political 
space were sundered by antagonism between poverty and wealth, and between 
‘ancient regimes’ and the people. To change this situation Disraeli advanced a 
formula of ‘one nation’. He aimed his efforts at the rupture of equivalential chains 
creating popular subjectivity. Laclau and Mouffe describe Disraeli’s methods as 
‘the differential absorption of demands, which segregated them from their chains 
of equivalence in the popular chain and transformed them into objective dif-
ferences within the system’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 130). Ultimately, Disraeli 
aimed to displace ‘the frontier of antagonism to the periphery of the social’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 130). The 2011–2012 policies of the Russian regime 
also illustrate the logic of difference displacing antagonism to the periphery.  
On May 6, the ‘All-Russian People’s Front’ organized a rally to celebrate 
Putin’s inauguration. The officials of the Front declared that this event brought 
together ‘true professionals’ including school and university teachers, entre-
preneurs, workers, and so on (Na Poklonnoi Gore Otmetili 2012).  
Workers and teachers are mentioned in one breath with entrepreneurs and all 
of them are enlisted as supporters of the regime. These social groups are different 
and official mass media do not insist that they are similar. Quite opposite, TV 
channels emphasize diversity of the regime’s supporters. Differences among 
them are considered to be objective and solid within the system. As previously 
mentioned, the logic of difference increases the complexity of political space and 
displaces antagonism to the periphery of the society. Disraeli’s and Putin’s 
formulas of ‘one nation’ presuppose the complexity and diversity of this nation.  
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May Day rallies provide another example of the logic of difference. After the 
collapse of the USSR, the former International Workers’ Day was renamed The 
Day of Spring and Labor but on May 1st traditional demonstrations still take place 
in Russian cities. These events usually involve different political groups, including 
United Russia. Local authorities and members of the ruling party walk together 
with trade unions. One of my interviewees, who works for trade unions, said 
about May Day rallies: ‘Once a year a governor might remember that most of the 
electorate are employees. It is possible to show some respect’ (Interview 3). Pro-
governmental media outlets usually report that ‘engineers and construction workers, 
teachers and doctors, scientists and public servants, employees of industry and 
transportation, social sphere and culture, energy and communication, commerce 
and housing services, students and veterans’ gather at a May Day rally (Pervo-
maiskiie Torzhestva 2014). The long enumeration of different trades highlights 
the diversity of social groups which compose the entirety of the nation together 
with elites. The report above also mentions, Sergey Sobyanin, a mayor of Moscow, 
who posed with workers for pictures and shook their hands. This example demon-
strates the work of transformism. The subaltern classes are not assembled into a 
people which could be antagonistic toward the regime. Quite the contrary, the 
subaltern classes are represented separately within the discourse and all of them 
are considered supportive of the regime. Laclau also provides an example of an 
interruption in an equivalential chain and mentions anti-communist rhetoric in 
the US of the 1950s: ‘The opposition between “parasites” and “producers” had to 
lose its centrality, while the link between “people” and “workers” was replaced 
by an appeal to the average man’ (Laclau 2005a: 135).  
In the hegemonic discourse the subaltern classes are apolitical and concerned 
with private issues. At the same time, they share conservative values promoted 
by the regime and are ready to confront the opposition when it comes to the 
protection of stability (Van’ke and Kulaev 2015). Pro-governmental media outlets 
argue that the subaltern classes do not participate in politics independently but 
become involved in politics, if a threat to stability emerges. In the hegemonic 
discourse, the subaltern classes are usually portrayed as passive and reactive, they 
do not produce any new ideas but maintain the status quo.  
The regime often appeals to subaltern classes when it needs popular approval 
for its political decisions. ‘Uralvagonzavod’ was the destination of the first 
Putin’s visit after his inauguration in May 2012. He presented his plans to improve 
wages and social benefits in accordance with what later came to be called ‘May 
Decrees’ (V Nizhnem Tagile Vladimir Putin Proviol Soveshchanie 2012). In 2017, 
Vladimir Putin announced his decision to run for re-election at the ceremonial 
meeting with workers of ‘GAZ’, an automotive plant in Nizhny Novgorod. 
It becomes clear that in this context the subaltern classes are portrayed by the 
hegemonic discourse in a positive way. For example, in 2010, more than a year 
before the 2011 protest rallies, President Dmitry Medvedev noted that mass 
media should have paid more attention to workers in constructing their positive 
image (Stenograficheskii Otchiot 2010). Medvedev made this remark at a meeting 
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of the State Council which discussed the professional education and the necessity 
to reinforce the prestige of industrial workers. 
Before the 2012 presidential elections, Putin published several programmatic 
articles. One of them covered economic and social issues and was entitled 
‘Building of Justice’. In this article he called workers ‘the backbone of every 
economy’ and mentioned the possibility to increase the workers’ participation in 
industry management (Putin 2012). At the 2014 annual press conference Putin 
called people of labor the true elite of Russia (News Conference 2014). 
Official mass media follow the trend set by Russia’s leaders. Pro-govern-
mental TV channels issued series of documentaries titled Heroes of Our Times 
and praised and glorified workers of various enterprises. One of these documen-
taries told about Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works and portrayed local employees 
as hardworking and patriotic (Geroi Nashego Vremeni 2012). Alexander Vlasiuk, 
a journalist from Magnitogorsk who was interviewed for this episode, argued that 
metal workers are the ‘backbone of the economy’ and their creative capacities 
coincide with the political will of the state leadership. Another documentary of 
these series told about professional technical schools which train industrial workers 
(Geroi Nashego Vremeni 2013). The producers of the documentary described 
working class as a ‘special category of people’ who enable the success of industrial 
production. Hence, the documentaries stress the importance of industrial workers 
for the economic development of Russia. This development, however, is con-
sidered to be an outcome of the joint effort between the subaltern classes and the 
state.  
A conservative writer and journalist Alexander Prokhanov also contributes to 
this ideology in his column of Izvestiia, one of the most circulated pro-govern-
mental newspapers. For example, when he describes an aircraft building plant in 
Komsomol’sk-na-Amure, he portrays workers and engineers of this plant as un-
selfish people who are ready to work even for free if it is necessary for the 
national interest (Prokhanov 2014). Prokhanov argues that workers helped the 
state to survive in the 1990s and that they reinforce the state now, at the time of 
the confrontation with the West. Prokhanov also mentions managers of this state-
owned enterprise who oversee the manufacturing processes. Thus, he creates an 
image of unity among workers, engineers, and the state, as the state and the 
employer are the same in this case. 
In sum, the hegemonic discourse constructs an alliance between the subaltern 
classes and the regime. The former are portrayed in the positive way as hard-
working and patriotic people who contribute to stability and economic prosperity 
of Russia. The regime, however, plays the leading role in this alliance. The existing 
hegemonic formation obtains an additional discursive pillar.  
Within the hegemonic discourse, the trade unions play the role of an important 
mediator in the dialogue between the regime and the subaltern classes. Thus, 
Putin often stresses the importance of the dialogue with trade unions on issues of 
the labor market and industrial relations (Putin Posovetoval 2014). In 2015, he 
delivered a speech at the congress of the FNPR (Vazhnyie Zaiavleniia 2015). 
Putin spoke about international relations and called on trade unions to strengthen 
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Russia’s sovereignty together with authorities. In addition, he said that the state, 
trade unions, and employers should cooperate to solve economic problems. Here, 
trade unions are chosen to be the audience of an important speech on international 
and home affairs. Speaking at the 2019 congress of the FNPR, Putin criticized 
those employers, who rejected dialogue with trade unions, and those represen-
tatives of the local authorities who did not pay attention to the cooperation with 
them (S’ezd Federatsii Nezavisimykh Profsoiuzov 2019). Thus, within the 
hegemonic discourse, trade unions are considered to be an integral part of the 
wide alliance created by the authorities. 
Pro-governmental media outlets often stress the role of trade unions in 
deliberation on issues of economic and social policies. According to official TV 
channels, the raise in the age of retirement in 2018 was discussed nationwide, and 
trade unions were involved in these debates. The government and the State Duma 
stressed the importance of trade unions in this deliberation (Vremia Peremen 
2018). Public debates in general are also important for pro-governmental media 
outlets. Thus, public hearings about the pension reform, with participation of 
trade unions in the State Duma were covered extensively with the emphasis on 
the role of trade unions (Pensionnyi Vozrast Proshiol 2018). 
In general, official mass media did not argue that the pension reform was sup-
ported unanimously (Profoiuzy – Vlastiam 2018). The hegemonic discourse 
allows the plurality of opinion. Trade unions considered allies of the regime were 
able to express their disagreement with the raise in the retirement age. Rallies 
against the pension reform were also highlighted by pro-governmental TV 
channels. The latter covered participation of trade unions in these rallies (Okolo 
6500 Chelovek 2018).  
Overall, official media outlets do not necessarily ignore social and labor protests, 
even when these activities are local and not massive. For example, in 2017, the 
economic department of Vesti, a news program of TV channel Rossiia, published 
a ranking of Russian cities with the highest level of protest activity (Desiat’ Samykh 
Bespokoinykh 2017).  
Therefore, the hegemonic discourse presupposes a specific position for sub-
altern classes. They are not considered as ignorant or dangerous. Since they are 
supporters of the regime, stability, and sovereignty within the hegemonic discourse, 
subaltern classes are portrayed by pro-governmental media outlets as patriotic 
and conservative. Subaltern classes are supposed to be apolitical and concerned 
mostly with private life but they can participate in street actions to protect the 
status quo. Subaltern classes are also allowed to participate in social and labor 
protests if these protests do not threaten the regime.  
Within the hegemonic discourse subaltern classes are not considered as 
absolutely passive and silent. According to official mass media, they just do their 
jobs and are satisfied with their lives under the regime,. However, the Russian 
regime does not exclude the possibility of people’s mobilization. First of all, 
people should be politically active, when it comes to the protection of sovereignty 
and stability. Second, they can express their disagreement with some policies and 
local authorities if this disagreement does not undermine the order as a whole. 
66 
Plurality of opinions and deliberation are also possible within the hegemonic 
discourse. 
In sum, the hegemonic discourse achieves its own sustainability through a 
certain articulation of subaltern classes’ positions. They are portrayed as the 
regime’s supporters which, when necessary, can protect Russia’s sovereignty and 
stability. They are conservative but not absolutely passive. Sometimes they can 
criticize some governmental policies if it does not undermine the order as a whole. 
This articulation helps to preempt potential antagonism between elites and masses. 
My argument can be reinforced by exploring the representation of foreign 
countries’ subaltern classes within the Russian hegemonic discourse. 
 
 
Subaltern classes abroad 
Official mass media pay special attention to international affairs. As widely 
recognized, the Kremlin propaganda projects an image of a fortress besieged by 
external enemies. The regime relies on the so called ‘rally around the flag’, which 
means that people appreciate the successes of the Russian foreign policy and 
support the existing political order. The discourse on foreign policy and inter-
national system should be examined within the framework for this research because 
it provides examples of positions of subaltern classes within the hegemonic 
discourse. Therefore, this section analyzes the representation of subaltern classes 
abroad. Subaltern classes of foreign countries demonstrate higher level of public 
engagement than Russian subaltern classes. Hence, representing subaltern classes 
abroad, the Russian hegemonic discourse specifies limits of permitted grassroots 
activities in general. 
First of all, the importance of sovereignty for the hegemonic discourse becomes 
more obvious when it comes to the interpretation of international affairs. Sover-
eignty as a concept and as a discursive element attracted the highest attention after 
the wave of ‘color revolutions’ considered a threat to the regime. For example, the 
pro-Kremlin youth movement ‘Nashi’ established in 2005 proclaimed that their 
goal was to preserve Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and confront 
external and internal enemies (Finkel and Brudny 2012). In that period a notion 
of ‘sovereign democracy’ was elaborated. Pro-Kremlin pundits produced numerous 
texts on problems of national sovereignty and criticized the EU and US for un-
dermining international stability. Richard Sakwa notes that‘[t]he core of Putin’s 
political identity is legitimism, support for sovereign constituted authorities’ 
(Sakwa 2017: 95).  
Sovereignty, as a discursive element, became even more important after the 
Arab spring and the ‘Euromaidan’. The hegemonic discourse describes these events 
as turmoil provoked by the West in order to colonize or re-colonize Ukraine and 
the Middle East. Russian media and officials insist that the real leaders of these 
protests were the European and US politicians. They supposedly organized 
‘Euromaidan’ using the old scenarios of ‘color revolutions’. ‘Color revolutions’ 
that occurred in the post-communist countries are connected to the ‘Arab spring’ 
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which was also sponsored by the West (Rossiia v OON Rasskazala 2017). Sakwa 
mentions that, according to the Russian authorities, ‘the US and its allies have 
repeatedly flouted international law in their various interventions’ (Sakwa 2017: 
93). According to Russian official media outlets, while the West organizes coups, 
people resist ‘color revolutions’ and try to protect stability.  
The discourse on Ukrainian affairs is illustrative of how the Russian hege-
monic discourse generally functions. From the very beginning of the protests in 
Kyiv in 2013, Russian mass media paid significant attention to the Ukrainian crisis.  
When the Ukrainian crisis began in 2013, president Viktor Yanukovich tried 
to mobilize the workers from the Eastern region. He united them with loyal 
entrepreneurs and tried to demonstrate that Ukrainian subaltern classes supported 
the regime against the opposition. As noted above, the same tactics were used by 
the Kremlin in 2011–2012. Representatives of Ukrainian subaltern classes, such 
as miners and metal workers, participated in rallies organized by the Ukrainian 
Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Posle Nochnykh Stolknovenii 2013). 
They showed their support of Yanukovich and his refusal to work with the 
European Union.  
During November and December of 2013, Ukrainian workers were associated 
with conservatism and pursuit for order and stability. According to Russian media, 
Ukrainian workers did not want to be a part of the European community. They 
saw their future in close collaboration with Russia. ‘People from the industrial 
East came to Kyiv. They support the decision of the government. Association with 
the EU would mean closures of enterprises and layoffs for public employees, 
miners, and metal workers. Russia and the CIS are their markets’, said Pervyi 
(Posle Nochnykh Stolknovenii 2013).  
After Yanukovich’s downfall, the conflict moved to the Eastern regions of 
Ukraine. Then Russian official mass media presented workers of Eastern region 
as supporters of Russian foreign policy and opponents of the new Ukrainian 
regime and its nationalist ideology. Reconstructing the Russian hegemonic dis-
course, Gerard Toal summarizes that, according to the Russian officials, ‘ordinary 
ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking people, concentrated particularly in the 
southeast, sought protection’ (Toal 2017: 238).  
 Russian mass media presented Eastern Ukrainian miners as supporters of the 
Russian foreign policy and opponents of the new Ukrainian government. 
According to Russian TV channels, Donbass miners condemned the protests in 
Kiev and regime change. They said in interviews that participants of the ‘Euro-
maidan’ went to the rallies, destroyed Kyiv, and did nothing useful while the 
miners worked. Here, Russian mass media demonstrate political virtues that have 
to belong to the subaltern social groups. These virtues include loyalty, social and 
political apathy. Political activity itself is condemned as idleness. Subaltern 
groups should perform their duties (work in mines, for example) and should not 
get involved into politics; however, when there is a threat to stability and order, 
they must drop their routines and defend the present regime. Donbass miners, 
who were dissatisfied with the new government and defined it as fascist, 
promised popular uprising (Novaia Zhizn’ Donbassa 2014).  
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Democratic rhetoric of the Russian hegemonic discourse is clearly visible in 
the so called ‘Crimean speech’ delivered by Putin to announce the annexation of 
Crimea. First of all, he criticized the ‘totalitarian state’ which transferred Crimea 
to Ukraine without asking its citizens. Then, Putin confessed that he sympathized 
with the Ukrainian people who ‘came out on Maidan’ and that he advocated ‘the 
right for peaceful protest’. However, according to Putin, this right was abused by 
nationalists and their ‘foreign sponsors’. Finally, he outlined the official version 
of ‘the reunification of Crimea with Russia’. In this version, ‘the reunification’ 
became possible due to joint efforts of Crimean people, local authorities, and the 
Russian state (Putin 2014). Therefore, this important speech discloses several 
features of the hegemonic discourse. It confirms that people’s activities are allowed 
within certain limitations. Protests are tolerated if they are peaceful. Democracy 
is not abandoned but should be temperate, otherwise unrestrained grassroots 
movements can be hijacked by destructive forces and become harmful. According 
to the logic of the ‘Crimean speech’, cooperation with authorities makes people’s 
activities fruitful and constructive. The ultimate example of such cooperation was 
‘the reunification of Crimea with Russia,’ when, according to official propaganda, 
‘local self-defense units’, people, local authorities, and, finally, the Russian state 
acted in concert.  
Russian media argue that subaltern classes support the Russian foreign policy 
across the globe. Analyzing the presidential campaign in France, pro-Kremlin 
pundits argue that Marine Le Pen who is backed by Moscow can use ‘Russo-
philia’, sentiments shared by ‘ordinary’ French people (Le Pen Idiot Va-Bank 
2017). The Russian operation in Syria was also supported in different countries 
and pro-governmental TV channels covered some rallies (V Rime Ustroili 2015). 
Here, Russian media outlets employed the distinction between ‘true’ Europe and 
‘false’ Europe. While ‘true’ Europa is characterized by national sovereignty and 
‘peoplehood’ and allied with Russia, ‘false’ Europe is characterized by the loss of 
sovereignty and anti-popular regimes and is hostile to Russia (Morozov 2009). 
According to this logic, the European subaltern classes are a part of ‘true’ Europe 
which does not confront Russia. Moreover, the high appreciation of activities of 
European subaltern classes within the Russian hegemonic discourse opens a 
space for the same appreciation of activities of Russian subaltern classes. 
Therefore, the Russian hegemonic discourse combines Putin’s support by 
Russian subaltern classes and support of pro-Russian political forces by subaltern 
classes in other countries (Ukraine and France, for instance).  
Russia tries to simulate anti-Western counter-hegemony, preserve authoritarian 
regime inside and forge its sphere of influence. The West is presented as an 
imperialistic power, which strives to colonize Ukraine. Colonization leads to 
economic crises, unemployment, impoverishment and cultural oppression of the 
Ukrainians and the Russians in the eastern regions. Thus, according to Russian 
official media, Russian regime conducts anti-imperialistic foreign policy and 
protects the entire principle of national sovereignty. 
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Speaking at the plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly in September 
of 2015, Putin accused the West of exporting democratic revolutions and un-
dermining the state sovereignty as such: ‘Aggressive interventions rashly 
destroyed government institutions and the local way of life… Power vacuum in 
some countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa obviously resulted in the 
emergence of anarchy’ (Putin 2015). Generalizing Putin’s approach toward revo-
lutions and uprisings, Sakwa correctly notes: ‘A popular movement agitating for 
democracy and human rights overthrows a stagnant and kleptocratic dictatorship, 
only to find that the alternative is worse’ (Sakwa 2017: 96). According to Putin, 
this worse alternative is promoted by the US interventions. 
However, this speech did not advocate authoritarianism and was not a mani-
festation of anti-democratic sentiments because Putin also employed the demo-
cratic dimension of the hegemonic discourse: ‘What is the meaning of state 
sovereignty? It basically means freedom, every person and every state being free 
to choose their future’ (Putin 2015). Therefore, the hegemonic discourse attaches 
sovereignty to citizens’ participation in the governing. It is another evidence that 
the hegemonic discourse does not exclude people’s grassroots activities. 
At the same time, these activities are supposed to be ‘civilized’, ‘peaceful’, 
and ‘legal’. The representation of the Yellow Vests movement within the hege-
monic discourse provides another example of how the Russian hegemonic dis-
course perceives protests abroad.  
In December of 2018, while talking about human rights activism and freedom 
of assembly, Putin said: ‘We do not want to have here events like in Paris where 
they destroy paving stones and set everything on fire’ (Zasedaniie Soveta 2018). 
He meant Yellow Vests movement. According to Putin, these protests in France 
deteriorated into riots and became an example of uncivilized and dangerous 
activities. 
In December of 2019, then prime minister Dmitry Medvedev mentioned the 
Yellow Vests during his conversation with mass media. He spoke about protests 
in general and said: ‘People can speak out – and it is absolutely normal. But 
speaking out should still be done in the manner prescribed by existing regu-
lations’. Then, he argued that in Russia the Yellow Vests protests could ‘erupt into 
a revolt’ which ‘would be nonsensical and ruthless’ (In Conversation with 2019). 
Medvedev quoted here a well-known phrase from Alexander Pushkin’s The 
Captain’s Daughter, a novella depicting the 1773–1775 peasants’ rebellion led 
by Yemelyan Pugachev. Medvedev also added: ‘At the same time, any legally 
authorized activity, including any activity related to expressing one’s views, is 
acceptable and even necessary’ (In Conversation with 2019). Here, ‘protest’ 
figures as a floating signifier, as it can acquire a variety of meanings oscillating 
between ‘nonsensical revolt’ and expression of opinions within the framework of 
existing regulations. The hegemonic discourse establishes equivalence between 
“protest” and legally authorized expression of opinions.  
Official media outlets extensively covered protests of the Yellow Vests. This 
coverage is varied and controversial. On the one hand, Pervyi and Rossiia 
recognize that these protests are not unfounded. On the other hand, mass media 
70 
criticize methods used by the protesters. This ambiguity illustrates positions of 
grassroots protests in the hegemonic discourse. Russian TV channels thoroughly 
enumerate demands of the Yellow Vests. For example, Pervyi reports: ‘The Yellow 
Vests are against rising prices, doctors are against the reform of the emergency 
vehicles, farmers are against the solutions of the ministry of agriculture’ (Parizh 
Gotovitsia 2018). Rossiia adds: ‘People are demanding reforms in economy and 
social policy’ (Aktsii ‘Zhioltykh Zholetov’ 2019). Commentators also note dys-
functional liberal-democratic governments that fail to meet people’s demands. In 
other words, media outlets argue that these protests were provoked by actual social 
and economic problems. At the same time, Russian TV channels criticize the 
Yellow Vests for radicalism and violent methods. Pervyi argues that the protests 
turned into marauding, robberies, and plain hooliganism (Uroki Neposlushaniia 
2019). The TV channel also condemns ‘populism’ of the Yellow Vests which 
hinders a possible peaceful solution of social and economic problems (Anali-
ticheskaia Programma ‘Odnako’ 2018). However, official media outlets admit 
that most protesters are peaceful, while the violent Yellow Vests discredit those 
civilized citizens. Pervyi reported that numerous peaceful protesters attended 
rallies because they wanted to express their disagreement with governmental 
policies and not because they wanted to fight police. The TV channel quotes one 
of the protesters: ‘I am angry. What is happening now [clashes with police] is 
discrediting the Yellow Vests and playing into the hands of police’ (Vo Frantsii 
Otmechaiut Godovshchinu 2019). Pervyi favorably mentions a women’s rally 
which took place in Paris on January 6, 2019. According to the TV channel, it 
was a peaceful attempt to communicate ideas of the protests to the authorities: 
‘Participants complained that numerous violent episodes which accompany 
protests of the Yellow Vests eclipse the essence of the problem’ (V Tsentre Parizha 
Sobralis’ 2019). 
Therefore, in the Russian hegemonic discourse the French protests oscillate 
between the reasonable and justified expression of disagreement and senseless 
and lawless riots fueled by populist sentiments. Official media outlets mention 
that the Yellow Vests involved people of various social groups and professions. 
There is a difference between the coverage of the ‘Euromaidan’ and the one of 
the Yellow Vests. In the case of the ‘Euromaidan’, Russian media outlets stripped 
the protesters’ activities and goals of any justifiable motives. In the case of the 
Yellow Vests, protests were conceived of as an outcome of actual social and eco-
nomic problems. Thus, the Russian hegemonic discourse can tolerate and justify 
grassroots protests. It is obvious that pro-Kremlin media discriminates between 
the ‘Euromaidan’ and ‘yellow vests’ because the former was harmful for Russian 
foreign policy unlike the latter. However, the TV channels criticize the Yellow 
Vests for crossing a certain line. Official media condemn protest actions which 
go beyond the legal frameworks and avoid peaceful solutions. According to 
Pervyi, populism of the Yellow Vests makes their demands impossible to satisfy.  
The example of the Yellow Vests and their image in Russian official media 
also illustrate how the Russian hegemonic discourse positions grassroots protest 
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activities. Protesters are supposed to peacefully express their discontent and 
discuss it with the authorities in order to find an acceptable solution.  
The hegemonic discourse is able to appropriate independent activities of 
subaltern classes. It means that the hegemonic discourse reserves a specific place 
for these activities and for their discussion and does not criticize them directly. 
However, it sets limits for grassroots activities and connects these activities with 
nodal points of the discourse. In other words, subaltern classes and their activities 
contribute to maintenance of stability and protection of sovereignty. The re-
presentation of grassroots activities within the hegemonic discourse indicates that 
these activities become a part of the current hegemonic formation. The alignment 
of subaltern classes’ activities with nodal points of the discourse provides a dis-
cursive base for the domestication of these activities and, hence, the preemption 
of antagonism between the regime and subaltern classes.  
The hegemonic discourse allows grassroots activities. It reflects the inclusion 
of subaltern classes into the hegemonic formation and the creation of their con-
sent to the current rule. There is a democratic dimension of the hegemonic dis-
course which endorses even social and labor protests within certain limits, 
plurality of opinions, and moderate discontent. 
 
 
From discourses to the hegemonic formation 
Two previous sections address the hegemonic discourse on subaltern classes and 
grassroots activities. As previously mentioned, the Russian hegemonic discourse 
considers subaltern classes as supporters of the current regime. Grassroots 
activities are allowed if these activities do not challenge the regime. Social and 
labor protests are supposed to be peaceful and apolitical.  
Even a quick glance at actual social and labor protests in Russia will show that 
they are peaceful and apolitical indeed. Therefore, one must explain the influence 
of official mass media on grassroots initiatives. Greene and Robertson (2018), for 
example, emphacize Vladimir Putin’s popularity. Sociologist Sarah Ashwin, who 
studied Russian workers’ ‘patience’ in the 1990s, tries to find origins of this 
patience in the culture of individual and collective dependence, which means that 
workers rely on their leader and abandon collective actions to solve problems at 
workplaces (Ashwin 1999). In other words, she explains the mildness of protests 
through certain cultural factors.  
In the 1990s, however, when Ashwin conducted her research, workers were 
neither passive nor patient. Numerous labor protest, including, for example, miners’ 
strikes and massive trade union rallies, took place in the 1990s. In fact, there are 
still plenty of social and labor protests and collective actions in Russia every year. 
The number of labor protests increases from year to year since the 2008 crisis 
(see: Bizyukov 2018). The average number of actions in 2008–2014 was 20.1 per 
month. In 2015 and 2016, this indicator was more than 34 per month due to the 
economic crisis. In 2017 it slightly decreased to 28.3 actions per month because 
the economic situation became more stable (Trudovyie Protesty 2017). In 2018, 
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Russian trade unions were involved in nationwide protests against the pension 
reform. As Samuel Greene notes, ‘Russian citizens are best understood not as 
passive, untrusting, and hide-bound individuals but as adept navigators of a 
shifting and uncertain sociopolitical landscape’ (Greene 2014: 220). Indeed, 
Russian subaltern classes participate in protest actions and sometimes succeed 
solving specific problems. However, local successes neither improve labor 
conditions and living standards, nor promote democratization of Russia. In her 
research, Ashwin registers, rather, disbelief in significant social changes than age-
old passivity and infinite patience. Hence, one should inquire into not why people 
are passive but why their activities do not result in significant political and social 
changes. 
Gramsci’s theory argues that the hegemonic formation is not reduced to the 
hegemonic discourse expressed through mass media and official statements. As 
previously mentioned, the concept of hegemonic formation derives from Gramsci’s 
historical bloc reconsidered through discourse analysis. While historical bloc is a 
hierarchical alliance of different social groups and organizations, hegemonic 
formation is a hierarchical alliance of discourses. According to Gramsci, histori-
cal bloc relies on capillary power to obtain coherence. Capillary power also con-
nects elites and masses. It enables to accommodate and satisfy demands from 
below. Moreover, capillary power facilitates the proliferation of the hegemonic 
discourse.  
Relations between Russian authorities and grassroots activities are manifold 
and sophisticated because, from the Gramscian perspective, there is no strict 
divider between the state and civil society. Therefore, the state simply does not 
need to suppress all grassroots activities. Hence, even under the authoritarian 
regime, relations between authorities and civic associations can be productive for 
both sides. Scholars, who study the functioning of organizations of civil society 
in Russia, describe the impact of the state in different ways; however, they usually 
note that authorities may create new opportunities for civic associations, provide 
funding for these associations, discuss problems with these associations, and use 
the expertise provided from non-governmental organizations (cf. Aasland, Berg-
Nordile and Bogdanova 2016, Chebankova 2012, Skokova, Pape and Krasno-
polskaya 2018). Thus, the regime and citizens’ initiatives may sometimes col-
laborate with mutual benefit. Catherine Owen (2020) notes that although authorit-
arian states may allow citizens’ participation in local policy processes, this 
participation does not contribute to democratization.  
In some cases authorities initiate citizens’ activities and promote civic asso-
ciations. Although many state-supported organizations only simulate grassroots 
activities, some of them provide the possibility to participate in social life 
(Brunarska 2018).  
Relations between authorities and civic associations are far from being unequi-
vocally antagonistic. The regime allows and sometimes even promotes numerous 
diverse organizations of civil society. Then, social and labor protests regularly 
occur in different regions. Hence, Russian subaltern classes are not passive and 
their protests are not necessarily suppressed or obstructed by coercion.  
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An informant who is a trade union consultant and has worked with the FNPR 
discloses: ‘The regime delineates a “field of friends” and a “field of enemies”… 
Many things are permitted within the field of trade unions defined as friends… 
Open opposition is being eradicated, but there will be a lot of activities within the 
field of friends including: strikes, serious demands, and even mass rallies’ (Inter-
view 1). The regime tolerates social and labor protests, if they remain within a 
limited field. It means that there are specific zones where these protests are allowed 
and which often emerge around FNPR organizations. So called ‘enemies’ are 
mainly the non-systemic opposition. Some labor unions also face strict reactions 
from the state to their activities. 
Recent cases of imprisonment of union leaders include criminal trials of dockers 
in Nakhodka (a Far Eastern port town) in 2014–2015 and pilots in Moscow in 
2013–2016. Trade unions and human rights activists considered both cases to be 
political repressions against independent organizations (Podarki Dokeram 2014; 
Leonid Tikhonov 2015; Liderov ShPLS 2016). However, such criminal prosecu-
tions do not form any systematic repressive policy against trade unions. The 
aforementioned trade unions of dockers and pilots, for example, could continue 
their usual activities after those trials. 
It is not only the authorities who violate trade union rights. Another challenge 
comes from unlawful practices used by employers. Owners of enterprises often 
refuse to recognize trade unions and sometimes use intimidation tactics against 
their activists (Ostrovskaia 2018). State repressions against activists of trade 
unions appear as sporadic actions rather than a coherent strategy. In fact, the 
regime needs grassroots protests to calibrate its own policies. 
As a rule, numerous labor and social protests start with spontaneous, un-
authorized actions. The Russian legislation restricts the freedom of assembly. 
Rally organizers have to obtain approval from the local authorities to hold a street 
event. In 2012, a new law increased fines for the violation of the legislation on 
rallies. In 2014, the parliament adopted a law which criminalized repeat viola-
tions of the legislation on rallies (Federal’nyi Zakon 2014). In 2012, a law on so 
called ‘foreign agents’ was adopted. This law restricts foreign donations to non-
profit organizations including trade unions (Federal’nyi Zakon 2012). The Labor 
Code adopted in 2001 tightened the rules for strike organizing. In order to 
organize a legal strike, workers have to start a collective labor dispute, call a 
meeting attended by more than 50% of workers, and achieve a majority of votes 
in favor of the strike (Trudovoi Kodeks 2001). Tomila Lankina and Alisa Voznaya 
stress that in 2007–2012, ‘on average, 26% of Russian protests met some kind of 
repression from the Russian authorities or pro-government associations’ (Lankina 
and Voznaya 2015: 338).  
Restrictive laws and real possibility to be prosecuted can intimidate potential 
protesters. However, the percentage of spontaneous protests is relatively high. In 
2013–2018, the share of spontaneous labor and social protests in the total number 
of protest actions grew from 35% to 63% (Trudovyie Protesty 2019). It does not 
mean that all spontaneous protests break Russian laws as petitions, for example, 
are among the most wide-spread means of protests (Bizyukov 2019b; Trudovyie 
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Protesty 2019). At the same time, spontaneity increases the probability of the 
action to be unauthorized as trade unions prefer to act within the legal framework 
(Bizyukov 2019b: 478). In 2008–2011, the rate of labor protests which followed 
prescriptions of the Labor Code declined. While in 2008 11% of labor protests 
used means prescribed by the Labor Code, in 2011 the share of this type of pro-
tests was amounted to only 8% (Bizyukov and Olimpieva 2014: 69). Although 
appeals to authorities do not break the law, they are not considered by the Labor 
Code as a regular form of labor protests. When it comes to rallies specifically, in 
2017–2018, 16.5% of rallies were unauthorized (Rost Protestnoi Aktivnosti 2019). 
The above suggests that spontaneous and unauthorized actions occur regularly 
as the effectiveness of legal means of protest has decreased. Repressions and 
restrictive laws do not eliminate open expressions of discontent. Dissatisfied 
workers see fewer possibilities of the legal expressions of their demands. Activities 
of trade unions, however, aim to channel popular discontent to legal frameworks. 
As previously mentioned, protest movements strive to participate in deliber-
ative processes. Their goal is to discuss social problems with the authorities. 
Despite censorship, lack of independent media outlets, and mostly fraudulent 
elections, Russia has an environment for public debates on certain issues of social 
life. Many protests start with submissions of complains and petitions to authorities 
(Gladarev 2011). Thus, protest groups usually try to establish the dialogue with 
the state. Although many protests occur spontaneously and protesters often 
experience problems with the organization of ‘civilized’ discussions, challenging 
groups are routinely involved in deliberative processes and cooperation with the 
state.  
The hegemonic formation embraces various organizations and grassroots 
activities that are not necessarily suppressed by the state. Social and labor protests 
occur regularly and sometimes succeed. However, these activities take place 
within the existing hegemonic formation and consent to the current rule. In other 
words, grassroots activities can become a subset of the hegemonic formation. At 
the discursive level, discourses of the subaltern classes and their activities are 
articulations of the hegemonic discourse. In Laclau’s terms, these activities and 
discourses compose democratic politics which does not challenge the hegemonic 
formation but diversifies it and by these means makes it sustainable. While this 
chapter describes general characteristics of the hegemonic discourse and the 
hegemonic formation which manage and transform grassroots activities, the next 
chapter covers Russian trade unions proper. These unions usually engage in 
protest actions but avoid antagonizing the regime and the state.   
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CHAPTER 4.  
The system of Russian trade unions 
As has been stated in the theoretical part of this work, transformism requires not 
only specific policies, but also a certain type of activities from below and 
institutional sites where governmental policies and grassroots activities meet. I 
argue that Russian trade unions provide these institutional sites.. This chapter 
addresses the organizational structure and discourses of Russian trade unions and 
allied social movements. 
Russian trade unions are not uniform. While some of them are quite active, 
others are not. They may criticize the government or refrain from such criticism. 
However, most of them are involved in social and labor protests. These protests 
occasionally result in democratic politics but popular politics has not emerged yet. 
Trade unions often go beyond workplace problems and address region-wide or 
even nation-wide issues. At the same time, mutual concessions between trade 
unions and the authorities fractionize the protest. 
The position of trade unions within the hegemonic formation is ambiguous. 
On the one hand, trade unions organize protests and contribute to their successes. 
In this way, they often improve labor conditions and living standards. On the other 
hand, trade unions fulfill functions of capillary power. They connect the regime 
and subaltern classes and provide the organizational base for this connection.  
The first section of this chapter introduces Russia’s main trade unions. It 
provides a brief overview of the post-Soviet history of trade unions and describes 
organizational structures of trade unions, their general activities, and their rela-
tions to the state.  
The second section addresses discourses of trade unions and demonstrates that 
they are subsumed within the hegemonic discourse. This subsumption also prevent 
the emergence of antagonism and popular subjectivation, although isolated social 
and labor protests may take advantage of being in alignment with the hegemonic 
discourse. I analyze texts produced by trade unions. I focus on programmatic 
documents and statements of trade unions’ leaders. I pay specific attention to those 
texts that address protest activities and major political events, mainly elections. 
The third section discusses how trade unions and their discourses contribute 
to transformism.  
 
 
Organizations of trade unions 
Russia has a developed and diversified system of trade unions which ‘form by far 
the largest component of an organized civil society’ (Traub-Merz and Gerasimova 
2018: 184). Organizations of trade unions vary by their relations with authorities 
and repertoires of actions. Scholars usually distinguish trade unions, which are 
members of the FNPR, and other trade unions which do not belong to the 
Federation. The former are called ‘traditional’ or ‘official’ and the latter are called 
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‘alternative’ or ‘free’ (Olimpieva 2010). ‘Traditional’ trade unions tend to 
cooperate with authorities and act within the framework of ‘social partnership’ 
which means the collaboration of authorities, employers, and trade unions and 
requires the solution of industrial conflicts through collective bargaining. 
‘Alternative’ trade unions rely on protest actions, such as rallies and strikes, and 
sometimes operate as uninstitutionalized social movements (Olimpieva and 
Bizyukov 2014). However, this division is not absolutely clear in all situations. 
In some cases FNPR organizations appear to be active and involved in protest 
activities within and out of workplaces. ‘Alternative’ trade unions, vice versa, 
also cooperate with authorities and follow principles of social partnership.  
The FNPR was founded in 1990, while the All-Union Central Council of Trade 
Unions (Vsesoiuznyi Tsentral’nyi Sovet Professional’nykh Soiuzov, VTsSPS), the 
old Soviet trade union federation, still existed. The word ‘independent’ in the 
name of the FNPR meant the independence of this new organization from the 
Soviet bureaucracy. The FNPR manifested a break with the history of the Soviet 
trade unions which were under total control of the state. This new and inde-
pendent worker movement played a significant role during perestroika. Labor 
protests were an important part of anti-Soviet movements. However, after the 
dissolution of the VtsSPS in October 1990 and the collapse of the USSR, the new 
federation gradually turned into a pro-government structure. The FNPR became 
a successor of the VtsSPS and inherited its property and large membership base, 
which was significantly shrinking during the 1990s. Nowadays, the FNPR has 
approximately 20 million members.  
Relations between the Kremlin and leaders of the largest trade union organ-
ization were defined in the beginning of the 1990s. At first, the FNPR stood in 
opposition to the Kremlin and supported the Supreme Soviet in the 1993 constitu-
tional crisis (Ashwin and Clarke 2002). Leaders of the Federation called for 
strikes and people’s mobilization against President Boris Yeltsin. As a con-
sequence, government froze the FNPR bank accounts. Then, the FNPR congress 
set course for the de-escalation of the conflict with the Kremlin and elected a new 
chair, Mikhail Schmakov, still in the office. According to the official FNPR report, 
in 1993, trade unions were in a critical situation, because the leadership failed to 
estimate the situation correctly and dragged trade unions into the political conflict 
(Profsoiuzy Rossii 2005).  
After 1993, the FNPR decided to support President Yeltsin and refused to 
create a coalition with his opponents, the Communist Party of the Russian Federa-
tion. In exchange, the Kremlin allowed the FNPR to secure ownership of the 
Soviet trade unions’ property and become the leading labor representative in the 
bargaining processes. Yeltsin’s administration, for its part, prevented the forma-
tion of a potentially strong opposition backed by trade unions (Olimpieva and 
Orttung 2013). 
Despite the alliance between the FNPR and the Kremlin, the Federation was 
deeply involved in social and labor protests of the 1990s. The FNPR organized 
numerous all-Russian ‘days of actions’ to criticize economic reforms of Yeltsin’s 
governments, defend worker rights, and protect wages and social benefits. These 
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‘days of actions’ included rallies and strikes and were well attended across the 
country. However, Sarah Ashwin and Simon Clarke note that the FNPR demon-
strated its adherence to social peace. The attachment to principles of social partner-
ship allowed to avoid the escalation of conflicts during the period of economic 
crises (Ashwin and Clarke 2002).  
The FNPR did not stay away from miners’ protests, which proved to be 
significant events in social and political life of Russia in the 1990s. They began 
at the end of the 1980s and contributed to the final collapse of the USSR. The 
post-Soviet movement of miners was heterogeneous. Firstly, there was the Inde-
pendent Trade Union of Miners (Nezavisimyi Profsoiuz Gorniakov, NPG). 
Secondly, there was Rosugleprof, a trade union of miners within the FNPR. Both 
of these unions organized numerous rallies and strikes in different regions, but 
some actions were spontaneous. The NPG could be considered a more radical 
union than the FNPR, since the former relied more on street action than on 
negotiations with the authorities. However, during the presidential election of 
1996, both the NPG and the FNPR officially supported Yeltsin (Solovenko 2016). 
This case demonstrates that trade unions, which did not belong to the FNPR, also 
avoided political confrontation with the government and strove for mutual 
concessions.  
In 1998, labor and social protests in Russia peaked. Besides miners, public 
employees, who were mostly members of FNPR unions, went on strike and took 
part in mass rallies across the country. For example, on October 7, the FNPR 
organized another all-Russian protest day which was one of the most massive 
actions in the post-Soviet history of Russia (Profsoiuzy Rossii 2005). However, 
trade unions preferred not to radicalize the protest movement, refrained from a 
direct political confrontation with the government, and became involved in 
dialogues with the Kremlin and regional authorities. The FNPR and authorities 
worked together to reduce the level of social unrest and keep protests ‘civilized’ 
(Katsva 1999). 
In the 1990s, trade unions already faced the pressure from the authorities. It 
would be an exaggeration to say that the authoritarian turn of the 2000s signi-
ficantly strengthened this pressure as sporadic attacks on trade unions took place 
already under Yeltsin. As previously mentioned, when the FNPR tried to support 
the Supreme Council during the 1993 crisis, its bank accounts were frozen and 
the chair had to resign. In 1998, some participants of miners’ protests were pro-
secuted for railroad blockades. However, there were no large-scale repressions 
against trade unions and actual prison sentences for participants (Solovenko 2016).  
In the 2000s and 2010s, the number of protests decreased due to the economic 
growth and the improving standard of living. Moreover, the new labor legislation 
restricted strikes. The window of opportunity for action shrank with the con-
solidation of the authoritarian regime.  
 As previously mentioned, the Labor Code, which was adopted in 2001, com-
plicated procedure for collective disputes and made legal strikes almost impossible. 
Experts and human right activists often criticize the Russian legislation on strikes 
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(Bizyukov 2015; Liutov 2012). In 2007, for example, a group of Russian socio-
logists signed a collective letter calling for revision of the Labor Code (Trudvoyie 
Spory 2007). The authors argue that the overwhelming majority of strikes in 
Russia are illegal because of the complexity of the bureaucratic procedures.  
Then, in 2004, the new law on assemblies, rallies, and demonstrations was 
adopted; after the 2011–2012 mass protests, it became significantly stricter. 
Finally, laws on non-governmental organizations and foreign agents restricted? 
the freedom of associations. Thus, trade unions lost some opportunities for legal 
action. At the same time, actual strikes, not registered by the authorities and 
employers as ‘legal strikes’, also occur regularly. For example, in 2014–2018, some 
35% of labor protests include work stoppages that do not meet legal requirements 
(Trudovyie Protesty 2019).  
Transformation of the party system in Russia also affected the FNPR. The 
Federation uses parliamentary elections to achieve its goals. During the 1990s, 
when there was no hegemonic pro-presidential party, the FNPR cooperated with 
different political forces and established its own electoral blocs. In the late 1990s, 
the Federation formed a tactical alliance with the mayor of Moscow Yury Luzhkov 
and his movement Otechestvo, which was supposed to be a frontrunner of the 
1999 parliamentary elections. This move canceled the creation of a trade union 
parliamentary party which could have become a political wing of the FNPR. As 
Ashwin and Clarke mention, by the end of the 1990s the FNPR realized that trade 
unions ‘had to work with whoever held the power’ (Ashwin and Clarke 2002: 57). 
Therefore, when United Russia took the State Duma and regional legislatures, the 
FNPR turned into a strategic ally of the leading party. 
The cooperation with United Russia appears fruitful for the FNPR. The 
Federation finally obtained the opportunity to regularly delegate its represent-
atives to the State Duma and regional legislatures. In general, the FNPR is 
involved in parliamentarian procedures and participates in numerous debates on 
legislative issues and social problems.  
As previously mentioned, besides the FNPR, there are alternative trade unions 
in Russia. The largest federation of alternative unions is the Confederation of 
Labor of Russia (Konfederatsiia Truda Rossii, KTR). The KTR was established 
in 1995 but soon split into two organizations: the KTR and the All-Russian 
Confederation of Labor (Vserossiyskaia Konfederatsiia Truda, VKT). These two 
confederations reunited in 2011 and the KTR exists now as a unified organization. 
The KTR is much smaller than the FNPR and has 2 million members. The 
KTR structure differs from that of the FNPR and does not have territorial units. 
The absence of regional branches allows the KTR ‘to handle plant union affairs 
directly’ (Traub-Merz and Gerasimova 2018: 170).  
In the 2000s, alternative trade unions received a new impetus. The economic 
revival and opening of new foreign-owned enterprises created opportunities for 
the development of trade unions. The relative flexibility of non-FNPR labor 
organizations allowed them to take advantage of the economic growth of the 
2000s. In 2011, the KTR had local unions at several automotive plants including 
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Ford, General Motors, Nissan, Volkswagen, and AutoVAZ, infood industry, among 
teachers and doctors, and so on. 
While the FNPR cooperates with United Russia, the KTR delegates its 
representatives to the State Duma and local legislatures thanks to its alliance with 
Just Russia, a party which belongs to the so called ‘systemic opposition’. It 
supports the Kremlin’s policies in general but sometimes criticizes United Russia. 
The KTR is also involved in existing deliberative mechanisms. Boris Kravchenko, 
chair of the KTR, is a member of the Presidential Council for Civil Society and 
Human Rights (Chleny Soveta 2019). The KTR is represented in the Public 
Council at the Ministry of Labor.  
After 2014, the recession and stagnation of the Russian economy undermined 
the development of alternative unions. While some enterprises were shut down, 
other enterprises went through massive lay offs. KTR unions were not able to 
organize significant protests. Hence, their influence has declined. 
The difference between traditional and alternative trade unions has developed 
historically. Because the FNPR became a successor of the Soviet trade unions, 
the Kremlin recognized the FNPR as the main representative of the working 
classes. In the late 1980s, however, labor movements were heterogeneous. For 
example, trade unions of miners, which neither were a part of the VTsSPS, nor 
joined the FNPR, organized massive strikes in several regions of the Soviet Union. 
These strikes contributed to the ultimate collapse of the USSR (Clarke, Fair-
brother and Borisov 1995). Although, in the early 1990s, independent miners’ 
unions supported Yeltsin and reforms of his administration, the economic crisis 
evolved into the 1998 ‘railroad wars’ organized by miners. In 1998, for example, 
protesting miners demanded the resignation of Yeltsin (Bizyukov 2001). Piotr 
Bizyukov (2001) notes that alternative trade unions emerged from spontaneous 
strike movements. These origins made them not only less bureaucratic and more 
militant, but also less numerous and less capable of routine everyday work in 
comparison with traditional trade unions.  
The Soviet legacy also affects the difference between traditional and alternative 
trade unions. One of the roles played by trade unions since the Soviet era is the 
distribution of benefits. Ashwin and Clarke note that the provision of benefits and 
‘administering the social and welfare facilities of the enterprise’ were ‘the most 
important role of [Soviet] unions for their members, absorbed the bulk of union 
resources and took up the overwhelming part of the time of union officers’ 
(Ashwin and Clarke 2003: 21). In the post-Soviet period, trade unions attempted 
to maintain these functions. Members of trade unions still expect certain benefits 
and even ‘services’ from trade unions. Legal advice and assistance are among the 
most popular services provided by trade unions. At the same time, some trade 
unions are able to provide welfare benefits, such as vouchers for accommodation 
at sanatoriums (Il’in 2001). Only FNPR unions inherited the property of Soviet 
unions. Hence, ‘traditional’ unions have more possibilities to provide benefits 
than ‘alternative’ trade unions. The latter can rely mainly on benefits provided by 
the collective agreement at a specific enterprise. Therefore, alternative trade unions 
have to be more militant and assertive than traditional trade unions.  
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In terms of politics, the main difference between the FNPR and alternative 
unions is their attitudes to presidential elections. The FNPR usually sides with 
Kremlin candidates. In 2012, the General Council of FNPR decided to support 
Putin in the presidential election. The FNPR participated in canvassing together 
with Putin’s electoral headquarters and in Putinite rallies (Postanovleniye 
Gensoveta FNPR 2012). FNPR unions organized these rallies in numerous Russian 
cities across the country (Mnogotysiachnyie Mitingi Profsoiuzov 2012). In 
Moscow, trade unions mobilized teachers to support Putin (Uchitelei Vyzyvaiut 
na Miting 2012). In December 2017, FNPR participated in gatherings which 
formally endorsed Putin as a candidate for the 2018 election (Vybor Rossii 2017). 
In accordance with the Russian legislation, if candidates do not represent any 
party, they must be supported by ‘initiative groups’. Independent candidates have 
to organize a group of at least 500 citizens. The meeting of such a group has the 
right to nominate an independent candidate (Federal’nyi Zakon o Vyborakh 2020; 
although the very recent amendment to this law was adopted in 2020, the provi-
sions on initiative groups have been introduced earlier). Since Putin was not a 
candidate of United Russia, he had to be nominated by such a group. The FNPR 
organized a meeting of this group to nominate Putin. Members of this group were 
members of the FNPR. Unlike the FNPR, the KTR distances itslef from the 
support of any presidential candidate and never involves in presidential campaigns.  
However, the sharp distinction between the FNPR and alternative trade unions 
is an exaggeration. When Green and Robertson call the FNPR ‘a virtual or ersatz 
union’ (Green and Robertson 2010: 89), they are not correct, as the situation with 
traditional trade unions is more complex than they depict. The FNPR regularly 
organizes rallies and strikes. For example, the FNPR is represented by an active 
union of miners in Kachkanar, a small town near Yekaterinburg. This union has a 
long tradition of protests activities and utilizes various types of collective actions 
(Rabotniki Kachkanarskogo GOKa 2007; Pravil’nyie Rasklady 2016). These 
activities can often be successful. In 2018, for example, the union achieved a 
wage increase (Profkom ‘Kachkanar-Vanadii’ 2018). Another FNPR union 
organized protests to prevent lay offs at the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (Terpenie 
Konchilos’ 2014). It is important to know that this plant is affiliated with 
‘Uralvagonzavod’. This is an additional evidence of the complexity of relations 
between the regime and the subaltern classes. Even workers of an enterprise 
which is important from the propagandist point of view can protest independently. 
FNPR unions have been involved in protests of bus drivers across the country 
(Na Poroge Avtokollapsa 2017). On March 29, 2017, the most attended action 
was a rally of bus drivers in Yekaterinburg. A FNPR local union organized this 
rally (Ostanovka Yekaterinburg 2017). The reason of the protests was a poor 
situation in the system of public transportation in Russian regions and especially 
wage arrears.  
In February 2019, workers of a carriage building plant in Chelyabinsk Oblast 
went on a spontaneous rally and were supported by a FNPR local union (Rabotniki 
Ust’-Katavskogo Vagonostroitel’nogo 2019). This action was provoked by a 
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reduction in wages. Although the local authorities did not authorize this rally, the 
FNPR did not stay away from this action. 
In other words, the FNPR is involved in regular protest actions. Some of these 
actions begin spontaneously and the FNPR guides them through legal channels.  
An interviewee, member of a FNPR organization in Saint Petersburg and 
Leningrad Oblast, said: ‘It is difficult to get our trade union somewhere, except 
for a holiday base’ (Interview 2). However, he discloses that, despite passivity, 
this union organized a protest action once: ‘It was a situation recently. For some 
reason, our chairwoman got offended by employers who changed something in 
the collective agreement… The union brought people to a rally’ (Interview 2). 
This example demonstrates that even passive FNPR unions can sometimes 
organize protest actions when their interests are challenged. In short, the FNPR 
participates in numerous protests which employ various repertoires of actions and 
can act independently.  
Local organizations of the FNPR are diverse. Some of these organizations are 
passive and involved only in various ‘team building’ and cultural activities such 
as New Year celebrations and the distribution of free tickets to theaters and guided 
tours. Others are quite active and focused on problems in their regions and cities 
rather than on issues of ‘high’ politics such as presidential elections. At the same 
time, demands of trade unions are an example of demands which, in Laclau’s terms, 
do not tend to become parts of equivalential chains. Demands of trade unions 
remain either requests within institutions or claims to institutions.  
As previously mentioned, trade unions often have to deal with spontaneous 
expressions of discontent. Trade unions do not ignore or stay away from spon-
taneous protests. Numerous protests which start as spontaneous ones become a 
part of trade union activities.  
Trade unions actually decrease the number of spontaneous protests in those 
sectors of the economy where the union density is higher than in other sectors. 
By contrast, absence of trade unions leads to radicalization of protests (Bizyukov 
2018). De-escalation of social and labor conflicts improves and supports positive 
relations between trade unions and the authorities.  
Irina Olimpieva and Robert Orttung (2013) argue that Russian trade unions 
are underrepresented in various governmental agencies and cannot influence 
labor and social policies. Trying to increase this influence, trade unions offer 
‘social peace’ in exchange for the access to processes of decision-making 
(Olimpieva and Orttung 2013: 7). Trade unions aim to secure their positions 
within the framework of relations among employers, the authorities, and labor 
organizations. These strategies presuppose concessions among them, employers, 
and the authorities.  
In the 1990s, there were attempts to establish a system of social partnership 
based on what might be described as corporatist principles – an ‘institutional 
arrangement for linking the associationally organized interests of civil society 
with the decisional structures of the state’ (Schmitter 1974: 86). Hence, the 
aforementioned strategies of trade unions might be justified within the system of 
social partnership. In the 1990s, the Russian tripartite commission and regional 
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tripartite commissions were established. These commissions were supposed to 
facilitate deliberations among the state, employers, and trade unions. The 
effectiveness of these bodies have always been questioned (Mikhailova 1999). 
Agreements signed by commissions are often vague and, in fact, employers do 
not adhere to them. However, trade unions pay special attention to the work of 
these commissions. The participation in the commissions is a tool for trade unions 
to communicate their problems to the authorities. Another part of the social 
partnership system is collective agreements at the enterprise level. Collective 
agreements are the ultimate goal for many trade unions and most of their activities 
are aimed at signing a more favorable document.  
Ashwin and Clarke conclude that corporatism in Russia is ultimately dys-
functional and trade unions usually fail to ‘achieve results through bureaucratic 
channels’, which leads to ‘growing frustration among workforce’ and ‘outbreaks 
of extreme militancy’ (Ashwin and Clarke 2002: 270). Irina Olimpieva argues 
that the imperfect system of social partnership results in the growing political 
involvement of trade unions. Since the system of social partnership is ineffective, 
trade unions have to be politically active in order to influence the authorities and 
employers (Olimpieva 2016). Vadim Borisov notes that the Russian system of 
social partnership is ineffective and appears as a ‘virtual space’ (Borisov 2001: 
56). Although tripartite commissions exist at federal and regional levels, these 
commissions usually fail to balance the interests of employees, employers, and 
the state. At the same time, he adds, trade unions are able to pressure the authorities 
(Borisov 2001: 66). In other words, Russian version of social partnership is 
mostly of declaratory character. Trade unions have to compensate for the ineffi-
ciency of social partnership by engaging in protest activities as a tool of gaining 
leverage over the authorities.  
Trade unions provide examples of capillary power. While the FNPR in general 
does not belong to the authorities at any level or branch of the state power, the 
Federation supports the regime and the hegemonic ideology. This support does 
not preclude protests activities of the local trade unions in regions. However, the 
close cooperation with the authorities and ideological subordination affect protests, 
organized by the FNPR, and make these protests less challenging for the regime. 
While the state apparatus may be ineffective and deinstitutionalized (Greene 
2014), the local trade unions compensate for this deinstitutionalization, at least in 
the sphere of industrial relations. Thus, the extensive and diversified structure of 
the trade unions allowed them to become an important actor of the local political 
and social life. From this point of view, KTR unions are less significant than the 
FNPR because the KTR has less members than the FNPR while a feature of 
capillary power is its presence in most regions and economic branches.  
Aswhin and Clarke highlight ‘the fragmentation of trade union interests that 
is a product of their integration into the branch and regional structures of social 
partnership’ (Ashwin and Clarke 2002: 58). An informant who currently works at 
an FNPR organization in Leningrad Oblast confirms that local unions are 
autonomous from the pro-Kremlin central apparatus: ‘The FNPR does not impede 
small initiatives… It is possible to launch a movement and achieve something in 
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small trade unions’ (Interview 3). An expert and consultant of trade unions 
mentioned the financial independence of local FNPR organizations: ‘During the 
Soviet times all financial streams [within trade unions] were centralized, but in 
the beginning of the 1990s it was decided to leave money in primary organiza-
tions’ (Interview 10). The central apparatus does not try to eliminate the auto-
nomy of local organizations because possible attempts of the unification might 
undermine the sustainability of the whole federation: ‘Nobody needs to create 
additional tensions within the structure [of trade unions]’ (Interview 11). These 
autonomy and involvement in various social protests, besides usual industrial 
relations, enable capillarity. As previously discussed in the theoretical chapter, it 
means that trade unions are possible to penetrate the whole society, respond to 
the wide range of issues, and control grassroots activities.  
In sum, Russian trade unions are a diversified system of various organizations. 
Their positions within the hegemonic formation are ambiguous. Trade unions are 
often involved in protests or even lead protests sometimes. Both ‘traditional’ and 
‘alternative’ trade unions participate in social and labor protests. Decentralized 
structures of the federations allow local organizations to operate autonomously 
and respond to local social and labor conflicts. In Russian regions trade unions 
often address the wide range of social problems, besides industrial relations. At 
the same time, protest activities of trade unions coincide with cooperation with 
the regime. Sometimes this cooperation is a prerequisite of a successful protest 
but imposes limitations on activities in general. 
Analyzing relations between trade unions and the state in Latin America, Ruth 
Berins Collier and David Collier (2002) note that the goal of the state incorpora-
tion of labor movements is ‘to create a legalized and institutionalized labor 
movement that [is] depoliticized, controlled, and penetrated by the state’ (Collier 
and Collier 2002: 163). In the Russian case, the state incorporation of labor 
movements is an ambiguous process. On the one hand, the FNPR leadership 
supports the regime and is associated with the state apparatus. The FNPR 
cooperates with United Russia and backs Vladimir Putin at presidential elections. 
On the other hand, the system of Russian trade unions is diversified and the 
regime does not eliminate this diversity. Alternative trade unions are not aligned 
with the regime. They neither support United Russia, not participate in Putin’s 
campaigns. Also, alternative trade unions can cooperate with other parties to run 
for seats in the State Duma and regional legislatures. Moreover, local FNPR unions 
can often be active and involved in protest activities. Deficiencies of the Russian 
system of social partnership also make the possible incorporation more compli-
cated. Therefore, it cannot be suggested that the state completely incorporates 
Russian trade unions.  
For example, Tatiana Vodopianova, the chair of Tatarstan a FNPR regional 
branch in Tatarstan, reports that 95% of labor conflicts end are resolved with by 
meetingthe satisfying of the workers’ demands (Vodopianova 2014). Hence, 
FNPR unions can often succeed protecting labor and social rights. However, 
particular successes turn into general failure and contribute to the sustainability 
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of the regime because trade unions tend to cooperate with the regime and seek 
give for concessions to its representatives.  
The cooperation between trade unions and the regime is also and especially 
evident at the discursive level. The next section addresses discourses of trade 
unions and their intersections with the hegemonic discourse. 
 
 
Discourses of trade unions 
Discourse analysis of trade union texts can disclose ways of thinking, norms, and 
values affecting their repertoire of actions. Discourses of trade unions generally 
receive less attention than institutional arrangements from scholars. However, as 
Dimitris Tsarouhas notes, balancing of institutional approaches with ‘attention to 
agency’ and use of such concepts as ‘union identity helps to refine the insights of 
the institutional tradition’ (Tsarouhas. 2011: 422). While discourses of European 
and US trade unions sometimes become subject to scrutiny (cf. Cornfield and 
Fletcher, 1998; Jansson and Uba, 2019), discourses of Russian trade unions remain 
understudied. Most texts focus on repertoires of actions, organizational structures, 
and violations of trade union rights. I argue that the application of discourse ana-
lysis to studies of trade unions provides a fresh perspective on labor organizations, 
their activities, and their positions within the Russian political system. Discourses 
of trade unions combine the pursuit of cooperation with the authorities and the 
involvement in social protests. Since discourses of trade unions remain under-
explored, investigation into these discourses can shed more light on relations 
between the regime and protest movements.  
As previously established, the Russian hegemonic discourse has three important 
features. First, it prioritizes stability and sovereignty. The hegemonic discourse is 
structured around signs of stability and sovereignty. Second, subaltern classes are 
portrayed as conservative and supportive of the regime. Third, the hegemonic 
discourse includes democratic rhetoric. Hence, subaltern classes are permitted to 
act independently if their activities do not challenge sovereignty and stability. 
Trade unions are considered legitimate mediators between the state and subaltern 
classes. Grassroots activities are allowed within certain limits. This section demon-
strates that the hegemonic discourse and discourses of trade unions intersect. In 
other words, trade unions and the regime are allied at the discursive level. Social 
and labor protests cannot produce any independent discourse which could chal-
lenge the hegemonic one.  
When trade unions protest, they adjust their rhetoric to the hegemonic discourse: 
‘They [protesting unions] may use this kind of rhetoric: ‘‘The employer rocks the 
boat. We are standing against sanctions and the hostile international community. 
We need unity, which is undermined by the employer’’’ (Interview 1).  
On the one hand, this discursive adjustment may be a rational strategy which 
is used to make protest actions more effective. The authorities often become a 
powerful ally of trade unions in labor conflicts. This alliance requires discursive 
compatibility. As previously established, the hegemonic discourse appeals to 
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subaltern classes and their legitimate protests. The hegemonic discourse admits 
that subaltern classes and trade unions as their representatives have the right to 
protests. Consequently, the hegemonic formation contains reserved zones for the 
expression of discontent where this expression can be effective.  
On the other hand, many union activists genuinely share the state-oriented 
ideology. The worldview of trade union leaders presupposes that the state is the 
ultimate value: ‘It does not matter what they [trade union leaders] say about human 
rights, for example. All of them have one in common: they stand for the state. 
They serve the state’ (Interview 10). Genuine beliefs and rational strategies produce 
situations where trade unions disseminate the official ideology and embed it in 
grassroots activities. As the second chapter of this dissertation demonstrates, the 
hegemonic discourse is able to reconcile the prioritization of sovereignty and 
stability, state-centrism, and grassroots activities. Discourses of trade unions 
become possible and legitimate vis-a-vis the hegemonic discourse due to this 
reconciliation. It can be suggested that this state-centrism is a part of Russian 
common sense. In the late 1990s, the weakening of the central government was 
widely blamed for turmoil of that period. Analyzing the Russian identity in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, Ted Hopf concludes: ‘There was a great deal of dis-
cursive consensus on Russia’s need to reestablish a Federal Center as the single 
authorized legal embodiment of the Russian state’ (Hopf 2002: 207). Since ‘good 
sense’ which enables protests is based on common sense, protest practices and 
discourses also appear to be state-centric.  
State-centrism of trade union discourse has a material foundation as the state 
is the main counterpart of trade unions. ‘FNPR unions operate within an industrial 
framework that is largely state-dominated’ (Traub-Merz and Gerasimova 2018: 
184). Sergeyus Glovackas, a representative of the International Labor Organiza-
tion (ILO) in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, argues that the state remains the 
largest employer in post-Soviet space and, therefore, employees often bring their 
claims against the authorities (Glovackas 2015). However, it comes mainly about 
confrontation with the local authorities. It can be suggested that potential 
protesters who are employed by state-owned enterprises lack economic autonomy, 
which hinders protest activities (McMann 2006). Yet relations between protesters 
and the authorities are complex and ambiguous. Protest groups often bring claims 
against the local authorities and simultaneously seek support of high-ranking 
officials at the same time. Intense relations with the state at all levels of activities 
affect discourses of trade unions. 
To analyze discourses of trade unions, I have chosen the FNPR and the KTR 
programmatic documents and their leaders’ statements from 2011 on. I focus on 
those statements that address general issues of trade union strategies and major 
events, namely elections and mass protests.  
The analysis of the FNPR and the KTR programmatic documents shows that 
both organizations advocate democracy and human rights, especially social and 
labor ones. According to the programs, the main task of the FNPR and the KTR 
is to improve living standards of employees and protect their rights and interests. 
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This is a standard set of goals and principles which are common for most of trade 
unions.  
After 2011, the FNPR adopted two programs in 2015 and 2019 respectively. 
The 2015 FNPR program classifies ‘threats to social stability and sovereignty’ 
as the ‘main challenges’ of our time. First of all, social stability and sovereignty 
are connected and even conceived as interrelated to each other. Then, the FNPR 
declares that the sources of these threats to stability and sovereignty are business, 
its political advocates, and the ‘neoliberal model of capitalism’ (Programma 
FNPR 2015). In the framework of this ideology the main mission of trade union 
is to preserve the stability, a notion which occupies a privileged position in the 
FNPR discourse and serves as a nodal point. Trade unions follow the hegemonic 
discourse’s prioritization of sovereignty and internal stability. 
The 2015 FNPR program declares that the Federation participates in ‘the 
political life of society’ to effectively fulfill the social role of trade unions. This 
political participation should result in ‘the civilized social and labor relations’ and 
improved ‘institutes of credibility, consent, and cooperation’ (Programma FNPR 
2015).  
The 2019 FNPR program (Programma FNPR 2019) does not significantly 
differ from the previous one. Although the new program does not mention sover-
eignty, it still considers ‘geopolitical instability’ as a threat for working people. 
The FNPR confirms its adherence to dialogue with the state entities. It is 
important that the 2019 program mentions ‘dialogue’ in a context of relations 
between the trade unions and the state. In other words, ‘dialogue’ is mentioned in 
a political context. Although the term ‘neoliberalism’ is not used anymore, the 
FNPR still criticizes contemporary ‘financial system’ and business which strives 
only for profit.  
The FNPR’s official worldview is generally hostile toward political changes 
as such. The book Ideology of Trade Unions issued by the publishing house of 
the FNPR’s newspaper Solidarnost’ argues: ‘Russian history of the twentieth 
century shows clearly that every destruction of political mechanism costs at least 
a decade of social devastation for workers’ (Shershukov 2012: 37). Yet, the book 
does not condemn labor protests or the participation of trade unions in parlia-
mentary activity within the limits set by the existing legislation. 
Social and labor protests are also interpreted through their relations to stability. 
For example, in one of his speeches Shmakov says: ‘Let us work together to 
reduce tensions in monocities and vulnerable branches of the economy; let us 
form together the civilized practice of social conflicts’ (Shmakov, 2015: 16). 
Vladimir Derbin, the chair of the FNPR regional branch in Saint Petersburg and 
Leningrad Oblast, notes: ‘Today there are no acute social and labor conflicts in 
our regions’ (Derbin, 2015: 36). He argues that stability in Saint Petersburg and 
Leningrad Oblast is impossible without ‘productive dialogue’ and that it is 
maintained due to ‘the effective system of social partnership’ (Derbin, 2015: 35).  
 As previously mentioned, official mass media extensively cover protests of 
the Yellow Vests. Putin also spoke about these protests and criticized actions of 
protesters for their violent methods. The FNPR echoes Putin’s statement but does 
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not directly criticize the Yellow Vests movement. Thus, Shmakov said: ‘The culture 
of protests is different in different countries. But this slogan, which are raised by 
the French now and means that rich and hardworking France does not want to 
live in poverty, sounds in the same way in Russia’ (Priamaia Liniia Mikhaila 
Shmakova 2019). The FNPR certainly does not advocate methods of the Yellow 
Vests movement but shares some of their slogans. This interpretation of the Yellow 
Vests does not necessarily contradict with the hegemonic discourse. The previous 
chapter demonstrates that official mass media emphasize that the protests are not 
unfounded and the protesters have reason to be unsatisfied with governmental 
policies in France. Both the FNPR and official mass media criticize the repertoire 
of actions. 
In 2017, Pavel Fel’dman and Eduard Avetisov, researchers from the Academy 
of Labor and Social Relations established by Soviet trade unions in 1919 and now 
officially affiliated with the FNPR (Svedeniia 2018), published a paper titled 
Trade Unions in the System of Ensuing Political Stability of Modern Russia 
(Fel’dman and Avetisov 2017). Although this text does not belong to official 
statements of FNPR leaders, it also represents discourses of trade unions. The 
authors argue that trade unions can contribute to the prevention of a ‘color 
revolution’ and contribute to the maintenance of political and social stability in 
Russia. The paper emphasizes that the decline of ‘institutionalized trade unions’ 
can be a reason of political instability because this decline creates a ‘vacuum’ in 
industrial relations which may be filled by ‘radical’ forces aiming at destructive 
goals (Fel’dman and Avetisov 2017: 56). According to the authors, ‘building of a 
culture of civilized political participation’ and ‘reducing of social and political 
tensions’ should be among tasks of trade unions (Fel’dman and Avetisov 2017: 57).  
Thus, according to the FNPR discourse, social and labor protests are allowed 
but they should be civilized and should not challenge stability. Hence, the task of 
trade unions is the collaboration with authorities to reduce social tensions and de-
escalate conflicts by channeling workers’ discontent into peaceful activities and 
dialogue.  
The chair of the FNPR, Mikhail Shmakov, said in 2012: ‘Nowadays there are 
attempts to unleash a political crisis which may cause … new social disasters for 
people of labor… Trade unions were and are right because the vector of their 
strategic interests corresponds to the vector of the strategic interests of our state’ 
(Shmakov 2012). In other words, the FNPR supports Putin and condemns the 
2011–2012 protests, which, in the view of its leadership, could have caused a 
political crisis and social instability. According to Shmakov, while the ‘liberal 
opposition’ advocates the interests of entrepreneurial class, Putin protects social 
welfare and workers’ interests. 
In March 2014, FNPR unions unanimously supported the Russian foreign 
policy toward Ukraine. On March 18, the FNPR official web site reported numer-
ous trade unions rallies in support of this policy and listed main slogans of these 
rallies: ‘Putin is right’, ‘Crimea, welcome back’, ‘We believe Putin’, ‘Ukraine 
and Russia are one family’, and so on (Krym, My s Toboi 2014). 
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On March 19, 2014, Solidarnost’ quoted Mikhail Shmakov’s speech at a 
conference Labor Market and Social Investments. Shmakov mentioned mentioned 
the Ukrainian events as well. Solidarnost’ reported: ‘Of course, he did not threaten 
power and business with the Maidan because the FNPR always stands for peace-
ful dialogue which is the only acceptable way to resolve confliccts’ (Shmakov 
Napomnil Rabotodateliam 2014). However, Shmakov addressed the Euromaidan 
in an original way. He said: ‘The Maidain began on a wave of legal demands of 
the majority of the Ukrainian people’. Thus, he admitted that the Euromaidan was 
not unfounded. Although this point of view does not coincide with the official 
perception of the Euromaidan, it resonates with the democratic rhetoric of the 
hegemonic discourse which allows legal addressing of grievances. Then, Shmakov 
argued that ‘stupidity’ of Ukrainian leaders led to the ‘collapse of the country’ 
(Shmakov Napomnil Rabotodateliam 2014). According to him, social partnership 
can prevent such acute conflicts in Russia.  
In October 2017, before the start of the most recent presidential campaign, 
Shmakov argued that trade unions should insist on Putin’s nomination (Profsoiuzy 
Nataivaiut 2017). The FNPR chair believed that it was Putin who made the system 
of social partnership work. However, in accordance with the democratic rhetoric 
of the hegemonic discourse, trade unions gave the incumbent president his orders 
(nakaz). These orders addressed social and economic problems which had to be 
resolved by Putin during his new term. First and foremost, Shmakov mentioned 
the poverty and low wages of working people. Then, he suggested to improve 
employees’ participation in the management of enterprises. This measure would 
strengthen the system of social partnership and increase economic efficiency.  
In November 2017, the FNPR chair stated that trade unions had become ‘points 
of support’ for Putin: ‘We believe that he [Putin] can lead Russia to a qualitatively 
new stage of development, increase the standards of living of the Russian citizens, 
and protect the rights and interests of employees’ (On Spravitsa 2017).  
Although the ideology of social partnership, which is shared by the FNPR, 
means a distance from the non-systemic political opposition and constructive 
relations with the state, it does not require this extent of the engagement with the 
ideological and organizational support of the regime demonstrated by the FNPR, 
when the Federation, for example, participates in presidential campaigns, as it was 
mentioned. 
United Russia and the FNPR proclaimed Putin’s first decrees issued after his 
inauguration in May 2018 as ‘absolutely pro-trade-union’ (V Gosdume Nazvali 
2018). Therefore, the alliance between the regime and the official trade unions 
was confirmed once again.  
Scholars usually come to the conclusion that the FNPR ‘always raised the 
banner for social dialogue with the ruling power’ (Traub-Merz and Gerasimova 
2018: 185). However, alternative trade unions often raise the same banner. The 
KTR official web site declares that the Confederation is oriented at cooperation 
with authorities and employers in the framework of social partnership 
(Organizatsiia 2013). President of the KTR, Boris Kravchenko, argues: ‘Labor 
protests should not be marginalized… Otherwise, we will face the uncontrolled 
89 
increase in unemployment, drastic and unjustifiable decrease in wages, and 
absolute power of employers. Then major social protests will start’ (Boris 
Kravchenko: Nel’zia Zagoniat’ 2015). Here too, social and labor protests are 
expected to be civilized. According to Kravchenko, the only means to avoid 
unrest is to establish a dialogue between employers and trade unions. 
The KTR believes cooperation with the state important. Kravchenko said: ‘Of 
course, we do not avoid the dialogue with the government. We work within the 
Russian tripartite commission to regulate social and labor relations and cooperate 
with different state bodies’ (Profsoiuzy ne Dadut 2015). Other KTR leaders 
followed this discourse on civilized protests and warned of dangers of possible 
unrest which could be caused by prohibitive state policies and employers’ selfish-
ness: ‘Ongoing restrictions of employees’ basic rights and abuse of trade unions’ 
capacities to represent their interests can lead to uncontrolled spontaneous protest 
actions and strikes’ (Predsedatel’ ‘Novoprofa’ 2015). 
Obviously, the KTR does not consider social unrest and spontaneous actions 
as a possible option for trade unions in social and labor conflicts. Quite opposite, 
the KTR presents itself as a force which could prevent the aggravation of conflicts. 
For example, Igor’ Stepanov, chair of the Council of the KTR, argues: ‘Neither 
the government, nor trade unions, nor working people need a “Russian revolt, 
nonsensical and ruthless” which Dmitry Medvedev and Maksim Topilin [then 
minister of labor] are afraid of’ (V Evrope Bastuiut 2019). He responds to 
Medvedev’s conversation with journalists discussed in the previous chapter and 
agrees that ‘Russian revolt’ should be avoided. Stepanov emphasizes that the 
Russian legislation deprives the trade unions and working people of a ‘civilized 
weapon’. By this ‘civilized weapon’, he means legal strikes and collective 
bargaining. Here, once again, the KTR confirms its adherence to ‘civilized’ 
protests.  
Trade unions define politics through ‘dialogue’. According to the KTR program 
(Demokratiia, Organaizing, Grazdanskie Prava 2011), politics is associated with 
wide and open discussions. The KTR criticizes elites because they ‘need no open 
public discussion’. Although alternative trade unions state that they should 
combine parliamentary and non-parliamentary activities in politics, their ultimate 
political goal is an independent trade union faction in the parliament. This faction 
is supposed to be a result of the “open discussion” among trade unions and social 
movements. The sign ‘politics’ acquires its meaning through relations with the 
sign ‘dialogue’.  
Discussing methods of trade union political engagement, the KTR program 
emphasizes that the Confederation does not ‘stand against the dialogue with the 
authorities and employers’ and considers ‘negotiations as the most important and 
necessary element’ of trade union activities. The KTR program speaks about the 
value of dialogue and deliberation in sections covering politics and methods. 
Thus, politics is based on dialogue and deliberation. Activities of trade unions 
inherently include negotiations and discussions . 
It is worth to compare programs of the KTR and the FNPR. Both organizations 
see the ‘neoliberal model of capitalism’, contemporary ‘financial structure’ and 
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‘self-seeking business’ as their rivals. Logically the KTR and the FNPR advocate 
state regulation of economy and protectionism. Alternative trade unions do not 
consider the regime an unconditional ally in this struggle against ‘neoliberalism’. 
This is the main difference between programs of the KTR and the FNPR. How-
ever, alternative trade unions, if possible, also seek for the dialogue with 
authorities (Demokratiia, Organaizing, Grazdanskie Prava 2011). The operating 
in the state-dominated environment certainly affects trade unions’ discourses. 
Besides, the KTR program criticizes traditional trade unions for passivity.  
The repetition of the sign ‘dialogue’ within trade union texts indicates that 
‘dialogue’ has become a value for trade unions. Discussing goals and means of 
protest activities in their texts, trade unions mention the cooperation with the 
authorities and the avoidance of social unrest. Trade unions offer ‘social peace’ 
not only because they deliberately pressure the state and employers but also 
because ‘dialogue’ is important in discourses of trade unions.  
Trade unions mention ‘stability’ and ‘sovereignty’ in their texts. Besides, trade 
unions also emphasize that labor and social protests should be ‘civilized’. In dis-
courses of trade unions, the sign of ‘civilized protests’, which can also be found 
in the hegemonic discourse, obtains its meaning through the sign ‘dialogue’. 
These facts demonstrate the connection between the hegemonic discourse and 
discourses of trade unions. 
Therefore, discourses of trade unions intersect with the hegemonic discourse. 
Both prioritize stability. However, since the hegemonic discourse does not 
preclude protests and grassroots activities, the discourse of trade unions has some 
space to ‘maneuver’. Trade unions employ the democratic rhetoric of the hege-
monic discourse and use the sign ‘civilized protests’ which do not threaten 
stability. Protests are ‘civilized’ when they strive for dialogue. Official trade 
unions often pretend to be protectors of stability and seek for the alliance with 
authorities on this basis. In other words, according to trade unions’ discourse, 
employers generate threats for stability and the common responsibility of the 
FNPR and the state is to prevent or remove these threats. Alternative trade unions, 
however, also adhere to ‘civilized protests’ and criticize employers, bureaucrats, 
and ‘neoliberalism’ which all together impede the civilized addressing of 
employees’ grievances. The KTR discourse, which sometimes can be critical 
toward the regime, does not break with the hegemonic discourse. 
 
 
Organizational and discursive transformism 
Two previous sections address organizations and discourses of Russian trade 
unions. This section summarizes previous findings and puts them into theoretical 
context. 
Although trade unions emerged independently and were not established by the 
state, they have gradually become associated with the regimes. However, the 
system of trade unions is diverse and fragmented. While the FNPR is considered 
as a pro-Kremlin organization, the KTR seems to be genuinely independent. At 
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the same time, the FNPR has a fragmented structure, which includes relatively 
autonomous local organizations, and the KTR also tends to cooperate with the 
authorities. Therefore, trade unions occupy an ambiguous position within the 
hegemonic formation in general. This ambiguity is evident at the discursive level. 
Discourses of trade unions prioritize ‘civilized protests’ and ‘dialogue’ which 
makes protests ‘civilized’. Properly organized ‘dialogue’ is supposed to prevent 
social unrest. Trade unions follow the hegemonic discourse in this sense because 
the hegemonic discourse also accepts ‘civilized’ expression of opinions from 
below as a necessary communication between the authorities and citizens.  
Trade unions should not be considered absolutely passive and obedient to the 
regime. FNPR and KTR organizations are often involved in social and labor 
protests. Although some of these protests succeed, all of them remain particu-
laristic. In terms of Laclau’s theory, it means that requests communicated by trade 
unions are often satisfied and do not turn into claims in that case. Even when 
claims emerge, they remain claims to institutions and not against institutions.  
According to Laclau, when claims addressed to institutions become claims 
against institutions and overflow the institutional apparatus, ‘we start having the 
people of populism’ (Laclau 2006: 655). In the case of trade unions and their 
demands, protests remain within the institutional order and the hegemonic 
formation. 
As previously mentioned, trade unions proclaim their adherence to peaceful 
protests, dialogue values, and cooperation with the authorities. It is not only a 
rhetorical maneuver which is supposed to protect trade unions from possible 
repressions. Trade unions actually deescalate conflicts in which they are involved. 
It is not only rhetorical maneuvers under conditions of authoritarianism, but also 
the way trade unions actually think of politics and protests. According to official 
documents and leaders’ statements, trade unions prefer methods which literature 
on social movements calls ‘polite protests’ (Johnston 2011: 69). It means that 
trade unions usually try to attract attention of the authorities and mass media to 
labor and social problems. Problems are supposed to be solved through dialogue 
between trade unions and the authorities. Due to this dialogue, grassroots demands 
stay within the hegemonic formation. Gramsci would use a metaphor of 
‘domestication’ here. Potentially dangerous protest groups and demands are kept 
within the hegemonic formation and reach compromise with the regime. These 
processes form the basis of transformism.  
While transformism preserves the hegemonic formation, it binds together 
different elements of this formation. Trade unions provide the organizational 
basis for this binding. Trade unions, mainly the FNPR which is the largest federa-
tion of trade unions, facilitate the dialogue between authorities and protest groups 
and, hence, contribute to the blurring of the possible antagonistic frontier between 
elites and people. Of significance is the fact that documents of trade unions and 
leaders’ statements define politics and protests through exchange of opinions. As 
found in the theoretical chapters, the equation of politics with deliberative pro-
cedures is incompatible with antagonism which is necessary for creation of the 
people. Trade unions have capacity to organize the dialogue between the protesting 
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citizens and the authorities. Due to fragmented and decentralized organization of 
the trade union federations, they are able to respond to various social and labor 
problems. At the same time, trade unions tend to cooperate with the regime. This 
contradiction leads to situations wherein local protests succeed but a broader 
movement, which can be possible, according to Laclau, does not emerge. 
This chapter has addressed general characteristics of trade unions and their 
discourses. However, the examination of transformism requires a closer look at 
specific relations among the authorities, protest groups, and employers in Russian 
regions because transformism manifests itself in small and regular, day-to-day 
interactions at the grassroots level. Therefore, the next chapter provides examples 
of the transformist processes.  
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CHAPTER 5.  
Transformism in Russian regions 
This chapter covers examples and variations of transformism. Transformistic 
processes and manifestations of democratic politics are multidimensional and can 
be understood through examination of numerous details regarding grassroots 
activities, responses of the authorities, and general situation in the hegemonic 
formation. 
In this chapter, I analyze four cases which provide an indication of trans-
formistic processes. Three of these cases address social and labor protests and the 
functioning of official trade unions in Russian regions, namely Leningrad Oblast, 
Pskov Oblast, and the Republic of Karelia. 
To demonstrate how transformism works in Russia, I analyze the activities of 
the FNPR in three regions of North-Western Russia – Leningrad Oblast, Republic 
of Karelia, and Pskov Oblast. The trade unions there are relatively active and 
usually involved in numerous protests, whose agenda is not limited to industrial 
relations. FNPR organizations in these regions also address social problems, such 
as poor infrastructure and environmental issues. Furthermore, trade unions have 
sustainable relations with other protest groups. These cases demonstrate varying 
patterns of protest and cooperation with the authorities. In Karelia, trade unions 
participate in labor and social protests but also in the All-Russia People’s Front 
(ONF, Obshcherossiiskii Narodnyi Front), an organization which was established 
in 2011 to support Vladimir Putin in the 2012 presidential election and then to 
facilitate the implementation of his policies. Trade unions in Pskov were 
especially active during the campaign against the 2018 pension reform to raise 
the retirement age. The situation in Leningrad Oblast has been developing in the 
long shadow of the high-profile conflict in Pikalyovo in 2009 (see below), in 
which the trade unions won but improve the social and economic conditions in 
the region. 
Although regional branches of trade unions unify Saint Petersburg and 
Lenindrad Oblast that are separate federal subjects, I focus on Leningrad Oblast 
as my analysis excludes cases of larger cities. I chose cases from peripheral 
regions because in big cities trade unions are integrated into other civil society 
structures and rarely play a key role in social conflicts extending beyond industrial 
relations. In the selected cases, on the contrary, trade unions function inde-
pendently and thus can be studied on their own. Accordingly, even though there 
is a single regional branch of trade unions in two separate federal subjects – Saint 
Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast – I do not consider the unions’ activity in Saint 
Petersburg. The comparison of the ‘periphery’ and the ‘center’ is a possible 
avenue for further investigations.  
The selected regions have similarities and differences at the same time. First 
of all, they differ economically. Leningrad Oblast is a relatively developed 
industrial region which, however, has always been vulnerable during crises. 
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Hence, the case of Pikalyovo in Leningrad Oblast is important because it demon-
strates how popular dissent emerged and, then, was domesticated. Pskov Oblast 
is aт economically backward region without any significant industrial enterprises. 
The Republic of Karelia is an economically average region with a diversified 
industry. Leningrad Oblast is a more populated region than Karelia and Pskov 
Oblast. The population of Leningrad Oblast is about 1.8 million inhabitants while 
the population Karelia and Pskov Oblast stand at some 600 thousands each.  
All cases support and illustrate one main argument. Trade unions, which often 
lead social and labor protests, tend to cooperate with the regime. This cooperation 
allows to achieve localized successes but turns into acquiescence of protesters to 
refrain from further development of protests and political subjectivation. In 
general, institutionalization of the protest impedes its development and postpones 
democratization of Russia.  
 
 
The case of Leningrad Oblast 
Leningrad Oblast has always been one of the most important center of trade unions 
in post-Soviet Russia. In the 2000s, the economic growth and foreign investment 
inflows resulted in launching of numerous automotive enterprises such as Ford, 
Nissan, GM, and so on. Independent labor organizations were established at these 
factories and joined confederations of alternative unions which were united 
within the KTR. The history of these trade unions was extensively described by 
several scholars (cf. Clement, Demidov and Miryasova 2010; Olimpieva 2010; 
Robertson 2011). The most important event for alternative trade unions was the 
2007 strike at Ford, in Vsevolozhsk, a small town next to Saint Petersburg. This 
strike encouraged the development of alternative trade unions in the region and 
the organization at Ford had obtained a central position within the regional 
structure of alternative trade unions.  
The labor union at Ford initially belonged to the FNPR. However, members 
of the union were dissatisfied with the lack of support they received from the 
FNPR leadership. In 2006, the union at Ford left the FNPR and then formed the 
Interregional Trade Union of Automotive Workers, which was officially registered 
in 2007. This trade union united local organizations of automotive workers not 
only in Leningrad Oblast but also in other regions. Later, the Interregional Trade 
Union of Automotive Workers joined the VKT and subsequently the KTR (Mandel 
2013).  
KTR unions participated actively in social and political life in general. In 2011, 
for example, they delegated their representative to the regional legislature (Lidery 
Profsoiuzov KTR 2011). In the late 2010s, however, KTR unions declined 
gradually in the region. In 2019, Ford closed its factory in Leningrad Oblast and 
the local union virtually ceased to exist (Zavod Ford vo Vsevolozhske 2019).  
The FNPR has also had strong positions in the region and has always been 
more influential than alternative unions. The regional organization of the FNPR 
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has 500 thousand members in Leningrad Oblast and Saint Petersburg (Sovre-
mennost’ 2019). In this section, I focus on a labor and social conflict in Pikalyovo, 
a small town 280 km east of Saint Petersburg. These events were one of the most 
important labor protests in Putin’s Russia and constituted a pattern of conflict 
management in Russia. However, what is more important for my analysis is not 
this conflict itself but its consequences, which still have an impact on social life 
in the region.  
Pikalyovo is a so called monotown (monogorod), where the whole economy 
of the city is based on three closely related industrial enterprises. All of these 
enterprises are private and owned predominantly by Russian owners. The 2008–
2009 recession heavily affected the city. During this crisis, enterprises found 
themselves at the edge of bankruptcy and employees faced large-scale lay-offs. 
Locals organized massive protest actions, blocking a highway and storming the 
city hall. Finally, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had to visit Pikalyovo personally, 
force owners to reopen the enterprises and allocate additional financial resources 
from the state budget to the city economy. To prevent further crises in other mono-
towns, the government elaborated and launched an economic support program 
for all monotowns of the country (Pravitel’stvo Nachinaet 2009; Soveshchaniie 
po Voprosam 2014). 
In his analysis of Pikalyovo and other monotowns, Stephen Crowley (2015) 
argues that, although Russian monotowns may produce protest activity due to 
economic reasons, the regime is still able to prevent possible unrest by subsidizing 
uncompetitive enterprises. He downplays the factor of labor organizations: in his 
view, ‘Putin has succeeded in marginalizing independent labor union activity’ and 
‘workers [are] left with few institutional channels through which to express their 
grievances’ (Crowley 2015: 17). Generally this might be true, but a noteworthy 
fact is that the protest in Pikalyovo was led by the local FNPR unions. 
In 2008 and 2009, Pikalyovo citizens used various avenues of protest. They 
organized several officially sanctioned rallies, which were well-attended and 
attracted due attention of regional media outlets. However, the most effective 
tools were those which were not authorized by local authorities. On May 20, 2009, 
when the city administration did not invite people’s representatives to a meeting 
where the shutdown of the enterprises and lay-offs were to be discussed, citizens 
stormed the city hall (Zhiteli Pikalyovo Prorvalis’ 2009). Although the Pikalyovo 
enterprises are private, the protesters posed their demands on the local authorities 
as well. The shutdown caused not only lay-offs but also the collapse of the local 
infrastructure. For example, hot water was cut off as boilers stopped working. 
The workers expected the authorities to intervene and wanted to participated in 
debates on the crisis.  
On June 2, protesters blocked a federal road near Pikalyovo, causing con-
gestion stretching hundreds of kilometers (Bizyukov and Olimpieva 2014: 78). 
This strategy was successful and the enterprises were saved after Putin had visited 
Pikalyovo. Hence, this success relied on intervention of higher-ranking officials. 
Although the protest repertoire went beyond the legal frameworks, protesters did 
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not face repressions and were not prosecuted. The authorities proposed con-
cessions instead of repressions.  
The FNPR did not stay away from this conflict. Central bodies supported legal 
rallies but leaders of primary organizations at the factories were involved in the 
blockade of highway and the storming of the city hall. Therefore, the protest was 
not absolutely spontaneous and uninstitutionalized, although it was not under full 
control of trade unions. At the same time, local KTR unions were not involved in 
the conflict at any stage. There have never been any significant cooperation 
between ‘traditional’ and ‘alternative’ unions.  
The Pikalyovo case is remarkable because the FNPR unions’ activity was not 
limited to raising industrial issues. They formed the core of a local initiative group, 
which remains influential to this day. From the perspective of literature on social 
movements, the protest has expanded the public sphere and improved the 
deliberative mechanisms in the city. In 2017, one leader of local unions said: 
‘They [the local authorities] track our moods and our claims. They invite us [the 
trade unions] to meetings. There was a meeting with the committee of the Oblast 
administration. I was invited. There are meetings with the mayor and with the 
administration of the Boksitogorsky district. They show and make us understand 
that our opinion matters’ (Interview 5). In other words, the protest gave birth to a 
mechanism of consultation and relatively open discussion. The subaltern classes 
gained the opportunity to participate in city governance. ‘When some problem 
occurs, trade unions, authorities, and employers are called together. They try to 
solve it immediately… Now a committee of the trade unions, the administration, 
and the employer has been established. We discuss issues concerning the city’ 
(Interview 5). Therefore, the protest created a space for public debates. These 
debates do not occur within only elites’ circles but affect the city decision-making 
process.  
However, the involvement of the Pikalyovo protest groups in the deliberative 
procedures also hinders further political subjectivation. The authoritarian regime 
is responsive to demands from below and partially satisfies them. Laclau noted: 
‘The more particularized a demand, the easier it is to satisfy it and integrate it into 
the system’ (Laclau 2000b: 209). Thus, the deliberation and accommodation of 
demands destabilize the antagonistic frontier between the regime and subaltern 
classes, and prevent any potential for popular subjectivity. The hegemonic 
formation integrates activist groups into itself and thereby expands. In Gramscian 
terms, the development of deliberative processes results in the expansion of the 
hegemonic formation and a reservation of zones for grassroots activities, where 
these activities are allowed, thereby localizing them. 
While the 2009 protest in Pikalyovo was initially neutralized by Putin’s direct 
intervention and the provision of subsidies, the local authorities later arranged 
mechanisms to prevent any repetition of social unrest. The trade unions provide 
the city and regional administrations with feedback which assists in controlling 
the situation and preventing possible protests. The local authorities satisfy some 
grassroots demands while obstructing the potential emergence of popular politics. 
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The expansion of “public spheres” and the relative successes of local trade 
unions did not lay a firm foundation for further activities. The informants from 
Pikalyovo emphasized the apathy and passivity of local inhabitants in 2017: ‘It is 
every man for himself… It is impossible to organize people for something. It is 
very difficult to talk to people’ (Interview 5). The documentary Three sides [Tri 
Storony] (2011), filmed by Nikolay Vylegzhanin in Pikalyovo in 2011, also 
highlights this apathy. The movie, which contains interviews with local citizens, 
argues that although some problems have been solved in the city (for example, 
the enterprises have been reopened and received a financial support), the overall 
economic and social situation remains difficult. The inhabitants speak about poor 
infrastructure, environmental problems, and low wages.  
‘Apathy’ and ‘passivity’ is understood here not through psychological and 
emotional conditions of citizens but as reduced organizational capacity for protest 
actions. It became visible, for example, in 2016, when the discharge by one of the 
Pikalyovo enterprises of about 200 employees did not lead to any significant 
protests (V Pikaliovo na Tsemenetnom Zavode 2016). In other words, Pikalyovo 
is still vulnerable socially and economically but the possibility and capacity of 
protests in this town became lower. The economically and socially vulnerable 
monotown, despite formidable labor organizations, has been controlled by 
including the workers in the hegemonic formation.  
Jeremy Morris (2016) calls Russian working-class people ‘silent majority’. 
He stresses on severe economic and social conditions influencing workers’ every-
day life. However, everyday problems did not prevent the initial protest wave in 
Pikalyovo and, hence, passivity cannot be assumed as a constant. The return to 
apathy indicates that protests were neutralized. The relative success of the protest 
did not enable popular politics. At the same time, the emergence of democratic 
politics can be recognized in this case as protesters addressed problems beyond 
their workplaces and confronted the local authorities.  
Informants from FNPR unions in Leningrad Oblast confirm that solution of 
parochial social and labor problems stabilizes the overall situation in the region 
but does not significantly improve the living standards of local citizens: ‘You can 
help people but only at some certain level and not at the level of the economic 
branch or region’ (Interview 3). Protest activities do not go beyond local and 
particular issues. ‘We do not have such tools as massive strikes like in France. It 
does not work here… Every small trade union can achieve something but it [the 
achievement] disappears at the next level’ (Interview 3). The interviewee adds 
that Leningrad Oblast has several active FNPR organizations which, however, do 
not contribute to any development of popular politics. It is also remarkable that 
Tikhvin, a city 42 km to Pikalyovo, is a home for two significant FNPR unions, 
which are active at local a IKEA factory and a railroad car plant, but there is no 
consequential cooperation between organization in Tikhvin and Pikalyovo. In fact, 
Leningrad Oblast is a region of numerous and important grassroots activities 
which cooperate mostly with authorities but not with each other.  
As previously mentioned, transformism prevents unification of particularistic 
demands and suppresses the emergence of antagonism between the regime and 
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subaltern classes. In case of the Pikalyovo protest, the local unions consciously 
decided to limit themselves to particular problems of the city and avoid any 
confrontation with the central government. Informants insist that their activity is 
not political and does not challenge the regime. One former chair of a local union 
says: ‘We are not suicidal enough to go out and shake up politics’ (Interview 6). 
It does not mean that they were afraid of potential prosecution for political actions. 
It rather means that politics may cause social disaster. Moreover, this interviewee, 
who was one of the protest leaders, explicitly supports Putin and was a member 
of United Russia: ‘Until spring 2016, I was a member of United Russia… When 
Putin became [president], I began to treat him seriously, as a serious person and 
a defender of the country… Yes, we support him here. Who else can we support?’ 
(Interview 6). Another informant thinks that workers are rather apolitical and do 
not support the regime: ‘People are very closed and infantile… They do not 
participate in elections, they are passive… Many people say here that nothing can 
be changed... Nobody believes that there will be any justice’ (Interview 5). These 
remarks suggest that, firstly, the protesters did not consider themselves as 
antagonists of the regime and, secondly, the new opportunities to discuss problems 
with the authorities has not made local citizens more politically active.  
Combination of pro-regime views and apolitical sentiments suggests that pro-
testers did not have any consistent dominant ideology. It is rather an expression 
of the state-centered common sense. This common sense consists not in allegi-
ance to a national leader but rather in reliance on cooperation with the authorities 
and pursuit for properly organized dialogue with them.  
The Pikalyovo protest can be considered a social movement organization 
because, unlike typical trade unions which rely mostly on bargaining, the pro-
testers used uninstitutionalized forms of action such as the highway blockade and 
storming of the city hall. They formed a group to achieve their specific goals. 
From the perspective of literature on social movements, the Pikalyovo protest 
was successful because the enterprises were reopened and local problems were 
discussed publicly. However, the Gramscian approach proposes another inter-
pretation. Grassroots activities were absorbed in the hegemonic formation. The 
remaining apathy and difficult economic situation demonstrate that the protest 
was neutralized due to transformism. Absorption and inclusion mean that the 
protesting groups turned into a channel for the communication between the 
authorities and people. The local unions were used as an additional tool for 
domestication. The cooperation with the authorities and participation in institu-
tionalized debates do not co-exist with a political project which requires 
antagonism.  
The relations between the FNPR unions and the local authorities are com-
plicated. According to interviewees, the incompetent city administration aggrav-
ated the unrest in Pikalyovo: ‘Their [the authorities’] wrong policy cause people 
to storm the city hall. What is it about authorities? [The authorities said:] “We are 
meeting here and you are disturbing”. This was a trigger for people’ (Interview 5). 
The city administration tried to balance between the workers and the employers: 
‘They [the authorities] were neutral. If we stand for truth, we are the masses. But 
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the employer has money, it is another power. And they are neither here, nor there’ 
(Interview 6). 
As previously mentioned, one of the Pikalyovo protest leaders used to be a 
member of United Russia. She was also an acting member of the local municipal 
council during the 2008–2009 protests. None of that, however, prevented her 
from taking part in the protest actions in 2009. Later, she unsuccessfully run for 
a seat in the Leningrad Oblast parliament and lost her seat in the local municipal 
council in 2014. Even though protest leaders are not represented in legislatures 
nowadays, this absence of representatives in legislatures does not escalate protest 
activities in Pikalyovo. Reuter and Robertson (2015) argue that cooptation of 
protesters into legislatures decreases the level of activism. In the case of 
Pikalyovo this hypothesis is not proven.  
Balancing between workers and employers is a typical strategy of local 
authorities. Alliance with the authorities seems to be both inevitable and desirable 
for a trade union which confront employers but not the state machinery. One 
informant from the FNPR regional branch in Leningrad Oblast discloses: ‘I can 
say that the authorities are not on the side of the employer, but keep a distance. 
When we point at some violation [of the labor legislation], they react. We cannot 
complain about the authorities. We work, seek, try. We collaborate’ (Interview 4). 
In the Leningrad Oblast, the protests against the 2018 pension reform were not 
well-attended. FNPR unions either collected signatures and sent petitions, or 
organized small rallies (cf. Rabotniki ZhKKh Trebuiut 2018; Sviazisty Regiona 
Protiv 2018). For example, a rally in Pikalyovo brought together only 150 parti-
cipants (Mitingi protiv 2018). Therefore, the 2018 campaign against the pension 
reform demonstrated that protest capacities remained low.  
In 2009, the FNPR unions achieved a notable success in Pikalyovo. However, 
this success did not become a stepping stone for the further development of the 
local movement. The trade unions turned to cooperation with the local govern-
ment. This strategy mollifies social and labor conflicts occurring in the region.  
Thus, despite numerous and often successful protests in Leningrad Oblast, 
these protests have not significantly changed the situation in the region. Trade 
unions contribute to development of deliberative processes and public spheres. In 
Pikalyovo, for example, they created an institutional site to discuss local problems 
with authorities. Trade unions participate in decision-making procedures. How-
ever, isolated grassroots activities do not turn into popular politics, although 
democratic politics emerges from time to time. Social and labor protests do not 
accumulate in order to take the next level. Quite the opposite, they dissolve within 
various deliberative procedures.  
 
 
The case of the Republic of Karelia 
Collaboration of the FNPR unions and the local authorities takes various forms 
depending on the region. In the Republic of Karelia, the FNPR is connected with 
the All-Russia People’s Front (ONF), which is an important structure in many 
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regions. According to my interviews, the Karelian FNPR has some 50 thousand 
members. 
An interviewee from Petrozavodsk, the capital of Karelia, who is simul-
taneously a member of the FNPR and the ONF, reports: ‘The ONF was formed 
in quite a democratic way. The regional elites did not participate in the process. 
Social activists, bloggers, and experts were counted on’ (Interview 7). He says 
that support for labor protests do not contradict the ONF’s mission, because the 
Front focuses on the ‘federal agenda’, while the unions are involved with local 
problems. From this perspective, a pro-Kremlin organization may be an ally for 
the activists: ‘The ONF may listen to the demands of the unions… Regional 
authorities are afraid of both the ONF and the unions’ (Interview 7). Trade unions 
also use the ONF as an additional channel to balance the interests of employees, 
employers, and the local authorities.  
The ONF does not control the Karelian unions directly. The Karelian FNPR 
organizations have been involved in numerous labor conflicts as an independent 
force. According to another interview from Petrozavodsk, ‘labor conflicts emerge 
quite often. Bursts are regular’ (Interview 8). The ONF and the FNPR interact in 
order to achieve their own particular purposes: the unions need an outlet to 
discuss their problems and demands, while the ONF has an instrument to monitor 
the situation in the republic.  
The interviewees testify that members of Karelian trade unions are mainly 
moderate or neutral in ideological terms. Most of them do not see any alternative 
to the current political system.  
At the same time, the regional organization of the FNPR cooperates not only 
with the ONF. In 2016, the Karelian trade unions supported the Communist Party 
at the regional legislative elections (KPRF i Profsoiuzy Karelii 2016). The trade 
unions stated that this alliance was a response to inequality and economic 
problems in Karelia. However, the chair of the Karelian FNPR, who also ran on 
the CPRF ticket, was removed from the ballot by the regional electoral com-
mission (V TsK KPRF 2016). This decision did not provoke any protest. Besides, 
the temporary alliance with the CPRF did not affect the cooperation between the 
Karelian FNPR and the ONF.  
The regional authorities also try to reach out to the unions: ‘The acting 
governor attends [May Day rallies] and interacts with the unions. When there was 
a conflict in Medvezhyegorsk, he came and put the city attorney’s office on high 
alert’ (Interview 7). In other words, the governor took the workers’ side in the 
conflict. According to the Karelian informants, the regional government usually 
admits the importance of a dialogue with trade unions. There are mechanisms 
which enable deliberation and accommodation of demands posed by labor unions 
in Karelia. 
The conflict at a milk plant in Medvezhyegorsk, mentioned by the interviewee, 
was one of the most significant labor conflicts in Karelia in the recent past. 
Medvezhyegorsk is a small town 150 km north of Petrozavodsk. It is not a 
monotown and, besides this private owned milk plant, is home to some wood-
working industries. The conflict at the milk plant erupted in 2016, when the owner 
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of the enterprise stopped wage payments and the enterprise found itself on the 
brink of closure. As the first reaction, employees asked the head of the republic 
to intervene. The authorities responded by sending inspections to the plant. 
However, as no improvement followed, the workers decided to go on a short-term 
strike. The FNPR supported the strike and tried to de-escalate the conflict 
(Medvezhyegorskii Molokozavod 2016). According to the trade unions’ 
representatives’ the objectives of the protest were: ‘First, to make authorities 
intervene. Second, to correct the owners of the enterprise so that they become 
more socially responsible in their business. Third, to make the enterprise more 
sustainable so that wages are paid on time’ (Ballada o Karel’skom Molokozavode 
2016). Hence, the FNPR sees the resolution of labor and social conflicts through 
the lens of cooperation with the authorities. Trade unions connected protesting 
workers and the government and organized deliberations on the conflict. As 
previously mentioned, the head of Karelia visited Medvezhyegorsk and supported 
workers. Although some problems of the enterprise have been solved and it is not 
anymore on the edge of bankruptcy, wage arrears are still common.  
Therefore, typically protests result in mutual concessions between authorities 
and protest groups. These concessions barely improve the overall situation in the 
region, although they can solve particular problems. Besides, an interviewee adds: 
‘There are no preconditions for transition from economic demands to political 
ones’ (Interview 7). Labor conflicts emerge from time to time and mechanisms of 
public discussions exist in Karelia but protests do not result in popular politics 
and remain parochial. Recalling his participation in students protests, Laclau 
wrote: “[A] mobilization which attained its immediate aims should finish there, 
while for those of us who were more militant, the question was how to keep the 
mobilization going, which was possible only in so far as we had historical aims – 
aims that we knew systems could not satisfy” (Laclau 2000b: 209). A satisfied 
demand drops out from a new potential unity which might be an antagonistic one 
to the existing hegemonic formation.  
Numerous protest actions, which are organized by the FNPR, do not challenge 
the regime: rather, they help the regional authorities accommodate grassroots 
demands. Moreover, deliberation on the demands mollifies them. 
In Karelia the KTR is represented by the union of healthcare workers. The 
main success of this union was a pay increase for paramedics in 2019 (Italianskaia 
Zabastovka 2019). This success was achieved through so called ‘Italian strike’ or 
‘work-to-rule’, a type of protest actions in which employees literally follow all 
existing rules while working. In fact, it decreases productivity. This action of 
Karelian paramedics attracted attention of the local authorities which satisfied 
requests of the union. At the same time, the union does not expand its activities 
beyond workplaces. The KTR and the FNPR do not cooperate in Karelia. My 
interviewee from the FNPR argues that two federations do not have any sufficient 
common ground to cooperate in Karelia and the KTR union of healthcare worker 
is too small to be a significant ally (Interview 8).  
FNPR unions in Karelia participated in protests against the pension reform. 
For example, on July 5, 2018, the FNPR organized a well-attended rally in 
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Petrozavodsk (Na Mitinge v Karelii 2018). Protesters appealed to the Karelian 
government and legislature with the demand not to give their consent to the 
reform. They also demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. 
However, this demand did not contribute to the emergence of political 
antagonism. The Karelian case demonstrates that trade unions preferred getting 
involved in parliamentary discussions on the reform to any more radical action. 
In July 2018, after the first wave of protests, trade unions decided to send to the 
State Duma their amendments to the pension bill. FNPR unions in Karelia 
supported this decision (Profsoiuzy Gotoviat Popravki 2018). However, the 
Duma chose to ignore the proposals. At the end of August, the Karelian union of 
cultural workers petitioned the president to reconsider the pension reform 
(Rossiiskii Profsoiuz Rabotnikov Kul’tury 2018).  
Trade unions usually complain that the authorities ignore opinions of labor 
organizations. Despite this dissatisfaction, trade unions did not abandon parlia-
mentarian procedures. For example, the Karelian FNPR organization mentioned 
that United Russia did not take into account trade unions’ arguments against the 
pension reform in July 2018 (Ilya Kosenkov 2018). It was before the trade unions 
sent their amendments. Although the trade unions criticized the authorities and 
the ruling party, the FNPR still decided to rely on parliamentary debates.  
Despite criticism of the government during the protests against the pension 
reform, the Karelian trade unions continue to cooperate with the authorities. In 
2019, the local FNPR organization and the Karelian legislature signed the agree-
ment on cooperation (Podpisano Soglashenie 2019). During the wave of protests 
against the pension reform, trade unions posed general demands such as the 
resignation of the government, but later abandoned those and refocused on 
particular amendments to the pension bill. The Karelian trade unions reaffirmed 
their alliance with local authorities by signing the agreement with the legislature.  
Numerous protest actions, which are organized by the FNPR, do not challenge 
the regime, rather, they assist local authorities in accommodating grassroots 
demands. Moreover, the strive to discuss these demands with the authorities de-
escalates protests. During the wave of protests against the pension reform, trade 
unions did not insist on general demands such as the resignation of the govern-
ment. Instead, they focused on particular amendments to the pension bill. Then, 
Karelian trade unions reaffirmed their alliance with local authorities by signing 
the agreement with the legislature. Successful neutralization of the protests 
ensure their parochial nature.  
 
 
The case of Pskov Oblast 
Pskov Oblast is one of the poorest Russian regions. It does not have any developed 
industries. A significant part of the local population works in agriculture. How-
ever, trade unions have adapted to these conditions and are relatively active. The 
FNPR organization in Pskov Oblast addresses a range of social, environmental, 
and infrastructural issues. Hence, the trade union operates in a manner of social 
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movements. The Pskov FNPR has connections with other grassroots civic 
initiatives. The regional organization includes, for example, the Union of 
Gardeners, which formally does not operate in the sphere of industrial relations. 
According to interviews which I took with members of the labor unions in Pskov, 
local trade unions have some 55 thousand members.  
In Pskov Oblast, protest actions of the FNPR tend to succeed when ‘demands 
are adequate’ (Interview 9). It means that demands and protests should be 
moderate and narrow: ‘Where we pose smaller demands such as payment of wages 
at one given enterprise, repair of one given part of a road, specific actions are 
always successful’ (Interview 9). Thus, trade unions consciously avoid general 
demands and prefer to focus on particular issues.  
At the same time, the local organization of the FNPR contributes to the 
expansion of the public sphere. Representatives of the union often participate in 
meetings with the local authorities and discuss relevant social problems of the 
region. These meetings are used by the union to solve specific problems and, 
moreover, to connect other grassroots initiatives with the authorities. Protests 
often succeed and enable civic participation in the regional decision-making 
processes: ‘Our people got used to the situation when the executive power is 
obliged to talk to them directly’ (Interview 11).  
In the context of the protests against the pension reform the case of a FNPR 
organization in Pskov is significant. The increase of the age of retirement was 
especially painful for this region because life expectancy there is one of the lowest 
in Russia. It is not surprising that the protests in Pskov and the Oblast occurred 
on a mass scale.  
Massive protest actions were organized by trade unions not only in Pskov but 
also in smaller towns across the Oblast. On June 28, a rally in Pskov was attended 
by about 700 people. Ttrade unions called the pension reform ‘anti-popular’ and 
demanded the government to resign. Participants of the rally claimed that the 
government represented ‘oligarchs’, not people (Okolo 700 Chelovek Priniali 
Uchastiye 2018).  
In July 2018, trade unions organized “a marathon of pickets” in the Oblast 
(Piketnyi Marafon protiv Povysheniia Pensionnogo Vozrasta 2018). Two signi-
ficant actions took place in Velikiye Luki on July 5 and July 18. These actions 
were attended by 120 and more than 700 people respectively (V Velikikh Lukakh 
Proshiol Piket 2018, Bolee 700 Chelovek Prinialy Uchastiye 2018). On July 5, 
protesters used slogan ‘Let us force authorities to respect us’. It is remarkable that 
the trade unions posed demands which can be considered as political. The FNPR 
organization criticized the government and raised a number of issues relevant for 
Russia as a the whole. At the same time, trade unions collected signatures against 
the pension reform and sent them to the president, thus demonstrating their 
willingness to engage in a dialogue with the regime. On September 13, when 
another rally was organized in Pskov, trade unions declared their adherence to the 
combination of ‘protests and negotiations’ (Uchastniki Profsoiuznogo Mitinga 
2018).  
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Attempts to prevent the increase of the age of retirement failed, and protests 
eventually subsided. Isolated and narrow protest actions, despite their success, 
did not result in a campaign against the pension reform or initiate any political 
movement. The informants in Pskov admit that ‘strategic actions, when we try to 
improve the situation in general, do not succeed’ (Interview 9). Localized 
achievements do not prepare the ground for a broader campaign, such as the one 
against the pension reform.  
The Pskov FNPR is present in most regions and can impose its strategy 
because people do not see any other organizations with the same influence and 
capacity to channel their dissatisfaction. In many regions, participation in FNPR 
rallies is almost the only means for citizens to express the discontent about the 
pension reform. The case of Pskov Oblast demonstrates that trade unions can 
become the main operator of protests activities. Hence, these activities are 
organized in accordance with usual FNPR practices, remain particularistic, and 
result in concessions to the authorities.  
The FNPR in Pskov Oblast returned to usual activities. For example, trade 
unions organized a rally to support a local state-owned transport company Pskov-
passazhiravtotrans, which faced closure, and an anti-landfill protest in Porkhov, 
a town 75 km east of Pskov. In the case of the transport company, trade unions 
relied on the assistance of the authorities: ‘We want to find allies from state power 
structures who will see the value of Pskovpassazhiravtotrans’ (Pskovskikh Sena-
torov i Deputatov 2019). In March 2019, the FNPR ainvited United Russia to join 
upcoming events (Pskovskii Oblsovprof Predlozhil 2019).  
The informants in Pskov reveal that members of local trade unions mostly 
share ‘statist worldviews’ and advocate ‘statesmanship’ (Interview 9). This means 
that the strong state is a value for trade unions and they try to avoid and prevent 
political instability. The state in general and higher-ranking officials are con-
sidered as allies against employers and some representatives of the local authorities. 
Following this logic, trade unions try to attract attention of higher-ranking officials 
to social problems. Hence, ‘statist worldviews’ of the rank-and-file members 
reflect and simultaneously reinforce the leadership’s strategy of cooperating with 
the regime. 
The Pskov trade unions cooperate with United Russia. In 2011 and 2016, the 
chair of the Pskov FNPR was elected on the list of the ruling party to the regional 
legislature (Deputaty 2019). However, trade unions are not completely integrated 
into the “power vertical”, and conflicts between labor organizations and the 
authorities sometimes do occur. In July 2019, it was reported that The FNPR 
organization in Pskov was suspected by the police of engaging in ‘illegal com-
mercial activities’. The trade unions claimed that this suspicion had political 
reasons. At the same, none of members was suspected or charged personally. 
However, this conflict between the FNPR organization and the authorities does 
not undermine the willingness of the trade unions to cooperate with the state in 
general. Relations between trade unions and the regional administration stay the 
same. The FNPR organization relies on the intensification of the dialogue with 
the Pskov governor and notes that several local unions discuss wages and social 
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benefits with the authorities in a ‘constructive way’ (Uliana Mikhailova: My 
Budem Borot’sia 2019).  
 Addressing a wide range of social problems allows to establish networks 
which are used to involve people from different towns in trade unions’ activities. 
Alternative channels for mobilization are almost absent. The informants mention 
passivity of local citizens, which have not been eradicated by particular achieve-
ments of the trade union and the relative development of the regional public 
sphere. Although this passivity does not preclude citizens’ participation in protests, 
participants of protests follow the trade unions and do not try to create any 
alternative.  
Activities of the Pskov FNPR provides an example of transformistic processes. 
These activities often succeed and solve local social problems. However, the trade 
unions prefer to stay within democratic politics and address claim to institutions 
and not against institutions. This strategy, which presupposes cooperation with 
the local authorities, enables small successes and creates an obstacle for popular 
politics. 
 
 
From the regional to the national 
Big things have small beginnings. The cases addressed in this chapter are of 
regional significance and regional interest. However, these local cases indicate 
broader processes being an obstacle for political subjectivation. 
Social and labor protests regularly occur in Russian regions, including the 
North-West. Some of these protests succeed and solve local problems. Sometimes 
protesters go beyond issues of their enterprise or neighborhood and make demands 
related to social life of the whole region or even country. Thus, the Pikalyovo 
unions address various problems of their town and affect decision-making 
processes there. Trade unions in Pskov are not limited to industrial relations and 
respond to a wide range of issues. During protests against the pension reform, 
trade unions heavily criticized the government. In general, social and labor 
protests can be politicized from time to time and to some extent. At least, protesters 
regularly discuss governmental policies and overall situation in the country. 
Trade unions have a developed network of organizations in the North-Western 
regions. Protests in these regions are usually well organized. However, trade 
unions channel protest activities to consultations with the authorities. Regional 
cases of Leningrad Oblast, Pskov Oblast, Karelia and the case of protests against 
the pension reform demonstrate that, getting involved in political activities, trade 
unions and institutionalized social movements often refrain from further develop-
ment of protests and try to strengthen their positions within the hegemonic 
formation. It is noteworthy that trade unions do not rely on institutions of social 
partnership. They try to hold regular meetings with bureaucrats of different levels, 
run for seats in councils and legislatures, and even use the ONF to affect decision-
making processes. It can be suggested that, being dysfunctional, the system of 
social partnership is not able to institutionalize protest groups.  
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The interviews with representatives of trade unions and analysis of their 
discourse demonstrate that trade unions consider cooperation with the authorities 
as the main tool to achieve protesters’ goals and the main strategy in general. As 
previously mentioned, trade union leaders declare their commitment to ‘statesman-
ship’. Strategies aimed at the properly organized dialogue between protesters and 
the authorities, are consistent with this ideological state-centrism. At the same 
time, this commitment to ‘statesmanship’ does not necessarily mean support for 
authoritarianism. Trade unions strive for effective bureaucracy which could 
protect labor rights and hear demands from below. 
Protesters of Pikalyovo established a platform to discuss local problems with 
the authorities and to address their grievances. Some of unions’ leaders were 
elected to municipal councils. The dialogue between trade unions and the 
authorities exists not only in Pikalyovo but in Leningrad Oblast in general. This 
dialogue does not improve the protest capacities of trade unions, regardless of the 
economic and social situation in the region, which remains difficult. In 2016, 
local enterprises suffered lay-offs, which did not provoke any protests. It can be 
suggested that protesters are not able to influence economic processes which 
make their enterprises unprofitable. The incapability to address major issues 
demonstrates shortcomings of democratic protests. Although numerous mono-
towns face similar problems, protests which occur in monotowns are isolated and 
do not influence each other. Coordination among protest groups in monotowns 
could be a first step towards popular politics. However, protesters are unable to 
collaborate even within a single region. Even though the FNPR has its organiza-
tions in several monotowns, this formal unity within the federation does not 
contribute to potential coordination among protest groups.  
In Karelia and Pskov Oblast trade unions often criticize governmental policies 
but always confirm allied relations with the authorities. Occasional conflicts 
between trade unions and the authorities do not hinder these ‘constructive’ 
relations. Trade unions address a wide range of problems. Labor and social 
protests are often successful, but this leads to mutual concessions between trade 
unions and the authorities. Protesters deliberately keep their demands isolated to 
facilitate these mutual concessions. 
The analysis of these three cases suggests several typical features shared by 
most regional trade unions. Firstly, protests organized by the FNPR often succeed, 
meaning that their demands are satisfied by the authorities. Secondly, the inter-
viewees acknowledge limitations of their protest activities but do not try to find 
any new forms: instead, they prefer to discuss problems with the authorities and 
intensify contacts with the state apparatus. These contacts appear at different 
levels. Representatives of trade unions can be elected in city councils and 
sometimes in regional legislatures. Also, trade unions have frequent contacts with 
the executive bodies. For example, the labor organization in Pikalyovo 
participates in meetings and consultations with the city administration and 
representatives of the Leningrad Oblast administration. The Karelian unions use 
the ONF to affect the regional administration. The Pskov unions regularly discuss 
social problems with the local governor and other officials. Maintaining of the 
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regular consultations with officials is an important task of the trade unions. At the 
same time, the involvement of trade unions in electoral processes and deliberative 
procedures do not affect political situation and electoral mechanisms in the 
regions. Thirdly, protests remain isolated and end with an accommodation between 
the authorities and protest groups. From the viewpoint of conventional approaches, 
it is difficult to provide an unambiguous interpretation of the outcomes of unions’ 
protest activities, as they do not correspond to the expectations. Although unions’ 
actions contribute to the development of the public sphere and ensure some 
degree of representation of protesters in the existing political systems of Russian 
regions, these protests do not serve as a stepping stone towards any large-scale 
activities. 
During the 2018 protests over the pension reform, activities of the regional 
trade unions were another example of shortcomings of democratic politics. 
Previous successes did not increase effectiveness of the 2018 campaign. Quite 
the opposite, usual protest practices were inadequate for the nation-wide campaign 
and mass discontent. Trade unions could abandon parliamentarian procedures to 
make a step towards popular politics. However, anti-governmental demands from 
below were transformed into amendments submitted to and rejected by the State 
Duma.  
Trade unions are often able to find a solution to labor conflicts through tripartite 
negotiations with employers and the authorities (Bizyukov 2018). Even as finding 
a solution to a specific problem may be considered a success of a protesting group, 
it disrupts any further mobilization. Trade unions and social movements are able 
to solve particular problems at the cost of addressing broader issues. 
Russian trade unions are not completely integrated into the ‘power vertical’. 
They can operate independently and organize protest activities which are not 
necessarily suppressed by the authorities. Trade unions often consider the state as 
an ally in conflicts with employers. If trade unions do clash with the local 
authorities, they usually try to gain the support of higher-ranking officials. Con-
sequently, trade unions prefer to avoid any direct and open confrontation with the 
regime, even where such a confrontation might be justified. During the 2018 
campaign against the pension reform, for example, local trade unions channeled 
mass discontent into petitioning and parliamentary procedures and did not try to 
escalate the protests. 
The relations between trade unions and the state are controversial. FNPR 
leaders always support Vladimir Putin’s electoral campaigns and the regime’s 
policies (except for the pension reform). Their leaders are represented in the State 
Duma and some regional legislatures. At the same time, the system of social 
partnership is dysfunctional, and the state is reluctant to intervene in labor 
conflicts. This is especially visible at the regional level. Trade unions, however, 
strive to bring the local authorities into workplace disputes. Frequently, this is 
one of the key goals of protest actions. Trade unions also use additional channels 
of influence on the state such as the ONF or meetings with mayors and governors. 
In other words, protest actions of trade unions compensate for the inadequacy of 
social partnership. At the same time, this strategy requires the avoidance of open 
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conflict between trade unions and the regime. Since institutions of social 
partnership are ineffective, trade unions use protest activities as a substitute. 
In sum, protest strategies of trade unions presuppose that they cooperate with 
the state and seek contacts and accommodation with the local authorities. These 
strategies ultimately channel grassroots discontent into dialogue between the 
protesters and the authorities.  
These cases illustrate Laclau’s theory. Protesters neither expand equivalential 
chains among their demands, nor try to construct antagonism. According to 
Laclau, grassroots movements can either expand chains of demands and try to 
employ populist strategies or remain within the institutional order and bargain 
with the authorities. It is worth to remind that Laclau pays attention to strategies 
of grassroots movements rather than policies of governments. Thus, protesters 
prefer to abstain from antagonism and keep their claims within existing institutions. 
Organizations which lead the protests channel citizens’ discontent toward 
accommodation with the authorities. 
Regional trade unions are routinely involved in local conflicts. However, the 
2018 pension reform provoked protests in numerous regions of Russia, and trade 
unions did not stay away. The ultimate failure of protests against the reform 
revealed once again strategies which hinder the emergence of popular politics. 
While this chapter addresses transformistic processes at the local level, the next 
chapter covers these processes at the nation-wide level.   
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CHAPTER 6.  
Protests against the pension reform in Russia 
This chapter addresses protests against the pension reform in 2018. As previously 
mentioned, this reform provoked mass discontent and protest actions in numerous 
Russian regions. The FNPR and the KTR became the main organizers of protests.  
The 2018 pension reform, which increased the retirement age, was extremely 
unpopular. According to different polls, almost 90% of Russian citizens opposed 
the reform (Pensionnaia Reforma 2018; Povyshenie Pensionnogo Vozrasta: 
Reaktsiia 2018). Due to this unanimous rejection of the raise in the age of retire-
ment, protests against the reform had a chance to construct the opposition between 
the people and elites. In other words, a ground for popular politics emerged.  
Protests started in June of 2018, after the Russian Cabinet submitted a bill on 
the pension reform to the State Duma on June 16, 2018. According to this bill, 
the retirement age was supposed to be raised from 60 to 65 for men and from 55 
to 63 for women. The submission was announced on June 14, right before the 
opening match of the Football World Cup, which took place in Russia in June and 
July of 2018. This specific date is important because a Presidential decree 
restricted freedom of assembly for the duration of the tournament (Ukaz 
Prezidenta 2017). 
Although the Russian Cabinet elaborated the reform, traditional, ‘pro-Kremlin’, 
trade unions did not back this reform. The raise in the retirement age caused mass 
discontent which the FNPR could not disregard. In June 2018, the Federation 
criticized the pension reform proposed by the Russian government and decided 
to organize a campaign (Press-Konferentsiia Mikhaila Shmakova 2018). Altern-
ative trade unions also called for protests (KTR Ob’iavliaet o Zapuske 2018). 
The campaign against the pension reform went beyond industrial relations; 
trade unions cooperated with other protest groups and even political parties. The 
kinds of action taken mainly consisted of symbolic actions and the campaign in 
general was unassertive and ineffective. Trade unions channeled mass discontent 
to consultations with the authorities therefore protests ultimately failed. One can 
argue that trade unions constrained the potential of mass discontent and created 
an illusion of protest activities in 2018 (Bizyukov 2019a).  
At the same time, protests against the pension reform grew into an important 
and controversial event. They were not confined to a specific territory, but took 
place in numerous regions across the country. However, the campaign addressed 
only one problem, namely the pension reform, and remained particularistic in 
terms of its demands. Compared to protests against the monetization of social 
benefits in 2005, the 2018 protests are less radical in terms of protest actions and 
less effective in terms of results and further influence. It is worth to compare. The 
2005 protests were the most significant outburst of social discontent in Putin’s 
Russia and fueled social movements in the 2000s.  
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In order to understand strategies of protests against the pension reform, I 
analyzed texts published on official web sites of the FNPR, the KTR, and Solidar-
nost’, a newspaper affiliated with the FNPR. I focused on a period between June 
1 and October 1 of 2018, when people discussed the pension reform and held 
protests. On May 8, 2018, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev declared 
the necessity of the pension reform, and on June 1 the KTR launched the cam-
paign against the raise of the retirement age. Putin signed The bill on the pension 
reform on October 3, 2018. Thus, the protests and debates continued for the 
period of four months. 
I have analyzed 184 documents related to protests against the pension reform. 
This includes also interviews of their leaders with media outlets and other 
statements of these leaders. I have selected those interviews and statements that 
disclose goals and intentions of the trade unions.  
The first section briefly discusses protest actions organized by the trade unions. 
The second section covers discourses of the trade unions during the campaign 
against the pension reform. The third section compares the 2018 protests with the 
2005 protests and discusses the main findings of the chapter.  
 
 
The protest repertoire of trade unions during the 2018 
campaign against the pension reform 
This section discusses means used by the trade unions during the protest 
campaign against the raise in the retirement age in 2018. The KTR and the FNPR 
initiated this campaign and the discussion of their protest repertoire in 2018 
provide a context which is necessary for understanding of trade union discourses 
and influence of these discourse on practices.  
As previously mentioned, on May 8, 2018, the Russian Prime Minister 
Medvedev made a statement about the necessity of the reform. On June 1, the 
KTR launched the campaign against the raise of the retirement age (KTR 
Ob’iavliaet o Zapuske 2018).  
On June 18, 2018, the FNPR called its local organizations for collective 
actions (Profsoiuznaia Kampaniia 2018). Alternative trade unions started with an 
online petition and the accumulation of signatures against the reform. Pavel 
Kudiukin, member of the council of the KTR, described the strategy of trade unions: 
‘First of all, we are planning street actions, the creation of a broad coalition, and 
the involvement of allies, such as other trade unions, political parties, and public 
associations’ (Pavel Kudiukin: Ostanovit’ Zakonoporekt 2018). The mentioned 
broad coalition was called Narod protiv (The people is against) (Konfederatsiia 
Truda Rossii Prizyvaiet 2018). This coalition included not only alternative trade 
unions, but also representatives of diverse social movements, civic initiatives, and 
small political, mainly leftist, groups. Besides, the KTR forged an alliance with 
the Just Russia party.  
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Alternative and traditional unions conducted almost similar protest campaigns. 
The government prohibited any actions in the cities where the World Cup games 
took place. Therefore, trade unions demonstrated their adherence to the Russian 
legislation and refrained from rallies in the largest cities. The KTR also excluded 
the possibility of a strike because the Labor Code made the strike procedure 
difficult (Pavel Kudiukin: Ostanovit’ Zakonoporekt 2018). In other words, 
alternative trade unions that were supposed to be more radical than the FNPR, 
did not differ from traditional trade unions. 
Trade unions declared that ‘protests against the pension reform consolidated 
Russian citizens’ (V Permi Tysiachi Aktivistov 2018). Indeed, opposition parties 
and regional civic initiatives supported the trade union rallies. Protests against the 
pension reform seemed to unite various protest groups into one broad coalition.  
Although local organizations of the FNPR criticized the Russian government 
for the pension reform and sometimes demanded that the prime minister resigned, 
trade unions quickly turned to parliamentarian procedures. On July 24, the FNPR 
called its regional organizations to send their amendments to the bill of the 
pension reform to the State Duma (Informatsionnoie Pis’mo 2018). In September, 
the Russian parliament rejected all these amendments. (Deputaty Otklonili 2018).  
In the beginning of July, the KTR also organized several actions in Russian 
regions (V Rossii Proshlo 2018). These actions were supported by the systemic 
opposition. On July 5, representatives of the KTR and Just Russia brought to the 
State Duma boxes with 2.5 million signatures of those, who signed the online 
petition against the raise in the retirement age (Profsoiuznye Lidery Peredali 
2018). On July 29, the Libertarian Party of Russia, which is not represented in 
the parliament, organized a rally in Moscow. The KTR also participated in this 
rally (Bizyukov 2019).  
The first allowed rally in Moscow took place as late as July 18, after the World 
Cup ended (Aktsiia protiv Povysheniia 2018). Further, on July 28, alternative 
trade unions joined in another rally organized by the Communist Party also in 
Moscow (50 Tysiach Chelovek Vyshli 2018). 
In August, protests against the pension reform took a break. Trade unions did 
not try to organize new actions during the end of summer. However, the FNPR 
unions elaborated amendments to the bill on the raise of retirement age. On 
August 21, the parliamentary hearing took place in the State Duma. Both the 
FNPR and the KTR participated in the debates (Povysheniie Pensionnogo 
Vozrasta: Parlamentsko-Obshchestvennyie 2018). Trade unions criticized the 
government and mentioned productive public discussion which occurred in the 
Russian society. 
On August 29, Putin addressed to the Russian people, asked to support the 
pension reform and softened it. He announced that the age of retirement for 
women would be raised only to 60. He also pledged several social benefits for 
persons of the pre-retirement age.  
In August of 2018, the FNPR intensified negotiations with authorities and 
representatives of United Russia in the parliament. The Executive Committee of 
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the Federation noted that, in fact, Putin supported the FNPR opinion on the 
‘continuation of the social dialogue’ (Postanovleniie Ispolkoma 2018).  
The KTR and the FNPR organized the last round of protests in the beginning 
of September. On September 2, Just Russia and alternative trade unions held a 
rally in Moscow (Na Suvorovskoi Ploshchadi 2018). 
On September 9, Alexei Navalny, a prominent leader of non-systemic 
opposition, and his supporters organized series of street actions in numerous cities 
across the country. The most significant rallies, which took place in Moscow and 
Saint Petersburg, had not been authorized by the local authorities, and more than 
one thousand participants were detained by the police (Bizyukov 2019; Rost 
Protestnoi Aktivnosti 2019). These actions coincided with the 2018 single voting 
day when gubernatorial and legislative elections were held in several subjects of 
the Russian Federation. On September 9, trade unions did not participate in the 
rallies.  
Some separate actions took place even in the second half of September and in 
October (cf. Miting protiv Povysheniia 2018; V Pskovskoi Obasti 2018). More-
over, the latest proteststook place in the regions outside Moscow and were 
organized by local trade unions. To some extent, regional organizations were 
more persistent than the central trade union bodies.  
The campaign against the pension reform enjoyed a wide public support and 
engagement, yet it did not turn into any efficient campaign. The KTR did not 
propose any strategy, other than legal rallies. Unauthorized actions were rare. 
Here, it becomes evident that even alternative unions use strategies that have 
much in common with those of the FNPR. The KTR also relies on authorized 
rallies, cooperates with parliamentary parties, and does not avoid negotiations 
with the regime’s representatives. Although alternative unions do not support the 
Russian authoritarianism explicitly and are less integrated in deliberative systems 
of the regime, alternative unions and FNPR organizations often act in the same 
way. Ideological differences between central apparatuses of these two federations 
do not necessarily affect their actions.  
 Consequently, on September 27, the State Duma adopted the bill on the raise 
of the retirement age. On October 3, Putin signed it. The parliament ignored 
amendments submitted by trade unions. Mass discontent with the reform has 
remained for a long time but in terms of protest action nothing significant happened 
after the adoption of the bill. 
 
 
Discourses during protests against the pension reform 
Protests against the raise of the retirement age provide extensive data to study the 
discourse of trade unions. The FNPR and the KTR made several statements on 
these protests and widely comment their own actions and responses of the state. 
This campaign addressed a national problem and trade unions covered a wide 
range of issues in their publications. The 2018 protests were inefficient and did 
not repeal the pension reform. Trade unions preferred ‘symbolic actions’ such as 
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peaceful rallies and petitioning. These practices found their reflection and fell 
under the influence of related trade union publications.  
Initially slogans proclaimed at trade union rallies were quite radical. This 
radicalism was especially tangible in regions outside Moscow. Protesters in Perm, 
for example, argued that the pension reform was ‘anti-popular’ one or even 
‘genocidal’ (V Permi Tysiachi Aktivistov 2018). They demanded resignation of 
the government. Protesters in the Republic of Karelia, for example, demanded to 
dismiss Dmitry Medvedev and all officials who were responsible for the pension 
reform (Na Mitinge v Karelii 2018). Some FNPR organizations claimed that the 
reform worked in favor of ‘oligarchs’ which were contrasted to the Russian 
people (Pskovskiie Profsoiuzy Nachali 2018). Even Solidatnost’ called the 
pension reform a ‘war against pensioners’ (Voina protiv Pensionerov 2018). Here, 
some protesters tried to break with the hegemonic formation by using metaphors 
of ‘war’ and ‘genocide’ which are incompatible with peaceful co-existence of the 
protesters and the regime.  
However, trade union leaders still insisted that they intended to enter into a 
dialogue with the authorities. Representatives of the KTR focused on the dialogue 
in several of their statements. On June 21, at a press conference, the KTR leaders 
reported on the status of the campaign against the pension reform. They 
mentioned lack of mutual understanding? between the authorities and the people 
and asked the parliament and the president to organize a ‘wide discussion’ of the 
reform. Representatives of the KTR also emphasized that all their protests were 
going to be peaceful (Press-Konferentsiia o Khode 2018).  
On July 23, the KTR published an address to Putin, called for ‘professional 
deliberation’ on the pension reform, and offered to avoid ‘populist slogans 
(Konfederatsiia Truda Rossii Obrashchaetsia 2018). Two days later, represent-
atives of the KTR emphasized once again that trade unions tried to discuss the 
pension reform and needed a counterpart for this discussion: ‘The State Duma is 
not a site for negotiations… The only site for negotiations we still have is the 
Presidential administration. President said that he was up for listening to all points 
of view personally’ (Kliuchevyie Protesty 2018). Thus, trade unions made a 
special effort to find a counterpart for the dialogue with the authorities. The KTR 
also explained the August break in the campaign through the need of a dialogue: 
‘August is a slow time, when there is no one with whom to have a dialogue’ 
(Kliuchevyie Protesty 2018). Trade unions also threatened that they could force 
the government to ‘hear people’ (Konfederatsiia Truda Rossii Prizyvaiet 2018). 
The campaign was supposed to achieve the correctly organized dialogue with the 
authorities. Here, the trade union leaders defined the goals of the ralliesthrough 
the sign ‘dialogue’. In the discourse of trade unions, ‘discussions’ and ‘nego-
tiations’ are considered as a rationale for protest actions.  
Even though regional labor unions posed radical demands, such as resignation 
of the government and criticized the Russian political and social system in general, 
and underscored the opposition between ‘oligarchs’ and the people, this radical 
criticism resulted in moderate actions. Trade unions collected signatures – one of 
the protesters’ main tools (Profsoiuzy Yakutii 2018; Pikety i Podpisi 2018; 
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Tul’skiie Profsoiuzy Sobiraiut 2018; V Gosdume Otkazyvaiutsia 2018). Since the 
trade union leaders criticized “populist slogans”, the opposition between “oli-
garchs” and the people had to be banished to the margins of the discourse because 
this opposition could be interpreted as a manifestation of populism. Petitions and 
collection of signatures corresponded to the prioritization of the dialogue within 
the trade union discourse.  
Some FNPR organizations asked the president to veto the bill. In Novosibirsk, 
for example, protesters requesting the presidential veto argued that the pension 
reform could ‘sunder the authorities from the people’ (Pravo Veto 2018). Here, 
the discursive opposition between ‘oligarchs’ and the people was replaced with 
the desired unity of the authorities and the people.  
Pavel Kudiukin from the KTR signaled that alternative trade unions also relied 
on the presidential intervention in the debates on the reform: ‘He [Putin] might 
also come up and say: the government went too far’ (Pavel Kudioukin: Ostanovit’ 
Zakonopoekt 2018). Andrey Konoval, member of the KTR Council, said in July 
2018 that Putin ‘suspended the situation’: ‘It means that the final decision has not 
been made yet… If protests intensify and result in some public actions, I am sure 
that the Head of State will exercise his right and reject the bill’ (Esli Pensionnaia 
Reforma 2018). Thus, the cooperation between trade unions and the regime is 
desirable within the trade union discourse.  
Both the KTR and the FNPR started protest campaigns slowly and hesitantly. 
Alternative and traditional trade unions operated in accordance with their dis-
course on civilized protests. Despite massive discontent with the pension reform, 
the KTR and the FNPR channeled this discontent to authorized rallies and online 
petitions. Trade unions preferred to discuss the reform with the authorities. 
Because the trade union discourse defines politics through the dialogue, inter-
actions between trade unions and the regime also take the form of discussions and 
negotiations. Rhetoric of the KTR and the FNPR presents this form as favorable. 
Pro-governmental media outlets often stress the role of trade unions in 
deliberation on issues of economic and social policies. According to official TV 
channels, the raise in the age of retirement in 2018 was discussed nation wide and 
trade unions were involved in this debate. The government and the State Duma 
stressed the importance of trade unions in this deliberation (Vremia Peremen 
2018). Public debates as such were also important for pro-governmental media 
outlets. Thus, public hearings about the pension reform and with the participation 
of trade unions in the State Duma were covered and the role of trade unions was 
mentioned (Pensionnyi Vozrast Proshiol 2018).  
In general, official mass media did not claim that the pension reform was 
supported unanimously (Profsoyuzy – Vlastiam 2018). Plurality of opinions are 
allowed within the hegemonic discourse. Trade unions which are considered 
allies of the regime were able to express their disagreement with the raise in the 
age of retirement. Pro-governmental TV channels also covered rallies against the 
pension reform. They did not ignore trade union participation in these rallies 
(Okolo 6500 Chelovek 2018). The coverage of protests against the pension 
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reform corresponds to the image of ‘simple ordinary people’ within the hege-
monic discourse (Kalinin 2018). Since ‘simple people’ are considered to be sup-
porters of regimes, official mass media does not tag their activities as dangerous, 
as long as these activities remain within specific limits. The 2018 campaign met 
the requirements of the ‘civilized protests’. In other words, the trade union 
discourse intersects here with the hegemonic discourse. If the sign ‘protest’ is 
attached to the sign ‘dialogue’, the hegemonic discourse and the trade union 
discourse consider protest actions to be legitimate.  
In 2018, the prioritization of the dialogue prevailed over other discursive 
articulations and strategies. Although some protesters made political claims, the 
campaign against the pension reform was not political in general. Trade unions 
abstained from open confrontation with the regime and preferred to deescalate 
the protests.  
Unsuccessful protests against the pension reform highlighted the prioritization 
of dialogue within the trade union discourse. Trade unions tried to find a site for 
negotiations with the authorities and to organize public deliberations over the 
reform. This strategy, understandably, resulted in legalism. In their statements, 
trade unions emphasized the adherence to legal actions and parliamentary pro-
cedures. Despite several unauthorized actions, the campaign remained within the 
framework of restrictive legislation. 
In 2018, trade unions deliberately refused direct actions and focused on 
symbolic actions. The discursive prioritization of dialogue reflects and solidifies 
this adherence to authorized rallies and petitions. Collected signatures might 
involve authorities in a discussion, while direct actions could damage deliberative 
procedures. 
Samuel Greene and Graeme Robertson (2019) note that Putin remains popular 
in Russia. They argue that many people support Putin unquestionably, trust him, 
and consider his power as something natural and inevitable. Speaking on Putin’s 
popularity, Greene and Robertson mention mainly ‘ordinary Russians’. Hence, 
one can speculate that trade union leaders have expected Putin’s intervention 
because they represent people’s confidence in the president. However, it is not 
absolutely true and rank-and-file trade union members sometimes were more 
radical than their leaders. 
Indeed, restrictive laws, which impede the freedom of assembly and asso-
ciations, obviously hindered protests against the pension reform and the trade 
union leaders recognized this obstacle in their statements. Again, Pavel Kudiukin 
said that the Russian legislation did not allow to organize strikes against the 
reform. Despite these facts, trade unions did not demand to amend the laws on 
rallies and strikes during the 2018 campaign. Thus, the leaders of the 2018 
protests did not try to expand equivalential chains of demands.  
During the campaign against the pension reform, the FNPR central committee 
and the KTR central council did not run the protests directly. The trade union 
leaders did not authorize the slogans of these actions. Citizens widely supported 
the campaign, and discontented people who did not belong to any organization 
attended the rallies. Grassroots slogans and demands were more radical than the 
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official trade union statements. Thus, the discourse on dialogue and cooperation 
with the authorities was challenged by other articulations. Protesters utilized near-
populist rhetoric referring to an ‘anti-popular reform’, the ‘pension genocide’ and 
other slogans regarding the opposition between oligarchs and the people. This 
rhetoric had coexisted and was gradually displaced by the usual statements about 
the dialogue with the regime. Indeed, the KTR even advocated for more dialogue 
and cooperation with the authorities. Since the FNPR and the KTR did not 
coordinate their actions and statements, it was not only a rational strategy, but 
also the manifestation of common norms and values. This shows how key elements 
of the hegemonic formation affect protest actions.  
Although coalitions against the reform included various initiatives and protest 
groups, none of these groups questioned the prioritization of dialogue. Protests 
against the pension reform contributed to the development of public sphere and 
deliberative procedures. At the same time, the mass discontent did not result in a 
significant challenge to the regime.  
The campaign against the pension reform demonstrated that rhetoric of trade 
unions focused on the establishing of a site for public debates. This rhetoric 
displayed the prioritization of dialogue and reflected the strategy of the campaign. 
At the same time, a ‘properly’ organized dialogue needs ‘constructive’ relations 
between protesters and authorities and deescalates social conflicts. 
 
 
Popular politics versus democratic politics 
Protests against the pension reform are often compared to the 2005 protests against 
the ‘monetization’ reform. Participants of the 2018 protests also calibrated their 
actions with the 2005 protests. The KTR noted that the campaign against the 
pension reform was the largest protest since 2005 (Kliuchevyiie Protesty 2018). 
Pavel Kudiukin argued that protests against the pension reform might be as 
massive as the 2005 actions. He added: ‘However, there is a hope now that these 
[2018] protests will be more organized’ (Pavel Kudiukin: Ostanovit’ Zakono-
proekt 2018). 
Indeed, the 2005 protests were nearly the most important ones in history of 
Putin’s Russia. The law on ‘monetization’ reform was adopted in 2004 and 
entered into force in January 2005. The goal of the reform was to replace in kind 
social benefits with direct payments. This measure was supposed to ‘delineate 
federal and regional social protection mandates, cash-out some of them, and make 
funding these mandates more transparent’ (Alexandrova and Struyk 2007: 153).  
The reform became unpopular from the very beginning. According to polls, 
more than 50% of citizens opposed ‘monetization’ in 2004 and 2005. People 
thought that the government was trying to relinquish its social responsibility 
(Klimov 2006).  
The first protest actions occurred as early as 2004. In July, rallies took place 
in dozens of cities across the country. The 2004 actions were organized mainly 
by trade unions, including the FNPR, parties of the parliamentary opposition, and 
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initiative groups representing recipients of social benefits. These first rallies 
failed to attract big crowds. On July 1, 2004, for example, a rally in Moscow was 
attended only by 3000 people (Clement, Demidov, and Miryasova 2010). In 
addition, non-parliamentary organizations held ‘direct actions’. In August of 
2004, activists of the National Bolshevik Party occupied the building of the 
Ministry of Health to protest the reform (Kak Natsboly Vziali 2004).  
In January of 2005, the protests peaked. After the reform process began, 
thousands of people took to the street in numerous Russian cities. Many of the 
protest actions were spontaneous and unsanctioned by the local authorities. 
Protesters blocked highways and stormed city councils. Participants of these 
actions demanded not only the abolition of the reform, but also the resignation of 
the president and the cabinet. At the same time, parliamentary parties asked 
protesters to avoid social unrest and be ‘peaceful’ (Clement, Demidov, and 
Miryasova 2010). 
 The 2005 protests were partly successful. The government restored some in-
kind benefits and withdrew plans to expand the reform (Monetizatsii L’got of 
Rossii 2014). However, what was more important is that the 2005 protests 
influenced the further development of social movements. ‘The country was 
confronted with a broad movement that was evidently not controlled by parties 
or other organizations’ (Gabowitsch 2017: 198). The 2005 splash also reignited 
social protests after the lull of the early 2000s and gave birth to several coordinating 
councils which united social movements and civic initiatives (Clement, Demidov 
and Miryasova 2010). 
The campaign against the pension reform was more institutionalized but less 
successful, less massive, and less influential than the 2005 protests. My inter-
viewees from Pskov, who participated in both protest campaigns, mention the 
degradation of protest activities from 2005 to 2018. They admit that the 2005 
protest actions were better attended and more radical than the rallies in 2018.  
Unlike the 2005 protest wave, the 2018 campaign did not include spontaneous 
actions. In 2018, almost all rallies were held with the permission from the 
authorities. As previously mentioned, the protests against the ‘monetization’ 
reform had two stages. In the summer of 2004, trade unions and parliamentary 
parties organized regular rallies which were not well-attended. The summer of 
2018 reminded that situation. In January 2005, however, numerous spontaneous 
and unauthorized actions occurred. Later, trade unions and parliamentary parties 
restored control over the protest wave and deescalated the conflict. Concessions 
by the regime also contributed to this de-escalation. In the case of the 2018 
protests, trade unions always controlled the activities and channeled them to 
‘dialogue’ with the authorities. This can be explained through the difference 
between the two reforms. While the ‘monetization’ reform affected citizens 
immediately after it had entered into force, the pension reform will have a delayed 
effect. Moreover, trade unions and parliamentary parties had protested against the 
‘monetization’ reform before its adoption, while spontaneous actions occurred 
after its implementation. Thus, mass discontent and organized rallies lacked syn-
chronization in 2004 and 2005. It meant that trade unions and parliamentary 
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parties had fewer opportunities to manage mass discontent in 2004 and 2005 than 
they had in 2018.  
Robertson (2013) argues that after 2007 the protests turned from direct actions 
to symbolic actions. While ‘anti-monetization’ protests included a significant 
amount of ‘direct actions,’ such as road blocks, the protests against the pension 
reform relied mostly on ‘symbolic actions’ and ‘polite protests,’ which were sup-
posed to attract attention of the public and organize a ‘proper’ dialogue between 
protesters and the authorities. In theoretical framework of the current dissertation, 
development of transformistic processes has enhanced deliberative procedures 
and expanded the hegemonic formation. The values of dialogue and ‘civilized 
protest’ have become predominant within discourses and strategies of the trade 
unions.  
These values were also imposed on rank-and-file participants of the 2018 
protests. In the beginning of the campaign, protesters in the regions employed 
anti-regime slogans, demanded the resignation of the cabinet, and juxtaposed the 
people and the ‘oligarchs’. Later, this rhetoric, which can be considered populist 
and directed against established institutions, was replaced with usual trade union 
rhetoric demanding dialogue between protesters and the authorities. Claims against 
institutions were superseded by claims to institutions and within the institutional 
order. 
 Although trade unions used the slogan ‘The people is against’, this alone did 
not signify a transition to popular politics. While some protesters demanded the 
resignation of the cabinet, trade unions did not expand the chain of demands and 
restricted the protest to the particular issue of the pension reform. Nor did trade 
unions try to criticize existing laws on rallies and strikes, though these laws 
constrained the protest in general. The protest repertoire contained mostly 
‘symbolic actions’, which complied with the existing legislation. 
Although trade unions initiated the campaign against the pension reform, they 
were not the only organizers of the protests and did not play a decisive role during 
the campaign. As previously mentioned, the parliamentary opposition, the non-
systemic opposition, various social movements and civic initiatives participated 
in the protests. Hence, the 2018 campaign provides evidence regarding not only 
trade unions but also other protest groups. Strategies and tactics of other organiza-
tions which participated in the 2018 protests did not significantly differ from 
those of trade unions. While some parties and social movements coordinated their 
actions with trade unions, other protest groups acted independently of trade 
unions. Therefore, trade unions were not able to impose their understanding of the 
campaign on all protesters. Yet protesters adhered mainly to ‘symbolic actions’. 
Unauthorized rallies organized by Navalny’s supporters coincided with the 
voting day to affect regional elections. In other words, these activities also 
focused on parliamentarianism. The non-systemic opposition was relatively 
passive during first months of the campaign but intensified its actions before the 
voting day. Thus, even when the situation required actions in June and July, non-
systemic opposition postponed rallies until the voting day in September. It 
demonstrates that parliamentary procedures have an intrinsic values for non-
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systemic opposition. In a sense, trade unions and non-systemic opposition share 
this focus on parliamentarianism. In sum, trade unions and other organizations 
which participated in protests against the pension reform did not significantly 
differ in their activities.  
The population widely supported the 2018 campaign. The growth of protests 
against the pension reform provided an opportunity for the popular politics. 
Protesters could make a step towards popular politics by posing demands which 
could go beyond the issues of the pension reform. For example, the restrictive 
legislation on strikes and rallies certainly hindered the development of the 
campaign but the protest leaders did not criticize this legislation. Some demands 
from below used anti-governmental and antagonizing rhetoric but they were not 
supported by the protest leaders. Strategies and discourses of the protest leaders 
channeled mass discontent into parliamentary procedures and petitioning. While 
the usual trade union activities may be effective for solving local problems, these 
strategies failed during the nation-wide campaign. The 2018 protests remained 
within the institutional order and within the framework of democratic politics.  
This type of politics coexists with the current hegemonic formation and 
derives from social processes. Democratic politics carries a residue of particu-
larism inherent in social and labor protests. Yet, both democratic and populist 
politics have their own logics and are not mere representations of social conflicts. 
Hence, politics cannot be understood through sociologism. In other words, the 
accumulation of social protests and the rise of people’s discontent in regard to 
particular problems does not result in popular subjectivity. The potential transition 
from democratic politics to popular politics does not depend on the intensity of 
social and labor protests. Moreover, even this kind of a transition is not a gradual 
or natural process. 
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CONCLUSION 
This dissertation examined the relations between protest movements and the 
regime in Russia and proposed a new perspective on this issue. Despite frequent 
splashes of social and labor conflicts, they fall short of initiating any major 
political change. This research demonstrates that protest movements often tend 
to cooperate with the regime, avoid antagonism and remain isolated. They also 
prefer to rely on deliberative procedures and strive for a dialogue with the 
authorities.  
This dissertation examined the relations between protest movements and the 
regime in Russia and proposed a new perspective on this issue. Despite frequent 
waves of social and labor conflicts, they fall short of initiating any major political 
change. This research demonstrates that protest movements often tend to 
cooperate with the regime, avoid antagonism and remain isolated. They also 
prefer to rely on deliberative procedures and strive for a dialogue with the 
authorities. Protest groups are often successful in voicing grievances, as the 
authorities satisfy isolated demands from below. However, local successes are 
achieved at the expense of potential political development of the protest. In other 
words, local successes sometimes block the way toward the emergence of a 
political subject which could challenge the regime. These phenomena contribute 
to the survival of authoritarianism. 
Transformism is to be understood within the dichotomy of popular politics 
and democratic politics. While popular politics establishes antagonistic frontier 
between masses and elites, democratic politics is a type of politics which operates 
within the current hegemonic formation. When protest groups go beyond the 
limits of individual workplaces and neighborhoods to problems of the region as 
a whole or even the entire country, they enter the political realm. However, such 
politicization still represents only one type of politics. As long as political 
activities of protest groups remain non-antagonistic toward the regime, these 
activities stay within the limits of democratic politics. 
According to Ernesto Laclau, democratic politics has its own internal logic, 
often neglected by other approaches. The examination of this logic helps to 
understand political implications of social and labor protests. Laclau highlights 
that democratic politics requires institutionalization of grassroots movements, 
which makes them prefer cooperation with the state.  
Furthermore, a comparison of Laclau’s, Badiou’s, and Lazarus’s theories shows 
that democratic politics presupposes a search for deliberative procedures. Non-
antagonistic politics relies on the exchange of opinions and comes close to 
parliamentarianism. Agents of democratic politics usually strive to enter into 
dialogue with the authorities or initiate public debates. These activities blur the 
potential antagonistic frontier between the regime and the masses. 
In the Russian case, trade unions can be classified as agents of democratic 
politics whose activity enables transformism. My analysis of the Russian 
hegemonic discourse demonstrates that independent activities of subaltern classes 
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in general are tolerated by the regime. The Russian hegemonic formation relies 
on democratic rhetoric. Although stability and sovereignty are prioritized within 
this discourse, grassroots activities can also be seen as legitimate. People are 
allowed to take to the streets in support of such loyalist slogans as the defense of 
stability and the principle of national sovereignty. Social and labor protests are in 
this view also legitimate, but under certain conditions. For example, protests 
against the pension reform were presented by official mass media as reasonable, 
even though they opposed an officially declared policy. Trade unions are 
considered rightful and proper mediators between the authorities, the employers 
and the subaltern classes. 
Graeme Robertson (2011) argues that labor organizations have been integrated 
into the regime’s power vertical. This is not absolutely correct. Although the 
central apparatus of the FNPR usually supports the president and the ruling party, 
local organizations operate autonomously. Besides, the KTR, another federation 
of trade unions, criticizes both the president and United Russia. At the grassroots 
level, labor organizations often organize independent protest activities. These 
organizations frequently operate as social movements addressing a wide range of 
issues. Sometimes trade unions confront local authorities and affect decision-
making processes in separate regions and cities. Most scholars distinguish 
‘traditional’ trade unions (the FNPR) and ‘free’ or ‘alternative’ trade unions (the 
KTR and other smaller federations). ‘Alternative’ trade unions are supposed to 
be independent from the regime and more radical than ‘traditional’ ones. However, 
on a wide spectrum of issues beyond federal elections, ‘alternative’ and ‘tradi-
tional’ trade unions have much in common. ‘Traditional’ trade unions often 
participate in social and labor conflicts. While it is true that many FNPR local 
organizations are passive, there is also a large number of active traditional unions.  
Discourses of trade unions have much in common with the hegemonic dis-
course. Even though the hegemonic discourse prioritizes stability, protests, as 
previously mentioned, are sometimes vindicated by the official mass media. Yet, 
according to both the hegemonic discourse and the discourses of trade unions, 
protests should be ‘civilized’, and trade unions declare that they strive for a 
dialogue with the authorities and employers. This dialogue is presented as con-
tributing to overall stability. Trade unions often explicitly argue that their 
‘civilized’ activities prevent potential social unrest. 
Both the FNPR and the KTR stand against so called ‘neoliberalism’ and the 
‘contemporary financial system’. Trade unions are concerned with the alleged 
retreat of the state from the economy. In fact, it means that labor organizations 
solicit the support of the state apparatus in industrial conflicts. Moreover, most of 
trade union leaders share statist ideologies, which affect strategies of other protest 
groups. These strategies presuppose cooperation with the authorities whenever 
possible. When protesters confront the local authorities, trade unions often appeal 
to superior officials. These appeals de-escalate social conflicts, hinder popular 
subjectivation, and contribute to the survival of the regime.  
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In the Russian regions, trade unions are active and social and labor protests 
occur regularly. Empirical examination of regional protest movements con-
tributes to the understanding of processes preventing popular subjectivation, as 
described above. In Leningrad Oblast, Karelia, and Pskov Oblast trade unions are 
often involved in grassroots activities and organize local protests.  
For example, the 2008–2009 mass protests in Pikalyovo have had a lasting 
impact on the social and political life in Leningrad Oblast. Yet, this impact is also 
contradictory. The protesters contributed to the development of deliberative 
procedures in the region, but social and economic situation in the city remains 
deplorable. Even more importantly, isolated successes and achievements did not 
lay any foundation for further protest activities. Representatives of the Pikalyovo 
trade unions often meet with the local authorities and discuss problems of the city 
and the region. From this perspective, the grassroots protest has been institu-
tionalized. It proves Laclau’s suggestion that the adherence to institutions replaces 
politics with administration (Laclau 2012). Protest groups in Russia often seek 
institutionalization. They establish numerous commissions, committees, and other 
sites where they can meet representatives of the regime and discuss local issues. 
Trade unions have an advantage in this search for institutionalization. They have 
already obtained certain mechanisms for consultations with the authorities such 
as tripartite commissions. Sometimes they sign agreements on cooperation with 
regional legislatures and other state bodies. FNPR organizations are included in 
the pro-Kremlin All-Russia People’s Front (ONF). Other protest groups often try 
to follow this way toward institutionalization. 
Institutionalization of grassroots activities in Russia is a sign of transformism. 
The hegemonic formation incorporates protest groups which seem critical toward 
the regime. By partially satisfying demands of these groups, the regime neutralizes 
and domesticates them. The responsiveness of the authorities is ensured by the 
establishment of various platforms where disgruntled people meet with represent-
atives of the regime and discuss their demands and requests.  
Pikalyovo is not the only center of protests in the region. The regional 
organization of the FNPR in Leningrad Oblast is active and regularly involved in 
labor and social conflicts. Trade unions of the KTR were influential in the region, 
but their influence decreased after several enterprises were closed due to 
economic reasons. 
The FNPR is also active in Republic of Karelia. Here, trade unions cooperate 
with the ONF. Local FNPR organizations participate in independent protest 
activities and sometimes support political slogans criticizing the government. 
Protest groups enjoy large autonomy and FNPR officials do not dictate or impose 
methods and strategies. At the same time, trade unions strive to establish what 
they call constructive relations with the authorities. 
In Pskov Oblast, trade unions address a wide range of issues, including infra-
structural and environmental ones. In fact, local trade unions come close to 
promoting politicization, because they go beyond the narrow sphere of industrial 
relations and have an influence over decision-making processes in the region. 
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In sum, trade unions contribute to the development of deliberative procedures 
and the public sphere. In Laclau’s terms, trade unions promote democratic 
politics. They contribute to the improvement of workers’ living standards locally, 
at the level of individual enterprises and municipalities. Yet, none of their 
achievements present a serious challenge to the regime. 
It is obvious that protests and their failures in a single region cannot signi-
ficantly affect the situation in the whole country. However, regularities and patterns 
of grassroots activities are similar in different regions. Occurring in numerous 
cities, protests jointly compose a general tendency preventing the emergence of 
a popular political subject. 
The whole picture of social and labor movements can be grasped by examining 
the protests against the pension reform. The campaign was organized and led 
mostly by trade unions. Although protests against the unpopular reform inspired 
a remarkable amount of public engagement, the campaign failed to produce mass 
mobilization and did not achieve its key goals. Protests against the pension reform 
highlighted several characteristics of social and labor movements as well as 
democratic politics as a form of politics promoted by these movements. 
Trade unions demonstrated their adherence to the discourse of ‘civilized 
protests’. They declared the aspiration for the dialogue with the authorities and 
did not want to risk their ‘constructive’ relations with the regime. However, even 
‘traditional’ trade unions were allowed to criticize the government and sometimes 
went as far as to call on Dmitry Medvedev’s cabinet to resign. The official mass 
media paid attention to the protests. Protesters did not face any significant police 
obstruction or repressions, although some rallies were banned. The regime, again, 
responded to claims from below, as President Putin amended and softened the 
reform.  
In fact, trade unions pursued an additional goal, besides the prevention of the 
reform. They aimed to improve their positions within the existing hegemonic 
formation. On the whole, the strengthening of trade unions as part of the hege-
monic formation leads to its diversification by the development of deliberative 
procedures. The diversification in turn contributes to the sustainability of the 
formation. Aspiring for dialogue, trade unions deescalated the protests and avoided 
antagonism.  
Lazarus highlights the connection between social movements and parlia-
mentarianism. It should not be understood as a mere cooptation of protesters into 
legislatures. It means that social and labor protests result in an accommodation 
between grassroots movements and the regime.  
My study of trade unions and their activities in Russia suggests the need to 
reconsider theories used to explain protest movements. The application of the 
notions of transformism and democratic politics to empirical evidence from 
Russia uncovers a highly significant logic of grassroots movements’ operation 
under authoritarianism. Even if these movements are led by independent organiza-
tions, they coexist with the regime and cooperate with the authorities. By encour-
aging such cooperation, the regime reinforces its own sustainability by providing 
zones where independent protests can exist within the hegemonic formation. 
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Since trade unions prefer to cooperate with the authorities, expansion of 
protests led by trade unions may result in democratic politics. Democratic politics 
is characterized not only by posing particular and isolated demands. What is also 
important is the avoidance of antagonism and prioritization of dialogue and public 
debate. Democratic politics does not break with, but settles into the existing hege-
monic formation. 
Therefore, transformistic processes contribute to the survival of the existing 
regime in Russia. Regularly occurring social and labor protests do not lead to the 
emergence of a political subject. Contrarywise, they are channeled to discussions 
and mutual concessions between the protesters and the authorities. Trade unions 
play an important role in the functioning of transformism. Although they organize 
successful social and labor protests, trade unions facilitate the ongoing accom-
modation between the state and dissatisfied groups. This results in the expansion 
and strengthening of the existing hegemonic formation.  
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Ametiühingud, transformism ja Vene autoritarismi püsimine 
Väitekiri uurib Venemaal toimuvate sotsiaalsete ja tööprotestide ohjeldamise ja 
neutraliseerimise mehhanisme. Kuigi majandusraskused ja valitsuse poliitika 
põhjustavad rohujuuretasandil regulaarselt rahulolematust ja sütitavad konflikte, 
ei kujuta need endast režiimile mingit poliitilist katsumust. Nendest arvukatest 
protestidest mõned saavutavad formaalse võidu, kui võimud rahuldavad altpoolt 
esitatud nõudmisi. Samal ajal jääb see edu lokaalseks, mis aitab kaasa valitseva 
rež iimi elujõulisusele ega tõsta protestijate mobiliseerimise suutlikkust. Käesolev 
doktoritöö põhineb transformismi kontseptsioonil, mille pakkus välja Antonio 
Gramsci ja mille poststrukturalistliku tõlgenduse esitas Ernesto Laclau. Trans-
formism viitab protsessidele, mille käigus protestijate nõudmisi rahuldatakse 
valitseva poliitilise ja ühiskondliku korra raames. Transformismi kasutatakse 
olemasoleva hegemoonilise formatsiooni ehk sotsiaalsete rühmade ja diskursuste 
hierarhilise bloki säilitamiseks. Lokaalsete nõudmiste rahuldamine transfor-
mistlike protsesside kaudu võimaldab hegemoonilisel formatsioonil tulla toime 
potentsiaalselt vaenulike jõududega ja deeskaleerida sotsiaalseid konflikte. 
Nende mõistetega kaasneb demokraatliku ja populistliku poliitika eristamine. 
Demokraatlik poliitika areneb olemasoleva valitsussüsteemi piires, populistlik 
poliitika on aga valitseva korra suhtes antagonistlik. Transformistliku paradigma 
lõksu jäädes tekitavad rohujuuretasandi protestid demokraatlikku poliitikat, kuna 
väldivad režiimi vastu astumist ega tegele populistliku poliitikaga. Väitekiri uurib 
transformismi toimimist Vene ametiühingute näitel. Ametiühingute tegevus on 
populistliku poliitika tekkimist takistavate transformistlike protsesside kõige 
silmatorkavam näide.  
Väitekiri tugineb poststrukturalistliku diskursusanalüüsi metoodikale, mille 
töötasid välja Ernesto Laclau ja Chantal Mouffe. Nende käsitlus eeldab, et dis-
kursuse elementidel pole püsivaid tähendusi. Laclau ja Mouffe’i järgi on diskur-
sused üles ehitatud nn sõlmpunktide ehk privilegeeritud diskursiivsete elementide 
peale. Teiste elementide tähendus diskursuses määratakse sõltuvalt nende seosest 
sõlmpunktidega. Sellest vaatenurgast lähtudes on diskursusanalüüsi eesmärgiks 
tuvastada sõlmpunktid ja uurida nende semantilist suhet teiste elementidega. 
Väitekiri uurib Venemaa hegemoonilist diskursust ning alamklasside ja ameti-
ühingute positsioone hegemoonilises formatsioonis. Hegemooniline diskursus 
kujutab alamklasse poliitilise stabiilsuse pooldajatena. Hegemooniline format-
sioon ei välista rohujuuretasandi proteste täielikult, vaid hõlmab konkreetseid 
tsoone, kus proteste lubatakse ja talutakse. Hegemoonilises diskursuses on näha 
ka demokraatliku retoorika elemente, mis soodustavad rohujuure tasandi aktivismi 
juhul, kui need tegevused ei kahjusta stabiilsust. 
Hegemoonilist diskursust analüüsitakse kahte tüüpi allikate põhjal, mis seda 
diskursust iseloomustavad. Esimesse kuuluvad ametlikud tekstid, näiteks presi-
dendi sõnavõtud ja presidendi ning peaministri avaldused. Teise allikate grupi 
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moodustavad peamiste valitsusmeelsete meediaväljaannete materjalid. Valim 
sisaldab artikleid, mis käsitlevad Venemaa režiimi ja alamklasside vahelisi suhteid. 
Väitekiri analüüsib kõigepealt ametiühingute struktuuri, toimimist ja dis-
kursusi ning keskendub seejärel konkreetsetele juhtumitele, mis iseloomustavad 
ametiühingute tegevust Venemaa loodeosa kolmes regioonis. Samuti käsitletakse 
2018. aasta pensionireformi vastast üleriigilist kampaaniat. Ametiühingud osa-
levad regulaarselt sotsiaalsetes ja töökonfliktides, korraldades kohalikke proteste, 
mille käigus saavutatakse sageli järeleandmisi nii tööandjatelt kui ka võimudelt. 
Väitekiri näitab, et Venemaa režiim ja riik lubavad ning sallivad sotsiaalseid ja 
tööproteste, kui need protestid jäävad rohujuuretasandi nõuete legitiimseks 
väljendamiseks aktsepteeritud piiridesse. Ametiühingud püüdlevad tavaliselt 
dialoogi ja koostöö poole riigi ja eriti kohalike omavalitsustega. Nad püüavad 
töökonfliktide käigus saada harilikult kohalike omavalitsuste toetust. Kui ameti-
ühingud lähevad kohaliku omavalitsusega vastuollu, püüavad töölisorganisat-
sioonid saavutada kõrgete ametnike soosingut. Üldiselt peab riik ametiühinguid 
töötajate legitiimseteks esindajateks. 
Uuringu empiiriline osa keskendub Venemaa kahele suurimale ametiühingute 
liidule. Nendeks on 20 miljoni liikmega Venemaa Sõltumatute Ametiühingute 
Föderatsioon ja kahe miljoni liikmega Venemaa Tööjõu Keskliit. Ametiühingute 
diskursuste uurimise käigus analüüsitakse väitekirjas nende organisatsioonide 
programmilisi dokumente ja juhtide avaldusi oluliste poliitiliste küsimuste kohta. 
Uuring viitab mitmele kattuvale aspektile ametiühingute ja võimude diskursuste 
vahel, ühe olulisena seisukohana saab välja tuua, et valitseb üksmeel selles, et 
sotsiaalsed või tööprotestid ei tohiks õõnestada poliitilist stabiilsust. 
Lisaks diskursusanalüüsile tugineb empiiriline uurimus 11 süvaintervjuule 
ametiühingute aktivistidega kolmest Loode-Venemaa piirkonnast: Leningradi 
oblastist, Karjala Vabariigist ja Pihkva oblastist. Nende piirkondade ameti-
ühingud osalevad arvukatel meeleavaldustel ja teevad samal ajal koostööd kohalike 
omavalitsustega. Intervjuud võimaldavad mõista ametiühingute tegevust osa-
lejate endi perspektiivist. Ühelt poolt saavad ametiühingud riigivõimude ja 
omavalitsustega koostööd tehes kohalikke probleeme edukalt lahendada, teisalt 
aga on selle tegevuse tulemuseks protestide potentsiaali neutraliseerimine ja 
alamklasside depolitiseerimine.  
Ametiühingute valik keskenduda dialoogile ametivõimudega mõjutab sotsiaal- 
ja tööprotestide arengut Venemaal. Ametiühingud suunavad spontaanse rohu-
juuretasandi rahulolematuse erinevatesse aruteluformaatidesse, nagu näiteks 
ametiühingute ja ametivõimude vahelised konsultatsioonid ja parlamentaarsed 
menetlused. Ametiühingute tegevuse eesmärgiks on pidada tõsiseltvõetavat 
dialoogi meeleavaldajate ja võimude vahel. See strateegia eeldab, et dialoogil on 
oma väärtus, ja see võib olla mõistlik kohalike konfliktide kontekstis. 2018. aasta 
üleriigiline pensionireformi vastane kampaania näitas aga selle strateegia eba-
efektiivsust. Pensionireform põhjustas massilist rahulolematust ja proteste, mis 
kogusid rahva seas laialdast toetust. Reformivastase kampaania korraldamises 
osalenud ametiühingud eelistasid aga petitsioonide esitamist ja hakkasid peagi 
konflikti deeskaleerima. Spontaanne rohujuuretasandi rahulolematus suunati 
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protestide asemel parlamentaarsetesse menetlustesse ja avalikesse aruteludesse 
ning lõpuks viidi reform läbi vaid väheoluliste muudatustega. 
Üldiselt omavad ametiühingud Venemaa protestiliikumises olulist tähtsust. 
Nad tekitavad sotsiaalseid ja töökonflikte ja mängivad nendes aktiivset rolli. 
Mõned ametiühingute eestvedamisel toimunud protestid on edukad ja nende poolt 
esitatud ning toetatud rohujuuretasandi nõudmised rahuldatakse. Protestidega 
seotud läbirääkimiste kaudu suunatakse aga sotsiaalsed ja tööjõukonfliktid 
kohalikesse kokkulepetesse võimude ja töötajate vahel. Seega neutraliseerib 
transformism protestiliikumisi ja aitab kaasa autoritaarse režiimi püsima-
jäämisele.  
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